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Abstract 
Producers and exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables from developing countries like Brazil 
are increasingly required to demonstrate the safety and traceability of their produce up to the 
consumption stage. In order to access international markets such as the European Union (EU) 
and the United States (US), fruits producers need to meet the requirements from the buyers 
and comply increasingly with certification systems. In Brazil, these are specifically the 
Integrated Fruit Production (PIF), GlobalGAP, Fairtrade and Organic certification schemes. 
Not clear is the impact these certification schemes have on Brazilian fruit farmers. There is 
some evidence in the literature, that certification contributes positively to the development of 
specific export sectors in developing countries. In fact, the Brazilian export market is still 
relatively underdeveloped, with an export share of only 2.4% of the total produced volume. 
However, certification may also have the effect of a non-tariff trade barrier, undermining the 
capability and financial ability of especially small-scale farmers in exporting to international 
markets. This study, therefore, aims at providing an economic analysis of certification in the 
Brazilian fruit chain. 
A survey of 303 grapes and mango farmers was conducted in 2006 in the Juazeiro/Petrolina 
region of the Sao Francisco Valley in Brazil. The survey continued interviewing 85 cashew 
nuts farmers and conducting six case studies with melon growers in the Serra do Mel/Mossoró 
region in the semi-arid zone of the Northeast of Brazil. Certified and non-certified farmers as 
well as those in process to obtain certification were included in the sample.  
To analyze the primary data, a conceptual framework of the marketing chain and the farmers’ 
adoption decision was first developed. Then, different theoretical and empirical approaches 
which are relevant for the analysis of certification, were added to the framework. The 
descriptive analysis has been complemented by some econometric models. The LOGIT model 
was used three times: first, for identifying the determinants of the adoption of certification and 
second, for determining the factors relevant for adopting two versus one certification scheme, 
and third, for testing the main factors that lead farmers to adopt specifically PIF. Several tests 
were performed to check the robustness of the models.  
Comparative analyses between certified and non-certified farmers of grapes, mango, melon 
and cashew nuts show that certified farmers receive higher net income than non-certified 
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farmers. The net income of the farmers in process is slightly lower compared to certified 
farmers. The higher net income partly derives from the price premium paid for the certified 
fruits. Certified mango and grapes farmers have received an increased price per kg of 58% 
and 28%, respectively. Cashew nuts farmers receive the highest rates: 82% per kg of nuts and 
62% per kg of kernel. Melon producers do not receive a price premium after adopting 
certification, but certification enables them to remain in the market. Other benefits identified 
refer particularly to environmental, health and food safety aspects. The costs of certification 
are found to be of minor importance, especially since financial support is provided by 
Brazilian governmental organizations like SEBRAE and EMBRAPA. Investments due to 
certification are partly considerable, but are outweighed by higher productivity and price 
premia. The price premia of small-scale farmers have been found to be lower compared to 
those of the medium-scale farmers, but the farmers are still able to compete.  
The logistic estimates show that education and the years of experience mostly have a positive 
and significant effect on the decision to adopt certification. The chances to certify decrease, 
however, when farmers are dependent on the income from non-agricultural activities, are 
living in rural villages and not on the farm and trade with an individual buyer using a verbal 
trust-based arrangement. The estimates on separate grapes and mango models also find the 
size of the farms and the share of the current irrigated area to negatively contribute to the 
chances of adoption. The decision of mango and grapes farmers to adopt two instead of only 
one certificate was found to be influenced by whether the farmer can made use of the packing 
house from the group, cooperative or association. Variables such as ‘years trading with the 
buyer’ and ‘living in the city’ have negative and significant influence on the decision making.  
An analysis of the grapes and mangoes marketing chains reveals that certified producers 
generally trade with groups, cooperatives or associations, while non-certified farmers trade 
with individual buyers. Groups, cooperatives and associations generally contribute to upgrade 
mostly certified farmers. Written contracts are more often found between groups and farmers. 
Uncertified farmers, however, trade more often with individual buyers based on verbal 
contracts. Such marketing chains are less vertically integrated and present low asset 
specificity.  
Keywords: fruits, certification, logit model, marketing chain, Brazil 
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Kurzfassung 
Von Produzenten und Exporteuren von frischem Obst und Gemüse aus Entwicklungsländern 
wie Brasilien wird zunehmend verlangt, die Sicherheit und Rückverfolgbarkeit ihrer 
Erzeugnisse bis zur Stufe des Konsums nachzuweisen. Um Zugang zu den internationalen 
Märkten wie der Europäischen Union (EU) und den Vereinigten Staaten (US) zu erhalten, 
müssen Fruchtproduzenten den Anforderungen von Abnehmern gerecht werden und 
Zertifizierungssystemen in zunehmendem Maße nachkommen. Diese umfassen in Brasilien 
die ‚Integrierte Frucht-Produktion’ (PIF), ‚GlobalGAP’, ‚Fairtrade’ und die Zertifizierung des 
organischen Anbaus. Nicht geklärt sind die Auswirkungen der Zertifizierungsanforderungen 
auf brasilianische Obstanbauer. In der Literatur gibt es Anhaltspunkte, dass Zertifizierung 
positiv zur Entwicklung entsprechender Exportsektoren in Entwicklungsländern beiträgt. 
Tatsächlich ist der brasilianische Exportmarkt bezüglich des Obsts mit einem Exportanteil 
von nur 2,4% am produzierten Gesamtvolumen verhältnismäßig schwach entwickelt. 
Zertifizierung kann jedoch auch den Effekt einer nicht tarifären Handelsbeschränkung haben 
und das Leistungsvermögen sowie die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit besonders von 
Kleinbauern beim Exportieren in Weltmärkte schwächen. Vor diesem Hintergrund strebt die 
vorliegende Arbeit eine ökonomische Analyse der Zertifizierung in der brasilianischen 
Wertschöpfungskette von Früchten an.  
Dazu wurde im Jahre 2006 eine Befragung von 303 Trauben- und Mangoproduzenten in der 
Region Juazeiro/Petrolina innerhalb des Sao Francisco Tals in Brasilien durchgeführt. Zudem 
wurden 85 Produzenten von Cashewnüssen befragt und 6 Fallstudien mit Anbauern von 
Melonen aus der Region Serra do Mel/Mossoró durchgeführt, einer semi-ariden Zone im 
Nordosten Brasiliens. In der Stichprobe befanden sich zertifizierte und nicht zertifizierte 
Produzenten sowie solche, die sich noch im Zertifizierungsprozess befinden.  
Um die Primärdaten zu analysieren, wurde zuerst ein konzeptioneller Rahmen der 
Vermarktungsbeziehungen und der Zertifizierungsentscheidung der Produzenten entwickelt. 
Dann wurden verschiedene theoretische und empirische Ansätze, die für die Analyse der 
Zertifizierung relevant sind, dem konzeptionellen Rahmen hinzugefügt. Die deskriptive 
Analyse wurde durch verschiedene ökonometrische Modelle ergänzt. Drei LOGIT-Modelle 
wurden durchgeführt: Zuerst zur Prüfung der Determinanten in Bezug auf die Entscheidung 
für die Annahme der Zertifizierung; zweitens, ein Modell zur Bestimmung der relevanten 
Faktoren für die Annahme zweier oder lediglich eines Zertifizierungssystems, und drittens, 
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die Prüfung der Hauptfaktoren, welche die Produzenten dazu veranlasst, sich nach PIF 
zertifizieren zu lassen. Verschiedene Tests wurden zur Überprüfung der Modellrobustheit 
durchgeführt.  
Vergleichende Analysen zwischen den zertifizierten und nicht zertifizierten Anbauern von 
Trauben, Mangofrüchten, Melonen und Cashewnüssen haben gezeigt, dass zertifizierte 
Produzenten ein höheres Nettoeinkommen im Vergleich zu nicht zertifizierten Farmern 
erzielen. Das Netteinkommen der Produzenten, die sich noch im Zertifizierungsprozess 
befinden, fällt etwas geringer aus im Vergleich zu zertifizierten. Das höhere Nettoeinkommen 
lässt sich teilweise von dem Preisaufschlag für zertifizierte Früchte ableiten. Zertifizierte 
Anbauer von Mangofrüchten und Trauben haben eine Preissteigerung von 58% respektive 
28% pro kg zu verzeichnen. Anbauer von Cashewnüssen erzielen die höchsten Anstiegsraten: 
82% pro kg Nüsse und 62% pro kg der Kerne. Produzenten von Melonen erhalten keinen 
Preisaufschlag nach Zertifizierung; sie ermöglicht es ihnen aber, im Markt zu bleiben. Weitere 
Vorteile schließen Umweltaspekte, Gesundheit und Aspekte der Nahrungsmittelsicherheit mit 
ein. Die Kosten der Zertifizierung sind von geringerer Bedeutung, besonders, da finanzielle 
Unterstützung durch brasilianische Regierungsorganisationen wie SEBRAE und EMBRAPA 
gewährt wird. Die für die Zertifizierung notwendigen Investitionen sind zwar teils 
beträchtlich, werden aber durch höhere Produktivitäts- und Preisaufschläge wieder 
übertroffen. Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kleinbauern geringere Preisaufschläge erhalten 
verglichen mit größeren Betrieben, dass die Produzenten aber noch in der Lage sind, auf dem 
Markt zu konkurrieren.  
Die Schätzung der logistischen Regression zeigt, dass Ausbildung und Erfahrung meist einen 
positiven signifikanten Effekt auf die Entscheidung haben, sich zertifizieren zu lassen. Die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Zertifizierung nimmt jedoch ab, wenn die Produzenten von 
Einkommen aus nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Tätigkeit abhängig sind, in Dörfern und damit 
nicht auf dem landwirtschaftlichen Hof leben und mit einzelnen Kunden handeln, mit denen 
auf Vertrauen basierte verbale Abmachungen bestehen. Die Schätzungen separater Modelle 
für Trauben und Mangofrüchte zeigen, dass sich zusätzlich die Größe der Höfe und der Anteil 
der bewässerten landwirtschaftlichen Fläche negativ auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Annahme 
einer Zertifizierung auswirken. Die Entscheidung der Mango- und Traubenproduzenten, zwei 
Zertifizierungssysteme anstatt eines anzunehmen, wird davon beeinflusst, ob der Produzent 
eine Kühllagerung einer Kooperativen nutzen kann. Variablen wie „die Anzahl der Jahre, die 
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mit dem Abnehmer zusammengearbeitet wird“ sowie dem „Leben in einer Stadt“ haben einen 
negativen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Entscheidung. 
Die Analyse der Wertschöpfungsketten von Trauben und Mangofrüchte zeigt, dass 
zertifizierte Produzenten im Allgemeinen mit Kooperativen Handel betreiben, während nicht 
zertifizierte Produzenten mit einzelnen Kunden handeln. Zudem tragen Kooperativen im 
Allgemeinen dazu bei, dass sich zertifizierte Produzenten innerhalb der Wertschöpfungskette 
meistens verbessern können. Schriftliche Verträge werden häufig zwischen Gruppen und 
Produzenten geschlossen. Nicht zertifizierte Produzenten handeln hingegen häufig mit 
einzelnen Kunden, wobei der Handel auf mündlichen Verträgen basiert. Solche 
Vermarktungsbeziehungen sind weniger vertikal integriert und weisen eine geringere 
Produktspezifität auf. 
Schlüsselwörter: Früchte, Zertifizierung, LOGIT Modell, Vermarktungsbeziehungen, 
Brasilien 
  ix
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .........................................................................................................II 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................. IV 
KURZFASSUNG ........................................................................................................................ VI 
LIST OF TABLES .....................................................................................................................XII 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. XIV 
LIST OF APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... XIV 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................XV 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................XV 
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................1 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................1 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY ...............................................................................................4 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ...............................................................................................5 
2 CERTIFICATION: LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................6 
2.1 CERTIFICATION.................................................................................................................6 
2.1.1 Definition and purposes ..............................................................................................6 
2.1.2 Different types of standards ........................................................................................7 
2.1.3 Information asymmetries ............................................................................................9 
2.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES .....................................................................11 
2.2.1 Cost-benefit approach ...............................................................................................11 
2.2.2 Global value chain approach.....................................................................................12 
2.2.3 Diffusion of innovation approach .............................................................................16 
2.2.4 Transaction cost approach.........................................................................................18 
2.2.5 Macro level approach................................................................................................20 
2.2.6 Logistic regression model .........................................................................................20 
2.2.7 Other approaches.......................................................................................................22 
2.3 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................24 
3 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK...........................................26 
3.1 CONCEPL OF THE MARKETING CHAIN ..............................................................................26 
3.2 VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS.................................................................................................27 
3.2.1 Definition and types of value chains.........................................................................27 
3.2.2 Governance: definition and determinants .................................................................29 
3.2.3 Upgrading..................................................................................................................32 
3.3 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) ........................................................................33 
3.3.1 Definition and characteristics....................................................................................33 
3.3.2 Behavioral assumptions ............................................................................................34 
3.3.3 Transaction dimensions.............................................................................................35 
3.3.4 Institutional environment ..........................................................................................36 
3.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CERTIFICATION DECISION ....................................37 
3.5 SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES .........................................................................................40 
4 BRAZILIAN FRUIT SECTOR: BACKGROUND INFORMATION, SURVEY 
AREAS AND DATA COLLECTION...............................................................................42 
  x
4.1 ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF FRUIT PRODUCTION IN BRAZIL ............................................42 
4.1.1 Fruit production in Brazil..........................................................................................42 
4.1.2 Fruit production in the survey regions ......................................................................46 
4.2 POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS OF BRAZIL’S FRUIT SECTOR................................................49 
4.2.1 Importance of organizations in the Petrolina/Juazeiro region...................................49 
4.2.2 Importance of organizations in the Mossoró/Serra do Mel region............................52 
4.3 SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION .........................................................................53 
4.3.1 Mango and grapes .....................................................................................................53 
4.3.2 Cashew nuts ..............................................................................................................55 
4.3.3 Melons.......................................................................................................................55 
4.3.4 Data cleaning and missing data.................................................................................57 
5 CERTIFICATION IN THE FRUIT SECTOR IN BRAZIL ...........................................58 
5.1 THE ROLE OF CERTIFICATION IN BRAZIL .........................................................................58 
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF EACH CERTIFICATION SCHEME ..............................................................61 
5.2.1 Integrated Fruit Production (PIF)..............................................................................61 
5.2.1.1 Definition and objectives ..................................................................................61 
5.2.1.2 Description of the requirements........................................................................62 
5.2.1.3 Certifying steps and monitoring .......................................................................65 
5.2.2 GlobalGAP................................................................................................................66 
5.2.2.1 Definition and objectives ..................................................................................66 
5.2.2.2 Description of the requirements........................................................................66 
5.2.2.3 Certifying steps and monitoring .......................................................................68 
5.2.2.4 Benchmarking among GlobalGAP and other schemes.....................................69 
5.2.3 Fairtrade ....................................................................................................................70 
5.2.3.1 Definition and objectives ..................................................................................70 
5.2.3.2 Description of the requirements........................................................................71 
5.2.3.3 Steps to acquire certification and monitoring ...................................................73 
5.2.4 Organic certification..................................................................................................73 
5.2.4.1 Definition and requirements .............................................................................73 
5.2.4.2 Procedure to certify and monitoring .................................................................77 
5.2.5 Summary ...................................................................................................................77 
5.3 THIRD COUNTRY STANDARDS AFFECTING BRAZILIAN FRUITS EXPORTS ...........................78 
6 DATA ANALYSIS OF THE FRUIT SECTORS..............................................................80 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SURVEY .......................................................................80 
6.1.1 Socio-economic factors.............................................................................................80 
6.1.2 Characteristics of the farms.......................................................................................81 
6.1.3 Investments and certification costs ...........................................................................85 
6.1.4 Benefits of certification.............................................................................................87 
6.1.5 Availability of information .......................................................................................90 
6.1.6 Future expectation and perspectives .........................................................................93 
6.1.7 Summary ...................................................................................................................93 
6.2 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS .................................................................................................94 
6.2.1 Description of variables and data used in the logistic regression .............................94 
6.2.2 Estimation procedure ................................................................................................97 
6.2.3 Econometric estimates for the all fruits model .......................................................100 
6.2.4 Econometric estimates for the mango and grapes models ......................................102 
6.2.5 Econometric estimates for the cashew nuts model..................................................105 
6.2.6 Summary .................................................................................................................106 
  xi
7 COMPARATIVE ANALYSES ........................................................................................108 
7.1 MARKETING CHAIN ANALYSIS ......................................................................................108 
7.1.1 Marketing chain analysis for mango and grapes sectors.........................................108 
7.1.2 Marketing chain of the cashew nuts sector .............................................................115 
7.1.3 Marketing chain analysis of the melon sector.........................................................118 
7.1.4 Summary .................................................................................................................120 
7.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CERTIFIED PRODUCERS AND FARM’ SIZES .........................121 
7.2.1 Certified mango and grapes farmers: one versus two certificates...........................121 
7.2.2 Comparative analysis by certification scheme........................................................123 
7.2.3 Comparative analysis of different mango and grapes size farms............................125 
7.2.4 Summary .................................................................................................................128 
7.3 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS ...............................................................................................128 
7.3.1 Description of variables and data used in the logistic regression ...........................128 
7.3.2 Econometric estimates for the decision of adopting two versus one certificate .....131 
7.3.3 Econometric estimates for the decision of adopting PIF.........................................134 
7.3.4 Summary .................................................................................................................136 
8 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................137 
8.1 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................137 
8.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATION ..........................................................................................143 





List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Arm’s length and obligatory contracting ...................................................................14 
Table 2.2: Relationship between farmers and buyers in the marketing chain ............................15 
Table 2.3: Results on fruit trade between Brazilian exporters and British importers .................19 
Table 2.4: Summary of the main studies in the horticulture sector categorized by the 
approach ...................................................................................................................25 
Table 3.1: Comparison between producer-driven and buyer-driven chains ...............................29 
Table 3.2: Determinants of global value chain governance........................................................31 
Table 4.1: Brazilian fruit production in 2004 .............................................................................43 
Table 4.2: Brazilian fresh fruit exports in 2004 ..........................................................................44 
Table 4.3: Participation of the main states of the country in fruit exports in 2004.....................45 
Table 4.4: Destination of Brazilian fruit exports to European Union and United States, in 
percentages, 2003-2005............................................................................................46 
Table 4.5: Population and sample sizes of the producers in Juazeiro/Petrolina .........................54 
Table 4.6: Population of grapes and mango farmers in the region .............................................54 
Table 4.7: Population and sample sizes of the producers, in Mossoró region ............................55 
Table 4.8: Population of the melon producers in Mossoró region..............................................56 
Table 4.9: Case studies selected according to the type of producer ...........................................57 
Table 5.1: Number of and area occupied by Brazilian producers certified with GlobalGAP 
in 2007......................................................................................................................59 
Table 5.2: Positive and negative aspects of having certification ................................................60 
Table 5.3: Description of the PIF requirements according to the Normative N. 11 and N. 12...62 
Table 5.4: Summary of the thematic areas of the PIF book keeping 1 .......................................64 
Table 5.5: Summary of the thematic areas of the PIF book keeping 2 .......................................64 
Table 5.6: Summary of the thematic areas of post-harvesting book keeping .............................65 
Table 5.7: Summary of GlobalGAP points of control and compliance criteria..........................67 
Table 5.8: Description of the Fairtrade requirements .................................................................72 
Table 5.9: Description of the organic requirements....................................................................75 
Table 6.1: Farm characteristics of mango and grapes farmers ...................................................83 
Table 6.2: Cost of new infrastructure, reconstruction and tests for mango and grapes 
farmers......................................................................................................................86 
Table 6.3: Benefits of certification in the case of mango and grapes .........................................88 
Table 6.4: Benefits of certification in the case of cashew nuts...................................................89 
Table 6.5: Availability of information for mango and grapes farmers .......................................91 
Table 6.6: Availability of information for cashew nuts farmers.................................................92 
Table 6.7: List of variables for the econometric analysis ...........................................................97 
Table 6.8: Tests of endogeneity ‘productivity’ and ‘main source of income’ ............................99 
Table 6.9: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for all fruits producers.....102 
Table 6.10: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for mangoes producers ..104 
Table 6.11: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for grapes producers ......104 
Table 6.12: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for cashew nuts 
producers ................................................................................................................106 
Table 7.1: Description of the variables on marketing chain .....................................................110 
Table 7.2: Description of the variables on post-harvesting ......................................................112 
Table 7.3: Details on grapes and mango exports in 2005, percentage of the total volume.......113 
Table 7.4: Description of the variables on contractual arrangements.......................................114 
Table 7.5: Contractual trust-based arrangements......................................................................115 
Table 7.6: Final destination of cashew nuts and kernel production and modes of transport ....117 
  xiii
Table 7.7: Negotiations trust-based between buyer and producer of cashew nuts ...................118 
Table 7.8: Description of the variables: one certificate versus two certificates........................122 
Table 7.9: Comparison between the years the producer became certified [a] and the year 
he/she started to sell to a specific buyer [b] ...........................................................123 
Table 7.10: Comparing certification schemes...........................................................................125 
Table 7.11: Small and medium farm size .................................................................................126 
Table 7.12: Comparative analysis on the land size of all type of farmers ................................127 
Table 7.13: List of variables for the econometric analysis .......................................................131 
Table 7.14: Logistic regression results on the decision of mango farmers to adopt two 
versus one certificate..............................................................................................133 
Table 7.15: Logistic regression results on the certification decision of grapes farmers to 
adopt two versus one certificate .............................................................................134 
Table 7.16: Logistic regression results on the decision of mango farmers to adopt PIF ..........135 
Table 7.17: Logistic regression results on the decision of grapes farmers to adopt PIF...........136 
 
  xiv
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework on the marketing chain for certified and non-certified 
producers ...............................................................................................................27 
Figure 3.2: Determinants of producers’ decision to adopt certification...................................38 
Figure 4.1: The study sites .......................................................................................................47 
Figure 5.1: Number of producers with Integrated Fruit Production in 2006 ...........................58 
Figure 5.2: Summary of the PIF requirements.........................................................................63 
Figure 5.3: Summary of GlobalGAP requirements .................................................................68 
Figure 5.4: Summary of Fairtrade requirements......................................................................73 
Figure 7.1: Marketing chains of grapes and mangoes ...........................................................109 
Figure 7.2: Marketing chain of cashew nuts ..........................................................................116 
Figure 7.3: Marketing chain of the melon sector ...................................................................119 
  
List of Appendices 
Appendix 1: Map of the Northeast region of Brazil ..............................................................159 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire applied for mango and grapes producers with and without 
certification ......................................................................................................160 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire applied for cashew nuts producers with certification ................175 
Appendix 4: Case studies guide for melon farmers ...............................................................187 
Appendix 5: Comparison of GlobalGAP, PIF and Faitrade according to the similar 
requirements.....................................................................................................189 
Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics for the binary variable in the all fruits model, by 
sample and sub-sample categories ...................................................................190 
Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics for the binary variable in mango and grapes models, 
by sample and sub-sample categories ..............................................................190 
Appendix 8: Descriptive statistics for the binary variable in cashew nuts model by 
sample and sub-sample categories ...................................................................191 
Appendix 9: Logistic results for the all fruit model...............................................................192 
Appendix 10: Logistic results for the grapes model ..............................................................193 
Appendix 11: Logistic regression results for the mango model ............................................194 
Appendix 12: Logistic regression results for the cashew nuts model....................................195 
Appendix 13: Logistic regression results on the decision of mango farmers to adopt two 
certification schemes........................................................................................196 
Appendix 14: Logistic regression results on the decision of grapes farmers to adopt two 
certification schemes........................................................................................197 
Appendix 15: Logistic regression results on the decision of mango farmers to adopt PIF ...198 
Appendix 16: Logistic regression results on the decision of grapes farmers to adopt PIF....199 
  xv
List of Abbreviations 
ACR Arm’s Length Contractual Relation 
AGAPOMI Associacao Gaúcha dos Produtores de Maçã 
APEX Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
APHIS United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
BRC British Retail Consortium 
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
CEO Conformity Evaluation Organization 
CNPAT EMBRAPA Tropical Agro industry 
CNPQ National Council for Scientific and Technological Development 
CPATSA EMBRAPA Semi-Arid 
CODEVASF Sao Francisco River Valley Development Agency 
COEX Comitê Executivo de Fitossanidade do Rio Grande do Norte  
COOPERCAJU Cooperativa dos Beneficiadores Artesanais de Castanha de Caju do Rio 
Grande do Norte 
DAAD German Academic Exchange Service 
EC European Communities 
EMATER Institute of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension of Rio Grande do 
Norte 
EMBRAPA Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
ESAM Federal School of Agronomy in Mossoró 
EUREP Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group  
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations 
FLO Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International 
FOB Free on Board 
GAP Good Agricultural Practices 
GCC Global Commodity Chain 
GFSI Global Food Safety Initiative 
GLOBALGAP Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice 
GMO Genetically Modified Organisms 
GMP Good Manufecturing Practices  
GVC Global Value Chain 
  xvi
Ha hectare 
HACCP Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
IBD Institute of Biodynamic Certification Association 
IBGE Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
IBRAF Brazilian Fruit Institute 
INMETRO  National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality 
IFOAM International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements  
ILO International Labor Organization 
IPM Integrated Pest Management 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
Kg kilogram 
MAPA  Ministry of Agriculture, Food Supply and Livestock 
MDIC Ministry of Development Industry and Foreign Trade 
MRL Maximum Residue Level 
NIE New Institutional Economics 
OCR Obligation Contractual Relations 
OGS Organic Guarantee System 
PIF Integrated Fruit Production 
PNSQV National Plan of Security and Product Quality of Vegetal Origin 
RN Rio Grande do Norte state 
SEBRAE Support Agency for Small and Medium-sized Firms 
SFV Sao Francisco Valley 
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade  
TCE Transaction Cost Economics 
UK United Kingdom 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
US United States of America 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
VALEXPORT Producers and Exporters Association of the São Francisco River Valley 
WTO World Trade Organization 
ZEF Center for Development Research 
 




This thesis aims at providing a comprehensive economic analysis of certification in the main fruit 
chains in the region of Petrolina/Juazeiro in Pernambuco and Bahia states, and the Mossoró/Serra 
do Mel region in Rio Grande do Norte state in Brazil. These two regions are mainly responsible 
for the country’s total exports to the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This 
chapter presents the background, states the research problem, discusses the objectives and finally, 
outlines the structure of the thesis.   
1.1 Background and statement of the problem 
Several crises and scandals like the one on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) have 
shaken the European food sector over the last decades. Despite public regulations and government 
control, most of the BSE cases were not detected immediately, consequently leading to a decline in 
the consumer’s confidence in the safety and quality of many food products. As a result, the private 
sector in many European Union countries developed consumers’ protection strategies such as new 
quality labels based on control throughout the whole value chain (Caswell & Modjuska, 1996).  
The European retail chains have assumed a leading role in the formulation of food safety and 
quality standards. Their international supplier base, especially in developing countries, needs to 
adapt and comply, if they wish to continue trading with major retailers (FAO, 2007). It is widely 
recognized that quality and safety standards play an important role for developing countries, 
especially for their agricultural sectors. There is a growing concern that standards will undermine 
the competitive progress already made by some developing countries and present insurmountable 
barriers to new entrants in the high-value food trade (Jaffee et al., 2005). Henson & Loader (2001) 
find that Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) are the greatest impediment to developing 
countries’ exports to the EU, surpassing transport and other direct export costs, tariffs or 
quantitative restrictions.  
Nevertheless, food safety standards can also have positive implications for developing countries. 
These countries may gain and maintain access to markets of high-value agricultural and food 
products, especially in industrialized countries (Henson & Jaffee, 2007). From this standards-as-
catalyst angle, the challenge inherent in compliance with food safety and agricultural health 
standards may well provide a powerful incentive for the modernization of developing countries 
export supply chains and give greater clarity to the necessary and appropriate management 
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functions. Further, via increased attention to the spread and adoption of good practices in 
agriculture and food manufacture, there may be spillovers into domestic food safety and 
agricultural health to the benefit of the local population and domestic producers. Hence, part of the 
costs of compliance could be considered as investments into the national economy. 
Rather than degrading the comparative advantage of developing countries, enhancement of 
capacities to meet stricter standards could potentially create new forms of competitive advantage. 
Hence, the process of standards compliance could conceivably provide the basis for a more 
sustainable and profitable trade over the long term, albeit with some particular winners and losers 
(Jaffee & Henson, 2004).  
Fresh fruits are an example of a traditional agricultural export crop and they illustrate the potential 
for agricultural diversification and production of high-value crops. Brazil is the third largest 
producer of fruits among developing countries, after China and India. Its total production was 43.8 
million tons in 2004, representing 3.2 % of the production of all developing countries. However, it 
is estimated that only around 2% of the country fruit production (in terms of volume) is exported 
generating US$370 million (Brazilian Fruit Institute (IBRAF), 2004).  
Grapes and mango exports have been the most successful cases, with around 260,000 tons and 
550,000 tons each being cultivated. The region of Petrolina/Juazeiro, which is part of the Sao 
Francisco river basin, is responsible for this export performance. This region produced 99% and 
88% of the country’s grapes and mango exports (IBRAF, 2004). VALEXPORT (2006) estimates 
that the sector generates a total of 240,000 jobs directly and 960,000 jobs indirectly in the region.  
The states of Rio Grande do Norte, covering the Mossró/Serra do Mel, and Ceará is considered the 
second biggest irrigated tropical fruits region in Brazil with about 20,000 hectares (ha) (Costa et 
al., 2007). These two states are responsible for 98% of the country’s total exports of melons in 
2005 when almost 99% of the fruit is designated to the European Union. Rio Grande do Norte 
State is also responsible for its exports of 23% of the total Brazilian shelled cashew nuts in 2005 
(Aliceweb, 2007). Aiming at accessing international markets such as the European Union and the 
United States, farmers of mango, grape, cashew nut, and melon need to meet the requirements 
from the buyers and comply with different certification systems.  
Given the trend towards tighter food safety requirements in international markets, in 1999 Brazil 
started to develop the Integrated Fruit Production (PIF) scheme, a national quality assurance 
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program. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food Supply and Livestock (MAPA) requested the 
Brazilian Agricultural Research Company (EMBRAPA) to further develop the scheme for 
implementation. The pilot projects involved apples, grapes, mangoes and citrus. As part of the 
Fruit Production Development Program (PROFRUTA), this system contributed to strengthen the 
ties between the public and private sectors, to aim at improving quality, competitiveness and share 
of national fruits at the international level (Andrigueto et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, besides the effort of the Brazilian government in developing and implementing a 
national certification scheme, the acceptance at both national and international levels was below 
the expectation. Indeed, as Vitti & Cintra (2003) highlight, supermarkets in the European Union 
started to require the Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP) certification, 
instead of PIF, from Brazilian fruit exporters at the end of 2003.  
Thus, certification has become increasingly relevant as a marketing signal for agribusiness 
especially in the fruit sector over the past few years. Substantial parts of many value chains are by 
now certified by standards as GlobalGAP, Fair Trade, Integrated Fruit Production and Organic. 
However, it has hardly been researched how these approaches impact on the trade with different 
products, on various sizes of producers, and how they can actually ensure a high quality control. 
FAO (2004) also highlights that there are no systematic studies available which assess the impact 
of certification programs over a wide range of farms, crops and locations. However, a growing 
number of case studies have analyzed their impacts on various costs and profitability aspects.  
While there is a great deal of literature on the role of certification in the international fruit export 
market, only a few studies have concentrated on certification in the Brazilian fruit production. 
Among them, Cintra et al. (2002) focus on the impact of certification adoption by mango and 
grape farmers in the Sao Francisco Valley. The results show that certified producers have 
preference when buyers and traders are selected as potential exporters. In this line, Cavichiolli et 
al. (2005) argue that for Brazilian fruit producers, certification is considered a vital mechanism to 
comply in order to access international markets.  
Fruit and vegetable sectors are seen as sectors where small producers are able to participate due to 
their low demand on land and their high labor requirements. However, the concern is that small 
producers’ participation in the international fruit and vegetable trade could be diminishing as a 
result of the increasing prevalence of food quality standards in the sector (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005).  
Implementing certification and entering certified markets have complex impacts on the economic 
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performance of a farm. Production costs, yields and producer prices may each be affected 
positively or negatively by certification and have to be analyzed together. Furthermore, initial 
investment costs are likely to be very farm-specific (FAO, 2004).  
USAID (2005) argues that for some producers, standards may open new opportunities as they 
permit access to particular market segments. At the same time, the process of (re)distributing 
market shares is accompanied by marginalization and exclusion, as standards may impose 
prohibitively high barriers on certain producers in terms of short-run and long-run efforts needed 
for production under certification. This is particularly relevant since certification with private 
standards has become a major requirement for participation in the fruit and vegetable markets 
worldwide.  
Since fruits are perishable, disastrous quality losses can occur at any stage in the marketing chain 
from grower to consumer and the total value of the product may be lost. Hence, every activity in 
the production and marketing chain of fruits must be precisely timed (Jensen & Rorabaugh, 2007). 
The White Paper on Food Safety of the EU (2000) highlights that food safety needs to be 
organized in a more coordinated and integrated way, i.e. along the chain (farm to table), across all 
food sectors, within and beyond the frontiers of the EU.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This thesis aims at providing an economic analysis of certification in the Brazilian fruit chain with 
particular focus on four sectors: mangoes and grapes in the Petrolina/Juazeiro region, and cashew 
nuts and melons in the Serra do Mel/Mossoró region. It directs attention to the role certification 
plays in these sectors to assess the differences and the similarities between certified and non-
certified farmers. It also looks at the characteristics of the producers to determine the probability of 
adopting a certification scheme on a wider scale and conducts a comparative analysis of different 
certification schemes and land sizes. Identifying the type of global value chain governance and 
providing a theoretical explanation for the reasons that arise are important to generate a better 
understanding of different forms of inter-firm coordination and to provide tools for policy.  
More specifically, the objectives of the study are: 
• To assess the differences and similarities between certified and non-certified farmers; 
• To understand the functioning of the marketing chain of the four selected sectors; 
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• To identify the determinants which lead producers to adopt certification or not;  
• To assess the impact of certification on producers differing by size; 
• To assess the importance, the role and the differences of certification schemes (PIF, 
GlobalGAP, Organic and Fairtrade). 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the introduction of this study. Chapter 
2 describes relevant theories associated with empirical and theoretical evidence on the economic 
importance of certification. Chapter 3 provides the basic conceptual framework and describes the 
methodology of the thesis used for analyzing the decision to certify and for analyzing the 
marketing chain. Chapter 4 presents details of the data collection in the grapes, mangoes, melons 
and cashew nuts sectors as well as background information. Chapter 5 shows major trends 
regarding fruit production and certification in Brazil. The descriptive and analytical statistics of the 
survey and the comparative analyses are presented in chapter 6 and chapter 7, respectively. 
Chapter 8 closes the thesis by presenting the summary and policy recommendations. 
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2 Certification: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature which takes a critical look at the existing research on 
certification. It provides insights about the originality of this research and establishes the 
importance of certification for the development of the Brazilian fruit chain. Section 2.1 presents 
the definition of certification, types of standards and issues related to asymmetric information and 
monitoring. Section 2.2 describes the theoretical and empirical evidence of certification available 
in the literature. Section 2.3 briefly summarizes the chapter.  
2.1 Certification 
2.1.1 Definition and purposes 
Certification is a procedure by which a third party gives written assurance that a product, process 
or service is in conformity with certain standards. Thus, certification can be seen as a form of 
communication along the supply chain while the certificate demonstrates to the buyer that the 
supplier complies with certain standards (International Organization for Standardization ISO, 
1996). Similarly, “certification is the (voluntary) assessment and approval by an (accredited) party 
on an (accredited) standard” (Meuwissen et al., 2003:54). Schiefer (2003:4) mentions that 
“sustainable and effective certification must allow clearly identifiable segmentation through, e.g. 
branding of products from clearly specified supply chains”.  
In the agricultural and food industry sector, certification refers to all kinds of food products (juices, 
cereals and grain incl. rice, and even alcoholic beverages (wine etc.), sugar, meat, dairy products 
or eggs) which have been produced based on organic or bio-dynamic farming technologies or on 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM). Other non-food agricultural products like animal feeds (for 
production of organic meat, dairy products and eggs), grain seeds, natural pesticides and 
insecticides, cosmetics and textiles (cotton, leather and leather goods) may also be certified if they 
meet certain environmental criteria (Basu et al., 2004). 
According to El-Tawil (2002), certification is the process by which buyers assess the compliance 
with defined standards and is typically undertaken by a third party agency that the buyer 
recognizes as competent. A crucial issue for low and middle-income countries is the establishment 
of certification capacity and parallel institutions through which certification bodies are accredited.  
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The purpose of certification is to reach a defined performance and to make this perceptible to 
stakeholders. Stakeholders may include consumers, other customers, governments, risk-financing 
parties such as banks and insurance companies, or society as a whole. Also the company itself can 
be a stakeholder, since certification of food safety and traceability systems gives organizations a 
tangible approval of good practice and a tool for due-diligence defence in case of product safety 
(Henson & Holt, 2000). For stakeholders to regard certification as a valuable tool, they must trust 
the certification scheme as well as the certifying party. Also, there should be regular tests or audits 
(usually specified in the certification scheme) to verify whether the certified party still reaches the 
agreed performance level. 
On the one hand, implementing food safety standards can increase costs for firms. On the other 
hand, firms have incentives to protect their reputation, and so might implement state-of-the-art 
food safety practices without any prodding from the government. Additionally, as consumers 
might be willing to pay more for food that they perceive as safer, firms have another incentive to 
implement stricter food safety regimes. The higher prices consumers are willing to pay could 
compensate firms for the costs of food safety provision. A firm will adopt more stringent food 
safety practices if the cost is smaller than the resulting benefit to the firm in the form of reduced 
risk of losses, reduced liability, and higher consumer willingness to pay for the safer food 
(Mitchell, 2003).  
Certification can act to impede exports either because explicit bans are placed on imports of 
particular products or the cost of compliance with requirements diminishes export 
competitiveness. Standards can therefore be a source of competitive advantage for the developing 
countries if they upgrade capacity and make the necessary adjustments in the structure and 
operation of their supply chains. For many high-value foods, including fruits and vegetables, the 
challenges of international competitiveness have moved beyond price and basic quality parameters 
to greater emphasis on food safety. Indeed, rising food safety standards serve to accentuate supply 
chain strengths and weaknesses and thus, affect the competitive positions of countries and distinct 
market participants (Henson & Jaffee, 2004).  
2.1.2 Different types of standards 
Setting international standards has proven difficult due to the variety of circumstances that exist 
around the world. This is especially true for agricultural products, which have to respond to 
differences in climate, soils and ecosystems and are an integral part of cultural diversity. 
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Environmental and social standards are hence, often normative standards, i.e. generic standards or 
guidelines used as a framework by local standard-setting or certification bodies to formulate more 
specific standards. Nevertheless, standards developed in one particular country or geographical 
area may discriminate against producers of other countries or areas if they do not take into account 
different local conditions (FAO, 2003).  
The most widely-applied general standards systems are the Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Points (HACCP) and ISO 9000 required by the food industry. The HACCP system identifies 
specific hazards and establishes control systems that focus on prevention rather than on end-
product testing. In contrast, ISO standards are specific to a particular product, material or process. 
ISO 9000 examines if regulations for items are met. Thus, HACCP is a food safety meta-system 
and ISO 9000 is a quality management system. Both systems are applied by the processing food 
industries (Lee, 2006). 
Hobbs, Fearne & Spriggs (2002) compare the incentive structures in the food safety legislation and 
business strategies in the private sector in the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Australia. The 
comparisons highlight the importance of incentives for changes in determining the respective roles 
of public policy and private sector responses to food safety issues.  
Henson (2006) distinguishes between standards as being mandatory, voluntary and de facto. 
Mandatory or regulatory standards, named technical regulations by the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Agreement, are standards set by public institutions whose compliance is obligatory in the 
legal sense. Voluntary consensus standards arise from a formal coordinated process involving 
participants in a market with or without the participation of the government. Finally, de facto 
standards arise from an uncoordinated process of market-based competition of private firms. These 
standards refer to a set of specifications to gain market share through authority or influence. 
According to Schulze et al. (2006), there are public and private certification systems. 
Governmental certification systems, for instance, serve the consumer’s protection purposes by 
providing quality labels to improve market transparency (e.g. organic farming). Public certification 
systems help to prevent mislabeling through laws and fines enforced by public authorities. 
However, most certification schemes are privately organized. Certification procedures tend to be 
different depending on the purposes: either for consumer marketing or to meet the demands of 
institutional buyers.  
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Likewise, the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2005) has also divided standards into private or 
public. The distinction between them matters when considering whose interests on standards are 
set for. It is assumed that interests of all actors in society are considered in the case of public 
standards, while the private standards are chosen to maximize firms’ profits. Thus, private 
standards are by definition voluntary, but public ones can be either voluntary or mandatory1. 
2.1.3 Information asymmetries 
Information asymmetries occur when producers have information about the characteristics of the 
goods they produce which the consumers do not possess. Buyers are in a disadvantageous position 
compared to sellers, because the latter are well-informed about the goods or services as opposed to 
the buyers. Therefore, standards can increase welfare by removing information asymmetries in 
markets (WTO, 2005). Thus, the existence of asymmetric information increases the transaction 
costs on the one hand, and on the other, generates private incentives to decrease them. Moreover, 
food quality and safety standards are voluntarily accepted and applied by the firms to improve 
their competitiveness. This motivation guides the firms towards quality assurance systems 
(Holleran et al., 1999). 
The idea behind certification systems is to reduce existing information asymmetries, especially in 
the case of goods including credence attributes such as food safety, organic production and animal 
welfare. In the supply chain, consumers and suppliers are confronted with information uncertainty. 
Consumers are not able to detect opportunistic behavior. In order to reduce consumers’ and 
suppliers’ uncertainty, retailers and brand manufacturers tend to increasingly monitor their 
suppliers’ production process themselves via second party audits (Caswell et al., 1998).   
An analysis of a certification system focusing on its functioning reveals that certification systems 
include tendencies towards opportunistic behavior. Taking into consideration the great number of 
customers demanding certificates from their suppliers, producers are constantly under pressure to 
certify (Schulze et al., 2006). Moreover, Beck & Walgenbach (2003) emphasize that suppliers 
perceive certification schemes as externally imposed obligations instead of intrinsically motivated 
quality management systems.  
                                                 
1In WTO terminology mandatory standards are referred to as technical regulations under the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and also sanitary or phytosanitary measures under the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  
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Jahn, Schramm & Spiller (2005:56) denote that “certification systems and labeling imply 
multifaceted problems to which the parties involved have paid little attention so far: the central 
task of certification and the reduction of information asymmetry within the market can be fulfilled 
only if the institutions in charge succeed in assuring certification quality and thus, the validity of 
the audit signal”. However, the reliability of the quality labels and their effectiveness strongly 
depend on the type of external audits and their implementation. Usually the control process is 
carried out by independent certifiers who, in turn, have to meet criteria settled by agencies. Only if 
the certifiers succeed in revealing critical aspects and opportunistic behavior, quality assurance 
concepts will be able to build up the reputation necessary to serve as a reliable quality signal (Jahn, 
Schramm & Spiller, 2005). 
Depending on the information about the safety of the goods that is available to consumers, goods 
are classified into three categories. First, there are search goods. The consumer is able to obtain 
information about the safety of the good through inspection – consumers have nearly perfect 
information. The second category relates to experience goods. Consumers can get information on 
safety through repeated purchases or through reputations established by others. The third is 
credence goods. In this case, consumers cannot discern information on product safety, even after 
repeated purchases (Antle, 2001). Marette, Crespi & Schiavina (1999) observe that agricultural 
markets are working imperfectly due to asymmetric information, since the consumers lack perfect 
information about the product quality.  
Jahn, Schramm & Spiller (2004a) seek to investigate the audit quality of certification systems 
within the food sector, based on financial auditing. They assume that suppliers are not interested in 
the highest possible standard of inspection, but in acquiring a certificate as easily as possible. 
Since the risk of free rider behavior occurs, a strict inspection lowers the probability of successful 
certification. Therefore, suppliers have an incentive to select an auditor known to employ low 
inspection standards. Thus, certification systems offer a variety of incentives for inadequate 
inspections. The conclusion highlights that standards tend to be weak without a public regulation 
inspection. The authors also mention the factors influencing the audit quality. These are: effects on 
reputation (if there is no reputation, suppliers search for a certifier with low control efforts and 
inspection prices); protecting quasi-rents (the dependence of certification is diminished); 
intensifying liability (the quality of the certifier inspection increases) and improvement of 
inspection technology (certifiers can have varying levels of success with the same costs due to 
having different levels of know-how).  
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Deaton (2004) points out that third-party certifiers play an important role in the global food 
system. Third-party certifiers are external institutions that assess, evaluate and certify quality 
claims. The framework used by him highlights five concepts: uncertainty; information 
asymmetries; opportunistic behavior; divergences between private and social returns and signaling 
institutions. The benefits of third-party institutions result from their capacity to provide market 
signals. Indeed, the costs of receiving independent third-party certification are inversely related to 
a firm’s product quality.  
2.2 Theoretical and empirical evidences 
This section reviews the literature and outlines different approaches which have been used to 
examine relationships between certification and value chains. Both issues are closely related since 
certification may drive integration in the value chain. Special emphasis will be put on empirical 
examples from the food sector, in particular related to horticultural products.   
2.2.1 Cost-benefit approach 
A cost and benefit approach using qualitative variables from the food industry and the consumer’s 
perspective of different systems: food safety, hygiene, traceability and certification has been 
presented by Meuwissen et al. (2003). The discussion is around three aspects: (i) the positive effect 
on trade: all systems are an indicator of the quality and product background. Thus, certification 
facilitates the communication about it; (ii) enhancing license to produce: the use of types of 
systems and schemes depends on upgraded markets and introduction of new requirements, and (iii) 
price premium: uncertainty involves the consumer's willingness to pay for food safety systems and 
certification schemes. They conclude that, in general, more attention has been paid to technical 
issues of traceability and certification than to economic ones. They recommend that future studies 
should focus more on economic analyses than on technical aspects.  
Carambas (2007) conducts a cost-benefit analysis comparing certified organic and conventional 
rice producers in Thailand. The net returns for farmers of eco-labeled products were estimated and 
compared with those of conventional farmers. The difference in incomes per unit of eco-labeled 
and conventional products depends on the magnitude of the price premium. The costs involved in 
producing eco-labeled products relate to capital costs due to adjustments to new technologies, 
additional costs of production and processing and increase in labor requirements, additional cost of 
raw material, cost of testing and certification. However, financial, environmental and health 
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benefits also accrue to producers of labeled organic rice. Financial net benefits depend largely on 
the presence of a price premium.  
Gogoe (2003) evaluates the costs for small-scale producers of pineapples to implement the 
EurepGAP protocol in Ghana. The results indicate that there are considerable fixed costs 
associated with the upgrading of facilities and production procedures in order to comply with the 
protocol and that these can be a significant constraints for the small-scale farmers. However, once 
implemented, EurepGAP significantly reduced variable costs of production due in particular to 
more selective use of agrochemicals. Although there were no appreciable changes in yields as a 
result of the changes in production practices, both profits from pineapple production and overall 
farm incomes increased. Producers benefited from improvements in the overall management of 
production, more secure and longer-term relations with their major buyer, and continued 
participation in potentially lucrative export markets. There were also wider benefits, for example 
through better knowledge of the handling of agrochemicals and hygiene. 
Unnevehr & Jensen (2001) measure social costs and benefits of food safety regulations. The social 
benefits of improved food safety include restrictions in risks of morbidity and mortality associated 
with consuming contaminated food. The costs that result from regulations include four types: (i) 
compliance costs (costs incurred by firms which must change production processes to meet new 
standards – fixed cost or variable), (ii) government regulatory costs (cost to administer, as well as 
for plant monitoring and testing), (iii) social-welfare losses (from higher consumer prices) and (iv) 
transitional social costs (possible firm closings due to the firms’ inability to competitively meet 
standards).  
2.2.2 Global value chain approach  
 Value chain analysis is one of the most prominent approaches to analyze changing market 
structures and to develop suitable strategies for private sector development in developing 
countries. Several studies based on Global Value Chain (GVC) theory have been developed. In the 
1990s the concept of value added chains emerged as an approach to analyze and explain new 
forms of international trade. Certification schemes are used to ensure marketing claims for 
unobservable quality attributes and under asymmetric information, to guarantee process-oriented 
quality characteristics. 
Cook (2000) analyzes the implications of drivers on fresh fruit and vegetables value chain in the 
US market. She concludes that the fresh producing industry is clearly leading to a greater vertical 
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coordination of the distribution system via more supply chain oriented procurement models, 
despite the fact that conventional retailers are lagging mass merchandisers in this regard. The 
explosive growth of the Supercenter format is a compelling force that will continue to move 
conventional retailers in this direction. 
Schipmann (2006) aims at comparing international and national value chains with regard to 
potential benefits for smallholders and existing entry barriers to their integration in the chilli sector 
of Ghana. Her results have shown that international value chain integration may offer additional 
benefits compared to national value chains. In this manner, smallholders have the ability to 
improve their production skills and become integrated into higher value chains through appropriate 
incentives. Besides, the author finds that the integration promotion of the poorer population (e.g. 
smallholders) into the value chain is a useful instrument to promote large-scale pro-poor growth.  
Dolan, Humphrey & Pascal (1999) argue that the requirements of the UK supermarkets act as an 
effective barrier to participation of African small exporters in the chain. The authors argue that, on 
the one hand, relations which arise in the Obligatory Contracting environment are those capable of 
promoting quality. On the other hand, Arm’s-length Contracting is seen as a price type of relation, 
where there is little space for quality management discussions. Table 2.1 shows the distinction 
between Arm’s length Contractual Relations (ACR) and Obligatory Contractual Relations (OCR) 
used in the literature on buyer-supplier relations.  
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Table 2.1: Arm’s length and obligatory contracting 
 Arm’s Length Contractual Relation (ACR) Obligatory Contractual Relations (OCR) 
1. Transactional 
dependence 
Buyer seeks to maintain low dependence 
by trading with large number of competing 
suppliers. Suppliers seek to trade with 
many customers 
For both customers and suppliers, 
avoidance of independence is not a 
priority. Buyers and suppliers have 
few customers 
2. Ordering procedure 
and projected length of 
trading relationship 
Open bidding for orders. Short-term 
commitment desired and real 
Bidding may not take place; 
established suppliers tend to win 
continued business. Long-term 
commitment desired and real 
3. Inspection Inspection on delivery Little or no inspection on delivery 
for most parts. Costumer is involved 
in establishing and/or monitoring 
suppliers’ quality system. 
4. Technical assistance Expertise rarely pooled, and assistance 
only when paid for 
Extensive unilateral or bilateral 
technology transfer over time 
5. Communication Infrequent and through formal channels. 
Narrowly focused on purchasing 
departments  
Multi-channeled, frequent and often 
informal 
6. Risk sharing Risk resulting from price and demand 
fluctuations distributed according to 
explicit prior agreement  
Much sharing of risk. Gains and 
losses distributed on a case-by-case 
basis according to some principles 
of fairness 
Source: Dolan, Humphrey & Pascal (1999:8) based on Sako (1992:11-12) 
Dolan & Humphrey (2000) analyze the fresh vegetables trade between the UK and Kenya and 
Zimbabwe from the global commodity chains perspective. Additionally, they also pay particular 
attention to the governance of the chain, identifying the key decision-makers and how their 
requirements for the performance of the chain are translated into structure and practice. In 
particular, they highlight the role played by large retailers in defining the outputs and structure of 
the chain and the impact of supermarket requirements on exporters and producers of these 
countries. Three different aspects of governance in the horticulture value chain are identified:  
i) the positioning of the chain: the UK supermarkets decide what is offered to customers 
and which characteristics the products should have (quality, consistency, variety, 
processing, product combinations, packing, supply and price). It also involves the 
specification of the chain structure and the systems that ensure that the actor in the 
chain meets the performance standards;  
ii) the structure of the chain: the UK supermarkets increase the control in the chain 
shifting from wholesaler markets to a lower number of suppliers, by tightening the 
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links. Overall, the number of actors, the distribution in the chain and the relationships 
between them change;  
iii) meeting performance standards: producers and exporters wishing to supply the UK 
market need monitoring systems that ensure compliance with retail (product quality) 
and legislative (due diligence) requirements.  
The rising competition in the fresh fruit industry and the need to meet norms and standards related 
to e.g. product characteristics, the production process and its impact on food safety and on the 
environment has meant a changing relationship between growers and buyers. The alternative 
strategies of buyers like supermarkets include formal and informal contracts directly with farmers 
and the establishment of their own distribution centers, which allow them greater leverage in 
forcing their quality and safety norms and standards (Farina, 2002). The compliance on the 
producers’ side is driven by the demand of supermarkets on: varieties, production methods, post 
harvesting technologies, packaging and labeling specifications, and acceptable environmental 
impacts and working conditions.  The global value chain analysis emphasizes that local producers 
learn significantly from global buyers on how to improve their production processes in order to 
attain consistent high quality and to increase the speed of response (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002). 
There are different marketing chains for fruits and vegetables which differ among countries, crops 
and farmers. An important stage to understand is the first link in the production or marketing chain 
between the farmer and the trader. Some actors who can form this link are shown in Table 2.2, 
according to FAO (1989):  
Table 2.2: Relationship between farmers and buyers in the marketing chain 
Type of buyer Characteristics of the buyer 
Contractors Buy crops in the field and undertake the harvesting 
Agents, collectors or 
country wholesalers Buy the harvested crop at the farm 
Wholesalers Buy produce from farmers at firm prices and sell at the wholesale market for their own account 
Secondary wholesalers Buy at the wholesale market and transport the produce either to sell to retailers or at another wholesale market where prices are higher 
Semi-wholesalers Are located near the wholesale market and sell produce by the box either to small retail businesses or directly to consumers 
Commission agents Auction produce in a wholesale market on a commission basis 
Retailers Sell to the final consumer such as street hawkers, stall holders, retailers, greengrocers or supermarkets 
Source: Own compilation based on FAO (1989) 
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The banana market structure is for example very heterogeneous, depending on the producing and 
importing countries. The presence of diverse economic actors is also different among countries 
and regions at the several stages of the banana chain. Due to high perishability, bananas require a 
careful control of the growing, packaging, transport, ripening and distribution process. This leads 
to a highly vertically integrated banana sector, where large transnational companies tend to control 
from direct growing of bananas in producing countries, through ownership of specialized 
refrigerated shipping and ripening facilities to distribution networks in importing countries. An 
analysis of the banana marketing chain reveals that companies face the challenge of an increasing 
role that is being played by supermarkets and retail chains in the distribution of bananas in 
developed countries, mainly in the US and the EU. Supermarkets tend to build long-term 
relationships with preferred suppliers in order to guarantee a continuous supply at the required 
level of quality (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD, 2007). 
In another study UNCTAD (2007a) develops the international citrus marketing chain. International 
trade in the fresh citrus fruits sector is characterized by a reduced degree of concentration of 
supply with a multitude of medium-sized firms providing the fruit. On the contrary, orange juice 
trade is highly concentrated. A small number of companies that operate in Brazil and Florida 
dominate the market. The major supplier of orange juice in the world is Brazil, followed by the 
US. The most significant players in the distribution channels for orange juice and fruit juices are 
the global retail chains, responsible for more than 80% of the total exports to Europe. 
Cueller (2003) aims to identify challenges faced by retailers in different marketing specificities in 
the US market. The study reveals that the key issues in the marketing of imported fruits and 
vegetables among retailers are food safety assurance, transportation cost reduction and quality 
improvement. Further, the key issues in marketing include improving packaging, adding value to 
products and assuring food safety. 
2.2.3 Diffusion of innovation approach 
Rogers (1995) develops the diffusion of innovation theory, which offers an analytical framework, 
identifying the determinants of the innovativeness of the actors involved. Roger (2003:101) 
defines an innovation to be an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual. 
Diffusion is defined by Rogers (2003:5) as the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.  
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The diffusion theory relies on the assumption of a multistage decision model. Rogers (2003) has 
developed a five-stage model where the decision-making unit passes from hearing about an 
innovation for the first time, to forming an attitude towards the innovation, on to deciding whether 
to adopt or to reject it, to implementing the new idea and finally to confirming this decision. 
The decision model provides three main advantages when it comes to analyzing the compliance 
process with food standards. Firstly, it systemizes the decision process, distinguishing the different 
stages of the whole process and thereby making it possible to identify the determinants of the 
decision process, which might differ according to the stage. Secondly, the model puts the decision-
maker at the center of the analysis, while at the same time taking interlinkages with the 
institutional environment into account. Thirdly, it combines various schools of thinking, including 
those of economics, education, rural sociology and geography to form an analytical framework of 
diffusion (Rogers, 2003). 
Chemnitz (2007) argues that the adoption of quality and safety standards can be considered as the 
adoption of an innovation and hence, can be analyzed following the concept for the diffusion and 
innovation theory. Tackie et al. (1996) evaluate the marketing of fruits and vegetables in South 
Central Alabama using the diffusion approach. Their aim is to verify whether farmers would adopt 
innovation regarding grading and packaging fruits and vegetables or not. The results of this study 
indicate that the farmers were using the information they obtained from workshops in their 
operations, implying that they considered the information important and useful. Ghadim & Pannell 
(1999) presented a conceptual framework of individual farmers’ decisions on adoption of a new 
innovation, using new crop species. Besides the influences of socio-demographic factors, farmers’ 
personal perceptions, managerial abilities and risk preferences were also considered.  
Kleinwechter & Grethe (2006) analyze the adoption of GlobalGAP by mango exporters in Peru 
based on a theoretical framework of a compliance process divided into three stages: the 
information stage, the decision stage and the implementation stage. A comparison between 
certified farmers and a control group then identifies the mechanisms that lead producers to adopt 
the standard or not. The findings reveal that access to information by the producers promotes the 
adoption, influences decision-making and supports the producer in the implementation stage and 
finally, excludes producers from GlobalGAP markets.  
Chemnitz (2007) provides an empirical analysis of the compliance decision behavior and the 
compliance process of standards related to the Moroccan tomato export sector. The study aims at 
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understanding who the drivers for the compliance decision are, by comparing the determinants of 
the decision process between certified and non-certified producers. The results suggest that small 
producers are not particularly disadvantaged in the compliance process. However, less organized 
and less integrated farmers tend to be less favored, especially in cases when integration diminishes 
the cost of compliance. Additionally, integration may facilitate the information access from 
buyers’ requirements.  
2.2.4 Transaction cost approach 
Transaction costs between buyers and sellers have several dimensions. First, they include 
information search cost for quality and food safety, second, cost for negotiations and third, the 
costs for monitoring and enforcement (Hobbs, 1996). Consequently, the higher the transaction 
cost, the less likely the transaction will occur. International standards help to ensure technical 
compatibility across countries and convey information to consumers about products that have been 
produced abroad or about processes that took place in another country. International standards thus 
reduce transaction costs and facilitate international trade (WTO, 2005). 
Lu (2005) uses a composite of various indicators to measure the effects of different variables of 
transaction costs on the technical efficiency of the tomato supply chain. The four categories of 
transaction costs used are: (a) transportation costs: depending on distance, time, road conditions 
and availability of own means of transport; (b) information costs: depending on the number of 
traders visited before selling and the sources of access to market information; (c) negotiation costs: 
related to the number of visits for reaching an agreement with respect to selling the tomato; and (d) 
monitoring costs: related to the number of years that the farmer is engaged with the trader. 
Christensen et al. (2003) analyze the consumer perceptions of certifying agencies to certify beef 
products in aspects regarding food safety and quality in the US and UK. While US consumers see 
it as the role of the government to assure food safety, UK consumers prefer the private sector to 
assume this role. Thus, the validity of the certification signal begins with the customer, who is 
dependent on credible quality labels when making purchasing decisions.  
Dörr (2004) studies the poultry sector in Brazil regarding the compliance of this industry with the 
requirements on food safety, quality and animal welfare of wholesalers and retailers in Europe. 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the Transaction Cost Theory were used as the 
conceptual background. She finds that transaction cost increased due to changes in the contractual 
relationships between the poultry industry and the input suppliers.  
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Neves (1999) analyzes the orange juice chain in Brazil using transaction cost approach as 
theoretical background. He analyzed the transaction costs between fruit growers and the 
processing industry. His findings reveal that the transaction costs between fruit growers and the 
industry still have to be better coordinated for the chain to be more competitive. He suggested to 
reduce costs, to improve supply guarantee and to enhance trust via contracts.  
A similar study carried out by Lopes et al. (2003) seek to analyze the relationship between the 
citrus industry and orange growers in Brazil. The objectives were to describe the characteristics of 
the standard contract used and to investigate the attributes of contracts. The description of the 
contract characteristics was derived from secondary data (copies of standard contracts). In 
addition, he conducted 48 structured and closed question interviews with orange growers. The 
attributes considered in the study were classified according to their level of importance: price paid 
for the fruit, payment conditions, type of relationship between grower and buyer, distance from the 
farm to the final destination, contract duration, general conditions, discount criterion for defective 
fruit, transportation fees added to the fruit price and finally, correlation between the fruit payment 
and the price of orange juice at the international market. In the case of the orange industry, the 
findings show that a more sophisticated contract is used with specific clauses on fruit quality, 
while traders utilize more simple contracts not specifying any details. 
A study by Carvalho (2003) investigates the fruit trade between Brazilian exporters and British 
importers. He did qualitative research interviewing 22 import agents in the UK and 19 Brazilian 
fruit exporters to find out the determinants for the configuration of transaction arrangements in the 
fruit trade. The results support the conviction that quality management strategies have been used to 
favor their commercial activities. Five strategies are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Results on fruit trade between Brazilian exporters and British importers 
Product specifications Specifications are settled in agreements with the fruit buyers and negotiated 
with fruit exporters abroad 
Quality control  Visits to fruit suppliers and quality control are done after the arrival of the 
fruits in the UK. 
Monitoring Agents control quality standards carried out on three different stages in the 
fruit trade sequence  
Logistics Exporters have to coordinate the fruit supply and arrange long distance 
transportation procedures 
Strategic alliances  Import agents are present in the chain and prioritize strategic alliances with the 
UK buyers. 
Source: Own compilation based on Carvalho (2003) 
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2.2.5 Macro level approach 
The theoretical model presented by Chau, Basu & Grote (2004) analyzes the economic incentives 
of eco-labeling initiatives. In the first stage of the model, countries decide whether or not to initiate 
eco-labeling in a multi-country context. In the second stage, countries compete in a horizontally 
differentiated market – via green and baseline production method. Based on a sub game perfect 
Nash equilibrium as the theoretical background, the study highlights the selection criteria of 
countries that adopt eco-labeling, the endogenous characteristic of labeling incentives and the 
welfare consequences of observed labeling initiatives. The findings reveal that the food industry 
export appears to be correlated with the speed with which countries implement their own eco-
labeling programs. Regarding the model results on the selection criteria of the labeling adoption 
and the welfare consequences, countries perceive a strictly positive price premium. The speed of 
adoption depends on the fixed cost of eco-labeling programs, the scale effect and the comparative 
cost advantage of a specific industry.  
Furthermore, Basu et al. (2007) extend the study cited above in two directions. First, they examine 
the set of welfare consequences associated with the move towards eco-labeling by some countries. 
Second, they aim at understanding whether the prior focus exclusively on export rivalry may have 
ruled out possible strategic interactions via import competition. Comparing producers’ welfare 
with and without competition based on eco-labeling, the results show that it depends on the size of 
the industry level green premium. The green premium depends on a demand side consumption 
green premium effect and supply side cost of green technological adoption effect. Additionally, 
export orientation of an industry can itself be a driving force that makes the practice of eco-
labeling an attractive option. 
2.2.6 Logistic regression model 
There have been very few studies related to the determinants of farmers’ adoption of certification 
in developing countries. Among them, Burton et al. (1998) analyzed the determinants of adoption 
of organic certification in horticulture in Spain, UK and Brazil at the farm level. The determinants 
may depend on (i) the socio-economic characteristics of the farmer, (ii) the characteristics of the 
farm, (iii) sources of information, (iv) membership of organizations, and (v) farmers’ attitudes. 
Regarding factors explaining the timing of the decision, variables such as age, managerial 
experience, and policy interventions were added. The main results show that: (i) non-economic 
factors play a primary role in the adoption decision in the European samples, but not in Brazil; (ii) 
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educational attainment was insignificant in both the UK and Spain, while gender, age, farm and 
household size were all found to be insignificant in the Spanish sample; (iii) UK managers of 
smaller holdings are more likely to convert to organic practices, but farm size per se does not 
explain the timing of that decision and, (iv) attempts to increase the uptake of organic techniques 
needs to take into account the different information sources currently prioritized by organic and 
conventional producers. 
Similarly, Carambas (2005) studies the decision adoption of eco-labeling farmers of agricultural 
sectors in Thailand and the Philippines. The range of factors that may influence their decision 
making are categorized as (i) socio-economic characteristics of the farm; (ii) factors relating to 
farmers’ support/assistance; (iii) farmers’ expectations and (iv) other economic factors. The 
findings reveal that the determinants that have relatively smaller influence on the decision of Thai 
farmers to adopt certification are gender, family size and tenure. On the contrary, if (a) it is easy to 
get information about eco-labeling; (b) farmers perceive positive yield and environmental effects 
and (c) farmers experienced sickness in conventional farming, the probability to adopt organic 
farming increases by 50% on average. For Filipino farmers, variables such as gender, age, family 
size and income and farmers’ organization campaign [10% level] have been found to be 
statistically significant.  
Continuing in this context, D’Souza et al. (1993) aim to identify the characteristics significantly 
influencing the decision to adopt organic certification using a logit model. Factors affecting 
technology adoption are grouped in human capital, structural, institutional and environmental 
categories. The variables influencing the adoption are: (i) human capital: age and education; (ii) 
structural and financial: farm size, debt/asset ratio, off-farm employment, hired labor; (iii) 
institutional: participation in farm commodity programs; (iv) environmental: ground water quality. 
Among the statistically significant variables, the variable awareness of the producers on 
groundwater contamination influences by 23% the probability of adoption. Considering that the 
producer has at least high school education, the likelihood to adopt certification increases by 20% 
and if the farmer is over 55 years old, the probability decreases by 14%. Producers not employed 
for more than 200 days a year, are 12% less likely to adopt the organic practices.  
Hattam & Halloway (2005) study the determinants that lead small Mexican avocado producers 
deciding to adopt organic certification compared to conventional ones. They find that adoption is 
positively influenced by economic and management factors (i.e. production cost per ha) and also 
by social factors (i.e. membership in an association). Education has shown a negative and 
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insignificant influence, while experience in agriculture has a negative effect but is significant.  In 
the same line, Udovc & Perpar (2007) compare conventional and organic farmers in Slovenia 
regarding the differences and similarities. The variables which distinguish organic from 
conventional farms are farm size, income structure, education, membership of associations, 
dependency of farm on income and personal attitudes towards environmental concerns. However, 
education and share of income from agriculture were not statistically significant.  
2.2.7 Other approaches 
Besides the approaches mentioned above, some other approaches exist which are relevant for 
analyzing certification in agro-food sectors. Marette, Crespi & Schiavina (1999) use the cartel 
theory to analyze the influence of labeling on agricultural markets. An analytical framework of 
adverse selection where consumers are imperfectly informed about the quality of products is used 
to investigate the welfare effects of a cartel. The authors hypothesize that the societal welfare 
increases if consumers can distinguish between high and low quality products. In this case, 
certification implies that the high quality producers gain market power and the low quality 
producers are no longer producing. Thus, the former can exercise market power by acting as a 
Cournot quantity agent. Basically, the societal welfare increases when high quality producers 
come together in a certification scheme and eliminate asymmetric information. The findings reveal 
that market inefficiencies may arise as a result of asymmetric information in the absence of a 
cartel. Additionally, given high cost of labeling, a cartel that provides information about product 
quality may improve overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce quantity competition.  
Nilson et al. (2003), based on the study of Marette, Crespi & Schiavina (1999), aim to analyze 
certification systems and their impact on market structure using a complementary model in order 
to verify the demand behavior of low quality products under certification. It is hypothesized that 
there is a positive welfare impact when producers choose to label their products. Their results 
show that the modified model presents an ambiguous welfare impact of certification when varying 
the number of firms providing low quality. If there is a firm with low quality instead of high 
quality, the welfare impact of a certification scheme is negative; and if the number of high quality 
firms rises, the welfare impact increases.  
Furthermore, Marette & Crespi (2003) focus on the relationship between cartel formation and 
quality certification. The adverse selection framework is used for cartel theory under Cournot 
competition with many sellers. It is hypothesized that third-party certification may provide 
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information about product quality for imperfectly informed buyers; individual sellers can choose 
whether they want to signal the quality of their products independently or join a cartel. 
Additionally, the cases where producers are able to share the cost of certification are also 
classified. The authors simulate two scenarios. The first one refers to the case where each seller 
incurs a cost for certification. The analysis includes the incentive for a seller to certify its products 
with and without a cartel. Each potential seller has three options to choose: join a cartel, certify 
independently, or remain independent without certification. The results reveal that some high-
quality sellers will form a cartel to collude in quantities. The second one proposes cost sharing 
within a cartel in order to make certification more attractive. This case considers that several 
sellers who decide to certify have an incentive to share the cost of certification. The results show 
that the larger the number of firms, the lower the share of fixed cost of certification.   
Luning et al. (2002) develop a conceptual food quality relationship which assumes that food 
quality is a function of both food and human behavior and their interaction. They used a techno-
managerial approach for the analysis. They define this approach as “the integrative use of 
technological and managerial theories in order to explain and predict food quality from food and 
human behavior” (Luning et al., 2002:383). The authors conclude that the approach requires 
increased information (to reduce uncertainty) and enhancement of knowledge (to reduce 
ambiguity) of both food and human systems to enable a more accurate level of prediction. 
Understanding how technological and administrative conditions influence food and human 
behavior and how they affect each other will provide better insight about the way food quality is 
perceived and managed.  
Schiefer (2003) analyzes some problems which occur in sector-oriented quality assurance in the 
agro-food sector regarding traceability and certification. His discussion is based on logical 
arguments and expert conclusions rather than on empirical studies. The framework includes: (i) 
establishment of a hierarchical control and certification system which allows a transparent 
identification in all food levels regarding quality and safety, (ii) visible delineation of co-operating 
sub-networks of stricter quality claims and for improved use of quality-supporting elements and 
(iii) utilization of quality-supporting and trust-generating elements by sub-networks. The author 
argues that sector quality-assurance systems are essential for the development of food markets. 
Segerson (1998) presents a framework for examining firms’ incentives to adopt adequate food 
safety measures voluntarily and the role of the market in providing those incentives. Supposing the 
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firm has two alternatives that comprise: either to undertake measures to ensure increased food 
safety voluntarily or not taking any initiative unless forced by government regulations or other 
forms of mandatory public policies. The two key determinants of the decision to undertake 
protective measures voluntarily are the expected changes in the net income earned by the firm and 
the expected loss incurred by the firm with and without those measures. The important issue in 
determining the independence between market structure, product nature and damages is whether 
consumers perceive the potential hazards associated with product consumption correctly and their 
willingness to pay.  
2.3 Summary 
Many approaches have been applied to analyze certification in agro-food products. Table 2.4 
presents a summary of the main studies in the horticulture sector. While many authors have 
discussed empirical approaches to different products, only few studies have focused on the theory 
(see (Chau, Basu & Grote, 2004) and (Basu et al., 2007)). A more comprehensive approach to 
standards is certification consisting of a number of different standards and regulations relating to 
food quality, environmental or social issues. Certification generally aims at providing consumers 
with better information about the characteristics and quality of food products, thus enhancing 
market transparency. The question of governance arises when some firms in the chain work 
according to standards set by others. Standards that are specified also have to be monitored and 
enforced. Therefore, value chain governance involves institutions for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance of certification. Specifically in the fruit sector, given the large number of certification 
systems, it is important to provide an economic analysis to increase the competitiveness and 
efficiency. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of the main studies in the horticulture sector categorized by the approach  
Authors Year Type of product Country Contents Approach 
Carambas 2006 Organic rice Thailand Cost: capital costs, raw material, testing and certification; 
Benefits: financial, environmental and health 
Cost and benefit 
Gogoe 2003 Pineapples Ghana Cost and benefits to implement EurepGAP Cost and benefit 
Cook 2000 F&V US Identification of drivers of change  Global value chain  
Shipmann 2006 Chili Ghana Comparing international and national value chains  Global value chain 
Dolan & 
Humphrey 
2000 F&V UK, Kenya 
and Zimbabwe 
Identifying the key decision-makers and how their requirements for 
the performance of the chain  
Global value chain 
UNCTAD 2007 Banana international Identification of actors in the chain Marketing chain 
FAO 1989 F&V international Understand the link in the marketing chain between farmers and 
traders 
Marketing chain 
UNCTAD 2007a Citrus Brazil and US Identify the players in the distributional channel; degree of 
concentration 
Marketing chain 
Chemnitz 2007 Tomato Morocco Identification of drivers for the compliance decision  Diffusion of innovation 
Kleinwechter 
& Grethe 
2006 Mango Peru Identification the mechanisms that lead producers to adopt the 
EurepGAP standard 
Diffusion of innovation 
Lu 2005 Tomato China Transaction costs on the technical efficiency: transportation 
information, negotiation and monitoring  
Transaction cost 
Neves 1999 Orange juice Brazil Transaction costs between fruit growers and the processing industry Transaction cost 
Carvalho 2003 Fresh fruit Brazil and UK Determinants for the configuration of transaction arrangements in the 
fruit trade 
Transaction cost 




Source: Own compilation based on the literature review (note: F&V= fruits and vegetables) 
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3 Methodology and Conceptual Framework  
This chapter presents in Section 3.1 the conceptual framework of the marketing chain applied to 
the fruit sector. Section 3.2 and 3.3 discuss the relevance of the value chain and transaction cost 
theories relevant for the analysis of certification. Section 3.4 focuses on the framework for the 
analysis of the certification decision. Finally, summary and the hypotheses are presented in section 
3.5.   
3.1 Concepl of the marketing chain 
An analysis of marketing channels and upgrading strategies for fresh fruit shows how the 
development of niche markets for high-value produce creates new opportunities for developing 
countries’ producers and exporters that can meet the required standards. New marketing channels 
have opened up as a result of a combination of changing consumer tastes and the increasing 
dominance of large retailers in the markets of industrialized countries. The identification of 
opportunities for adding value and the development of strategies to take advantage of them are 
based on an analysis of the changing governance structures of food value chains (UNCTAD, 
2000). 
The framework presented in Figure 3.1 aims to facilite the understanding of the marketing chain 
process of non-certified and certified producers in the fruit sector. Certified farmers are more 
likely to have access to international markets and non-certified ones are more likely to sell the fruit 
production in the domestic market. Farmers can either trade with groups, associations and 
cooperatives or with individual buyers, who sell the fruit production in the domestic market.  
However, farmers who expect to export, may trade their fruit in the domestic market in case of a 
non-favorable situation; such a situation is given if there is a lack of quality caused by bad-crop 
formation, disease or climate conditions. Non-certified farmers are also vulnerable to those factors. 
However, non-certified producers may also export directly or indirectly to international markets. 
Directly occurs when they export via a trading company and indirectly, when they sell the fruit 
production to the middleman who repack and export.  
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework on the marketing chain for certified and non-certified 
producers 
Source: Own illustration 
3.2 Value chain analysis 
3.2.1 Definition and types of value chains  
During the last decade, the concept of the value chain has been highlighted in the literature and 
widely discussed among researchers and policy makers. Global value chain analysis evolved from 
global commodity chain analysis, which emphasized the importance of global buyers, particularly 
retailers and brand-name companies, in creating global production, distribution, and marketing 
systems. According to Kaplinsky & Morris (2002:4), the value chain describes “the full range of 
activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception through the different 
phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various 
producers’ services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use”. 
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The analysis of global commodity chains (GCC) developed by Gereffi (1995) highlights that trade 
is increasingly organized through networks linking dispersed actors across the global economy. 
According to the author, “what is novel about GCCs is not the spread of economic activities across 
national boundaries per se, but the fact that international production and trade are increasingly 
organized by national and commercial firms involved in strategic decision making and economic 
networks at the global level” (Gereffi, 1995:113).  
This strategic decision making may determine how the chain is positioned in the market, the 
inclusion and exclusion of actors and how functions are divided within the chain. Gereffi (1994) 
distinguishes two types of governance structures: buyer-driven and producer-driven. The producer-
driven commodity chains are usually exemplified by capital and technology-intensive industries, 
where barriers to entry are related to production and to the development of technologies, for 
instance, transnational firms. In contrast, buyer-driven commodity chains are governed by 
retailers, importers and branded companies. Value chain analysis identifies the impact of these 
new buyers by focusing upon, first, the different positions of lead firms in value chains, their 
competences, and what this implies for the activities of other agents in the chain, and second, what 
different types of buyers are trying to get out of the chain and its implications for the structuring of 
value chains in the competences of firms within them. 
Another study from Gereffi (1999a) mentions further specifications and examples of “producer-
driven” and “buyer-driven” commodity chains. The first is composed of those in which large 
manufacturers play the central role in coordinating production networks, characterized by capital 
and technology-intensive industries [automobiles, aircraft, computers, semiconductors and heavy 
machinery]. The second refers to industries where the largest retailers, brand marketers and 
manufactures play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized production networks located mainly 
in developing countries. It is characterized as labor-intensive, as in consumer goods industries 
[garments, footwear, toys, house wares, consumer electronics and handicrafts]. 
“One of the main characteristics of firms that fit the buyer-driven model […] is that 
frequently these businesses do not own any production facilities. They are not 
manufacturers because they have no factories. Rather, these companies are 
merchandisers that design and/or market, but do not make, the branded products they 
sell. These firms rely on a complex network of subcontractors that perform almost all 
their specialized tasks […] Profits in buyer-driven chains thus derive not from scale 
economies and technological advances as in producer-driven chains, but rather from 
unique combinations of high-value research, design, sales, marketing, and financial 
services that allow the buyers and branded merchandisers to act as strategic brokers in 
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linking overseas factories and traders with evolving product niches in their main 
consumers markets” (Gereffi, 1994:99). 
Furthermore, Gereffi (1999b) points out that producer-driven chains are more likely to be 
characterized by foreign direct investments than buyer-driven chains. And each of these different 
types of value chains is associated with different types of production systems (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Comparison between producer-driven and buyer-driven chains 
 Producer-driven commodity chains Buyer-driven commodity chains 
Drivers of global commodity 
chains 
Industrial capital Commercial capital 
Core competences Research & Development; 
production 
Design, marketing 
Barriers to entry Economies of scale Economies of scope 
Typical industries Automobiles; computers; aircraft Apparel; footwear; toys 
Ownership of manufacturing 
firms 
Transnational firms Local firms, predominantly in 
developing countries 
Main network links Investment-based Trade-based 
Predominant network structure Vertical Horizontal 
Source: Gereffi (1999b)  
A reason which justifies the importance of a value chain is that it plays a key role in understanding 
the need and scope for systematic competitiveness. The analysis and identification of central 
competences may lead firms to invest in competent sectors. In addition, it helps to understand 
whether the way producers are connected to final markets influences their ability to gain by 
participating in global markets (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2002).  
3.2.2 Governance: definition and determinants 
The concept of governance “ […] is central to the global value chain approach […] the concept is 
used to refer to the inter-firm relationships and institutional mechanisms through which non-
market co-ordination of activities in the chain takes place. This coordination is achieved through 
the setting and enforcement of product and process parameters to be met by actors in which 
developing country producers typically operate” (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001:3).  
The authors use the concept of governance “to express that some firms in the chain set and/or 
enforce the parameters under which others in the chain operate. A chain without governance would 
be a string of market relations” (2001:4). Thus, the importance of governance is highlighted in the 
value chain using the following five reasons: 
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i) Market access: access of producers to new markets is limited to lead firms; 
ii) Fast track to acquisition of production capabilities: producers, who gain access to 
chains of lead firms need to be able to improve continuously; 
iii) Distribution of gains: governance facilitates the understanding of the gains distribution; 
iv) Leverage points for policy initiatives: besides the fact that global value chains offer 
leverage points for government initiatives, they can also undermine government policy 
and  
v) Funnel for technical assistance: to combine technical assistance to developing country 
producers with connectivity. 
The determinants of governance presented by Humphrey & Schmitz (2000:6) are: arm’s length 
market relations [buyer and supplier do not define the product; no long term relationship and the 
buyers’ and producers’ risks are low]; networks [the buyer and supplier define the product 
specifications together; the buyers’ risk is minimized because of the suppliers’ high level of 
competence]; quasi-hierarchy [high degree of control from buyers over suppliers; the former 
define the product] and hierarchy [buyers control the supplier production process]. The authors 
suggest that quasi-hierarchy is more likely to occur where global value chains frequently link 
producers in developing countries and retailers in developed countries.  
Similarly, Keesing & Lall (1992) argue that producers in developing countries are expected to 
meet requirements that frequently do not apply to their domestic market. For instance, this creates 
a gap between the capabilities required for the domestic market and those required for the 
international one. This gap is widened when the buyers require consistent quality and supply, 
creating two reasons for quasi-hierarchical governance. The first refers to monitoring and control 
which might be required to ensure that products and processes meet the required standards. The 
second reason, in case the gap needs to be closed quickly, is that buyers will need to invest in a 
few selected suppliers and help them to upgrade. Mostly buyers have a higher interest in suppliers 
according to their relationships.  
Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005:83) propose a more complete typology of value chain 
governance, divided into five types: (i) markets: market linkages can persist over time with 
repeated transactions - the cost of shifting the partner is low for both; (ii) modular value chains: 
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suppliers make the products according to the customers’ specifications, detailed more or less by 
the former; (iii) relational value chains: complex interactions among buyers and sellers, often 
creating mutual dependence and a high level of asset specificity; (iv) captive value chains: small 
suppliers are transactional dependent on larger buyers, characterized by a high degree of 
monitoring and control by lead firms, and finally (v) hierarchy: characterized by vertical 
integration.  
In the same study, the authors develop a theory of value chain governance based on three factors: 
(i) the complexity of information and knowledge required to sustain a particular transaction with 
respect to product and process specifications, (ii) the extension in which knowledge and 
information are codified and transmitted efficiently, and (iii) the capabilities of actual and potential 
suppliers regarding the requirements of the transaction.  
Table 3.2 presents the five global value chain governance types combined with the values of three 
variables that determine them [complexity of transactions, ability to codify transactions and 
capabilities in the supply-base]. Each type of governance provides a different trade-off between 
the benefits and the risks of outsourcing. The last column shows that the type of governance 
changes from a low level of explicit coordination and power asymmetry, between buyer and 
supplier [in the case of markets], to a high level [in the case of hierarchy].  










Degree of Explicit Coordination 
and Power Asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High 
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low  
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
Source: Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005:87) 
There are economies of scale in governance. Large firms have the management capabilities 
required to coordinate complex relationships with suppliers and customers. Dealing with a few 
large suppliers or customers is easier than dealing with many small ones. At the same time, large 
buyers have more purchasing power and therefore more opportunities to enforce compliance with 
their wishes. Therefore, governance is associated with buyer power. Increasing buyer power in 
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global value chains has four main consequences for producers in developing countries: access to 
export markets, opportunities for upgrading, systemic competitiveness and returns to participation 
in global markets (Humphrey, 2005). 
Ponte & Gibbon (2005) emphasized quality management as a competition and/or cooperation 
factor between actors of a value chain. Key actors might verify the quality of information in order 
to determine the form of coordination used within a specific segment of the chain. As quality 
becomes more complex, it is expected that firms move toward tighter forms of coordination, i.e. 
closer to vertical integration. On the other hand, if the actors are able to embed complex 
information about quality, labeling, certification and codification procedures, they might be able to 
operate with looser forms of coordination, i.e. closer to market coordination.  
Moreover, quality standards play an important role in accessing global value chains in developed 
countries due to changes in consumption. Thus consumption is characterized by safety awareness, 
identification of consumers’ tastes as well as social and environmental concerns. They emphasize 
the proliferation and differentiation of products due to market saturation. Likewise, an increased 
importance of issues of quality control and management, traceability and certification, has also 
contributed to increase the role played by quality standards (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005).  
3.2.3 Upgrading 
Entering new export markets could be considered a major challenge for many firms in developing 
countries. New skills and knowledge are demanded, mainly related to bureaucratic procedures, 
national standards and procedures, marketing channels and consumers’ tastes. Upgrading could 
facilitate and promote competitiveness to access those markets.  
The value chain literature focuses on the role of global buyers and chain governance in defining 
upgrading opportunities. Humphrey & Schmitz (2000) use the concept of upgrading to refer to 
three different shifts that firms might undertake. First, process upgrading: firms can upgrade either 
through transforming inputs into outputs more efficiently by re-organizing the production system 
or introducing superior technology; second, product upgrading: firms can upgrade by moving into 
more sophisticated product lines and third, functional upgrading: firms can upgrade by higher 
value added.  Kaplinsky & Morris (2002) added a fourth case, intersectional upgrading: where 
firms can upgrade by moving out of a chain into a new one. 
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Upgrading occurs as a result of learning by exporting, the buyer promotion of the capabilities of 
developing countries producers or by entering value chains with more demanding customers. The 
knowledge required for upgrading flows downstream through the chain supplied by customers 
(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002:23). The three key elements of value chain analysis are economic 
rent, barriers to entry and distribution. Kaplinsky & Morris (2002) state that economic rent: 
i) arises in the case of differential productivity of factors (including entrepreneurship) 
and barriers to entry (scarcity); 
ii) takes various forms within the chain, including technological, organizational, skills and 
marketing capabilities,  
iii) may arise in form of relational rents from activities between groups of firms; 
iv) is dynamic in nature and is transferred into consumer surplus in the form of lower 
prices and/or higher quality. 
Furthermore, “[…] the concept of rent provides an important analytical vehicle to explain why 
some activities in the chain are well-rewarded and others are not – the central part of this story lies 
in the determination of barriers to entry which limit competitive pressures […] the greater the 
barriers to entry, the higher the level of profitability” (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2002:41). 
3.3 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)  
New Institutional Economics is formed by two complementary lines. One studies the Institutional 
Environment, while the second one focuses on transaction cost theory. The first one, headed by 
Douglass North, refers to the macro-institutional parameters, while the second one, headed by 
Oliver Williamson, has micro-institutions as the main focus. Thus, the New Institutional 
Economics is concerned with the origins, incidence and ramification of the transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1979). 
3.3.1 Definition and characteristics 
Williamson (1985:1) considers the term transaction cost economics as “the basic unit of analysis 
and holds that the organization of economic activity is largely understood in transaction cost 
economizing terms. Transaction costs are realized by aligning governance structures […] with the 
attributes of transactions in a discriminating way”. Further, the author mentions that the theory of 
Chapter 3 Methodology and Conceptual Framework 
 
 34
transaction cost economics maintains that bilateral contracts are complex and invariably 
incomplete (Williamson, 1985).  
Furthermore, Farina et al. (1997) mention that the characteristics of transactions will condition the 
most efficient governance form or the form which is expected to reduce transaction costs. They 
emphasize the difficulties in measuring the transaction costs and their identification. Thus, 
transaction costs are not those directly associated with production, but might appear according to 
the relationships of the agents, and problems in coordinating them arise as a result of their 
activities. 
Arguing on vertical integration, it will be more common where (i) the cost savings gained due to 
asset specificity are great; (ii) design features prevent the allocation of assets to alternative use; 
(iii) economies of scale are small, or among firms of different sizes, the largest ones will be more 
integrated than the smallest, and (iv) bureaucratic cost related to internal organization are smaller 
(Williamson, 1985). In a former paper, Williamson (1979:253) mentioned that “the advantage of a 
vertical integration is that adaptations can be made in a sequential way without the need to consult, 
complete, or revise inter-firm agreements. Where a single ownership entity spans both sides of the 
transactions, a presumption of joined profit maximization is warranted”. Both price and quantity 
adjustments will be more complete than in inter-firm trading.  
Transaction costs hold a problem of economic organization as a problem of contracting. Thus, 
transaction costs are distinguished between ex ante and ex post. The first are the costs of drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement. The parties involved agree in advance about the 
contingencies. The second, the ex post costs refers to costs incurred when transactions drift out of 
alignment, costs associated with the governance structures and costs related to security 
commitments (Williamson, 1985).  
3.3.2 Behavioral assumptions 
Williamson’s (1979) concept about transaction costs refers to factors as: (i) opportunism which is 
its central concept, relevant for the economic activity that involves transaction-specific 
investments in human and physical capital, (ii) the efficient processing of information which is an 
important and related concept, and (iii) the assessment of transaction cost as a comparative 
institutional undertaking. In other words, the basic elements of behavioral decision-making are 
opportunism, bounded rationality and asset specificity (Williamson, 1985). According to the 
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author, these three assumptions are the elements why the market mechanism often fails. 
Opportunism refers to the strongest form of self-interest and actors are usually motivated by it. 
The second, bounded rationality states that, individuals are incompetent to make allowance for 
every possible effect that a certain transaction or decision would have. Third, transaction-specific 
assets refer to uncertainty caused by human and physical assets (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, 
transaction costs are greater when the asset specificity is high. This is because the market 
mechanism fails when the number of qualified partners is too low (Williamson, 1975). 
3.3.3 Transaction dimensions 
Azevedo (1996) points out that transaction costs differ from each other. This is the basic reason 
that explains the existence of different institutional arrangements to rule each transaction. These 
institutional arrangements are divided in spot markets, contracts and vertical integration.  
Basically, there are three critical dimensions to characterize transactions: (i) frequency; (ii) 
uncertainty; and (iii) asset specificity. Frequency is characterized as one-time, occasional and 
recurrent, and investments are classified as nonspecific, mixed and idiosyncratic. In addition, three 
structures of governance were considered: non-transaction-specific, semi-specific and highly 
specific (Williamson, 1979).  
Farina et al. (1997) define transaction frequency as the sequence and the regularity of a 
transaction. According to the authors, frequency has a dual role, because the greater it is, the 
smaller the average fixed costs associated with information gathering and with preparation of a 
complex contract that can impose restrictions on opportunistic behavior. The second attribute, 
uncertainty, includes the variance or lack of knowledge of future elements related to the 
transaction. Neves (1999a) emphasizes that transactions with greater uncertainty should have more 
future adaptations in contracts and demand more complex control structures. The third attribute, 
asset specificity, relates to the binary view of how global production might be organized, either 
through markets or within transnational firms, in terms of the complexity of inter-firm 
relationships and the extent to which they involve investments specific to a particular transaction. 
Thus, asset specificity refers to how specific the investment is for the activity and how costly its 
reallocation is for alternative use (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, the more specific an asset is in a 
relationship, the greater the frequency and the risk. In this case, a firm manages towards vertical 
integration relationships (Farina et al., 1997).  
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Furthermore, market governance refers to non-specific transactions of occasional and recurrent 
contracting [where buyers and sellers meet to exchange goods at equilibrium prices]. In the case of 
highly specific governance, only recurrent transactions will support semi-specific structures 
(Williamson, 1979). Favoring arguments towards structural decision-making based on hierarchical 
relations, transactions will increase when the uncertainty of operation and environment is great and 
asset specific investments are needed. Williamson (1985) highlights that behavioral uncertainty is 
essential in order to understand transaction cost deeply. 
3.3.4 Institutional environment  
Douglass North has developed many studies regarding institutions, definitions and importance in 
the economic focus. The definition of institutions consists “[…] of formal rules, informal 
constraints (norms, behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct) and the 
enforcement characteristics of both. The degree to which there is an identity between the 
objectives of the institutional constraints and the choices individuals make in the institutional 
setting depends on the effectiveness of enforcement […] Institutions affect the economic 
performance by determining (together with the technology employed) transaction and 
transformation (production) cost” (North, 1990:2).  
North (1990) discusses further that “if institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are the 
players. They are groups of individuals engaged in purpose activity. The constraints imposed by 
the institutional framework (together with the other constraints) define the opportunity set and 
therefore the kind of organizations that will come into existence” (North, 1990:3). Changes in the 
formal rules are results of legislative changes and changes in informal norms; they occur gradually 
and subconsciously as individuals develop alternative patterns of behavior, according to the cost 
and benefits perceived.  
North (1990) describes five propositions about institutional change. First, continuous interaction 
exists between institutions and organizations; second, competition forces organizations  
continually investing in skills and knowledge; third, the institutional framework provides the 
incentives regarding the types of skills and knowledge perceived to maximize the pay-off; fourth, 
perceptions are derived from mental constructions of the players and fifth, economies of scope,  
complementarities as well as network externalities of an institutional matrix make changes 
increase in a dependent way.  
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3.4 A framework for the analysis of certification decision 
The economic model underlying the empirical investigation presupposes expected utility 
maximization and the notation E(Uij) where E(U) denotes expected utility, with i=1,2,3,...,N   
denoting an individual in the sample and j (=1, if the agent adopts, =0 otherwise) denoting action. 
Using this notation, individual i adopts certification if the expected utility from adoption exceeds 
the expected utility from non-adoption, or, in other words, if E(Ui1)≥E(Ui0), 
where the expected utility is ij ij ijEU v ε= + ; ijv  denotes the observable utility and ijε  is the error 
term. 
Rewriting the observable utility as below: 
,( Pr , )ij ij ij ijv f Cha ChaFarm Cha=                                                                            (Equation 3.1) 
where 
PrijCha = characteristics of producers; 
ijChaFarm = characteristics of  their farms; and 
ijCha = other characteristics 
This is a standard interpretation of the binary response in a structured survey (Feder et al., 1985), 
and a standard set of techniques is available for investigating the factors that influence the 
adoption decision (Greene, 2003). It is expected that farmers’ decision of adopting certification or 
not be influenced by a range of factors that can be categorized as: (i) characteristics of the 
producers; (ii) characteristics of their farms; (iii) obtaining information; (iv) cost to certify; (v) 
benefits to certify; and (vi) future expectation. Figure 3.2 highlights the factors which determine 
the returns and the cost to certify. The resulting net present value again is decisive for the decision 
to adopt certification or not. The hypotheses are presented in the next section.  


































Figure 3.2: Determinants of producers’ decision to adopt certification 
Source: Own illustration 
Logistic regression is used to investigate the determinants of the producers’ decisions whether they 
certify or not. As described in Figure 3.2 the decision may be influenced by a range of different 
variables. Thus, the logistic model is used for the analysis of binary responses or dichotomous and 
allows one to examine how a change in any independent variable changes all the outcome 
probabilities (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). In general, the results are reasonably robust to changes 
in the set of independent variables included in the regression. The method leads to the least squares 
function under the linear regression model (when the error term are normally distributed), and 
yields values for the unknown parameters which maximize the probability of obtaining the 
observed set of data (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
Nevertheless, logistic regression diagnostics are similar to linear regression, but unlike OLS 
regression, logistic regression does not assume linearity of relationship between the independent 
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and the dependent variables, it does not require normally distributed variables, does not assume 
homoscedasticity and in general has less stringent requirements (Baum, 2006).  
The assumptions of logistic regression are described by Hosmer & Lemeshow (2000) as follows: 
1) the true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the independent variables; 2) no 
important variables are omitted; 3) no extraneous variables are included; 4) the independent 
variables are measured without error; 5) the observations are independent and 6) the independent 
variables are no linear combinations of each other. Furthermore, Brannick (2007) adds that the 
error term is not normally distributed, is not linearly related and has not equal variance in each 
group. Thus the relationship between the discrete variable and a parameter is non-linear. 
The pseudo R-square calculated in the logistic regression is not similar to the R-square found in 
OLS regression, where R-square measures the proportion of variance explained by the model. The 
pseudo R-square is not measured in terms of variance, since in logistic regression the variance is 
fixed as the variance of the standard logistic distribution. However, it is still a proportion in terms 
of the log likelihood. It is highlighted that different pseudo R-squares can give very different 
assessments of a model's fit, and that there is no one version of pseudo R-square that is preferred 
by most data analysts over other versions (Wooldridge, 2003). 
In the basic model, let Yi be the binary response of a producer which can take one of two possible 
values: Y = 1 if the producers decide to certify and Y = 0 if not. Suppose x is a vector of 
explanatory variables (producers’ characteristics, information cost, cost to certify, benefits to 
certify, future expectation) contributing to the adoption decision and β a vector of slope 
parameters, measuring the changes in x on the probability of the producers decision to certify. The 
model is: 
i i iY xα β= +                                                                                                             (Equation 3.2) 
where α and βi are the unknown constant term and vector of regression coefficients to be estimated 
respectively. 
Once the coefficients are estimated, one can calculate the probability that lead a farmer to certify. 
The probability of the binary response is defined as: 
If  1;iY =     ( 1) ( )iP Y xπ= =                                                                                        (Equation 3.3) 
     0;iY =    ( 0) 1 ( )iP Y xπ= = −                                                                                   (Equation 3.4) 
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where  ( ) ( )Yx E xπ =  represents the conditional mean of Y given certain values of x. 
Thus, the probability of adopting certification is then expressed as (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000): 
1( 1) ( )
1 exp[ ( )]i i i i
P Y x
x
π α β= = = + − +                                                                      (Equation 3.5) 
For the quantitative analysis of the descriptive statistics in this survey, t-test and the correlation 
analysis have been applied at 90% confidence level. All quantitative analyses were performed 
using SPSS and STATA softwares.  
3.5 Summary and Hypotheses 
Based on the concepts of governance in global value chain approaches presented by Gereffi (1994) 
and Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005), this thesis will identify and explain different ways of 
coordination in which fruit value chains are structured in order to deliver effective governance. In 
addition, it considers how new forms of global coordination affect the possibilities for upgrading 
fruit producers in Brazil. It will address the issues of market access and the acquisition of 
technological capabilities such as certification. It will also consider how different forms of 
insertion in the global economy facilitate the potential for the acquisition of capabilities and 
market access, and the policy frameworks which might enhance upgrading opportunities.  
The transaction cost approach will be used as a framework for the analysis of contracts between 
buyers and sellers in fruit marketing chains. High-value crops, such as fruits, are typically 
associated with high transaction costs which increase the risk of buyers behaving opportunistically 
and defaulting on the contract. Reduction of the transaction costs could be envisaged as a useful 
device for enhancing productivity and quality that could eventually lead to higher farmers’ income 
as well as better resource management practices. 
In the following, the hypotheses which derived from the literature review are presented. 
Considering the findings of previous studies, fruit adopters of certification are expected to have the 
following characteristics: 
• The adoption of certification provides incentives to producers to access more sophisticated 
markets and to upgrade; 
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• The determinants that lead to certification adoption are similar for any fruit growers, but 
their impact on the decision may differ due to the specificities of the product; 
• The impact of certification on small, medium and large land size producers has different 
dimensions. Small farmers face higher difficulties to comply;  
• Certified producers who trade with groups or cooperatives present a higher level of 
coordination; 
• The marketing chain for certified products are more sophisticated and more efficient 
regarding post harvesting processes providing better contractual arrangements.   
 




4 Brazilian fruit sector: background information, survey areas and 
data collection 
This chapter deals with the case study undertaken in Brazil in 2006. The economic importance of 
fruit production in Brazil, in general, and in the surveyed regions, in specific, is described in 
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 summarizes the importance of organizations in supporting certification 
programs in the surveyed regions. Section 4.3 discusses the data collection procedures. The survey 
was carried out with mango and grape farmers from July to October in the Juazeiro/Petrolina 
region, and with cashew nut and melon growers from mid October to December in the Serra do 
Mel/Mossoró region.  
4.1 Economic importance of fruit production in Brazil 
4.1.1 Fruit production in Brazil 
Brazil is the third largest fruit producer in the world after China (161 million tons) and India (58 
million tons), growing more than 35 million tons of fresh fruit on an area of 1,8 million ha in 2004. 
Table 4.1 shows the 12 main produced fruits in the country and their respective planted area in ha. 
Orange and banana production represents around 70% of both the total volume and of the land 
planted with fruits. Grapes, mango and melon production makes up around 7% of the whole 
volume.  




Table 4.1: Brazilian fruit production in 2004 
Fruits Volume (Tons) % of total volume Planted area (ha) 
% of total 
planted area 
Orange 18,313,717 51.7 823,902 44.6 
Banana 6,583,564 18.6 495,385 26.8 
Watermelon 1,719,392 4.8 81,281 4.4 
Papaya 1,612,348 4.5 35,553 1.9 
Grape 1,291,382 3.6 71,640 3.9 
Tangerine 1,163,213 3.3 63,099 3.4 
Lemon 985,623 2.8 49,372 2.7 
Apple 980,203 2.8 32,993 1.8 
Mango  949,610 2.7 73,239 4.0 
Maracock 491,619 1.4 37,252 2.0 
Guava 408,283 1.2 18,826 1.0 
Melon 340,863 1.0 15,505 0.8 
Other fruits2 616,523 1.7 49,345 2.7 
Total 35,456,340 100.0 1,847,392 100.0 
Source: IBRAF (2004) 
Table 4.2 shows the fresh fruit exports in volume and value terms for 2004. The main fruits 
designated to international markets are apples, mangoes, melons and grapes, responsible for nearly 
60% of the country’s total revenue. However, comparing the total production and exports figures, 
it is found that the share of fresh exported fruits in 2004 amounted to only 2.4% of the total 
production in volume terms. 
                                                 
2 It does not include data on coconuts and pineapples represented in units.  




Table 4.2: Brazilian fresh fruit exports in 2004 
Fruits Exports (US$ Free on Board (FOB) 
% of total prod. 
(US$) 
Exports (tons) % of total production (tons) 
Apple 72,549,960 19.6 153,043 18.0 
Mango 64,187,221 17.4 111,037 13.1 
Melon 63,251,151 17.1 142,587 16.8 
Grape 52,755,494 14.3 28,815 3.4 
Banana 26,983,243 7.3 188,087 22.2 
Papaya 26,563,343 7.2 35,930 4.2 
Orange 21,492,237 5.8 90,119 10.6 
Lemon 18,298,500 4.9 37,326 4.4 
Tangerine 8,190,572 2.2 18,014 2.1 
Watermelon 4,003,153 1.1 16,143 1.9 
Other fruits 11,480,870 3.1 27,207 3.2 
Total 369,755,744 100.0 848,309 100.0 
Source: IBRAF (2005) 
Melon have the highest export rates. Mango in Pernambuco state have an export share of almost 
30% and apples from Rio Grande do Sul state of 20%. Sao Paulo is the biggest producer of 
bananas, oranges and the third in mangoes, but its production is mostly consumed domestically. 
The individual states in Brazil differ in terms of exported volume and type of fruit (Table 4.3). For 
example, in 2004, 95% of the melon was exported by Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte states. 




Table 4.3: Participation of the main states of the country in fruit exports in 2004 
Fruits 
  
States Production (ton) Exports (tons) Export share (%)
Rio Grande do Norte 167,492 100,504 60.0Melon 
Ceará 109,566 38,492 35.1
Sao Paulo 1,060,520 8,965 0.8Banana 
Bahia 872,474 0 0.0
Rio Grande do Sul 451,429 0 0.0Watermelon 
Sao Paulo 215,868 0 0.0
Sao Paulo 14,717,790 89,363 0.6Orange  
Bahia 794,916 0 0.0
Santa Catarina 583,205 80,870 13.9Apple 
Rio Grande do Sul 353,140 70,816 20.1
Bahia 305,658 52,669 17.2
Sao Paulo 245,085 3,525 1.4Mango 
Pernambuco 145,893 43,077 29.5
Rio Grande do Sul 696,599 1 0.0
Sao Paulo 193,300 322 0.2
Bahia 85,910 16,193 18.8
Grapes 
Pernambuco 152,059 12,193 8.0
Source: IBRAF (2005) and Aliceweb3 (2004) 
With respect to cashew nuts, Brazil is the fourth largest producer, after Vietnam, India and 
Nigeria. Based on the statistics from Aliceweb (2007), it is shown that Rio Grande do Norte State 
exported around 23% (9.7 thousand tons out of 41.8 thousand tons) of the total Brazilian shelled 
cashew nuts (i.e. kernels) production in 2005. From the total exported volume of this state, 66% 
(6.4 thousand tons) was transported to the US and 12% (1.2 thousand tons) to the EU.  
The European Union is the main importer of almost all kinds of fruits from Brazil, as listed in 
Table 4.4. Almost all melons, grapes, apples and oranges were exported to the EU from 2003-
2005. Also mango exports to the EU were significant with increasing shares between 2003 to 
2005. Banana and cashew nuts exports are less important. In comparison with the EU, the United 
States did not import any melons, apples, oranges and bananas, but they imported mangoes [23%] 
and grapes [11%] with the latter showing increasing rates from 2003 to 2005. Furthermore, the US 
was the biggest importer of shelled cashew nuts from Brazil with 64% of the total shelled cashew 
nuts production. Putting the figures of the EU and the US together, it can be found that most of the 
Brazilian fruits’ exports are designated to them. 
                                                 
3 Aliceweb is a statistical database with information regarding Brazilian imports and exports, supported by the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) 




Table 4.4: Destination of Brazilian fruit exports to European Union and United States, in 
percentages, 2003-2005 
European Union United States 
Fruits 
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
Mango 44.7 68.3 71.5 28.8 25.6 23.0 
Grapes 94.0 89.5 85.7 1.5 4.8 10.6 
Cashew nuts shelled 12.0 10.8 14.7 70.9 70.6 64.3 
Melon 98.5 99.2 98.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Apples 93.8 91.9 91.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oranges 91.3 86.7 89.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Banana 23.0 28.9 31.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Aliceweb (2007) 
To what extent Brazil will be able to increase its export shares in the future depends on a number 
of different factors. Nachreiner & Santos (2002) identified some difficulties that Brazilian fruit 
exporters face: (i) phytosanitary and legislative barriers in the importing countries; (ii) lack of 
national phytosanitary policies; (iii) inadequate quality according to buyers’ requirements; (iv) 
lack of organized infrastructure for storage and trading; (v) lack of pre-fixed contracts between 
importers and exporters; (vi) bad road and port conditions; (vii) weakness of the government to 
support the sector at international negotiations and (viii) lack of advertisement of tropical fruits in 
countries with cold climate.  
4.1.2 Fruit production in the survey regions 
A survey was conducted in two regions in Brazil, namely in Juazeiro/Petrolina and Mossoró/Serra 
do Mel. The choice of the survey areas was based on two considerations: (i) the extent to which 
standards and certification have been applied in the regions, and (ii) the importance of their fruit 
production in the export market. In view of these considerations, mango and grapes were chosen as 
the focus of the analysis in the Juazeiro/Petrolina region, whereas cashew nuts and melon were 
selected in the case of Serra do Mel/Mossoro region. The Figure 4.1 shows Brazil with the survey 
sites. A map of the Northeast states is presented in the Appendix 1.  







     
Figure 4.1: The study sites 
Source: http://www.guianet.com.br/guiacidades/ 
Juazeiro/Petrolina region 
The Sao Francisco Valley (SFV) region is composed of the following states: Minas Gerais, Bahia, 
Goiás, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Alagoas and Distrito Federal. The total area is around 640 km2 and 
the number of inhabitants was about 13 millions in 503 cities in 2005. The study area 
Juazeiro/Petrolina is located at the sub-medium Sao Francisco Valley in the semi-arid zone of the 
Northeast (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics IBGE, 2005).  
The SFV region has historically been a poor region of Brazil, mostly due to its very dry climate 
and geographical conditions. Before the adoption of irrigation in the 1970s, there were few 
economic activities in the region. The region gained economic importance in agricultural 
production once the government promoted investments in irrigation infrastructure. However, the 
largest boom in the region occurred only in the 1990s, mainly after the devaluation of the currency 
that enabled farmers to become competitive in foreign markets (Hirsch, 2005). Nevertheless, it 
constitutes a territory which is a natural connection between the Northeast and the Southwest, 
which is now considered as one of the most developed regions in Brazil. It has played an important 
role in the economic and social development of Brazil after 1990s (Domingues et al., 2003). 




Research conducted by Hirsch (2005), divided types of farmers in the SFV region in Brazil into 
two main types namely large-scale and small-scale farmers. On the one hand, there are large-scale 
farmers that are basically top fruit companies producing mostly high-quality grapes and mangos 
with sophisticated technology and infrastructure. On the other hand, there is the group of small-
scale producers farming on about two to five ha under projects assisted by the Company for the 
Development of the Valleys of the Sao Francisco and of the Paraíba (CODEVASF). These small 
farmers represent around 70% of the total farmers in the region. However, their cultivated area 
represents only 17% of the cultivated area.  
Figures from Aliceweb (2007) show that the production and cultivated area of mango and grapes 
in Juazeiro/Petrolina region are very high. The region was responsible for 88% of mangoes and 
99% of grapes country’s total exports in 2006 to the EU. The total cultivated area in these regions 
in 2005 was 155 million ha while the harvested volume was around 260 thousand tons of grapes 
and 550 thousand tons of mangoes. Apart from grapes and mangoes, the region currently also 
produces various other fruits including mangoes, grapes, sugarcane and guava at a relatively large 
scale, as well as melons, coconuts, bananas, tomatoes, passion fruit, lemon and papaya at a small 
scale.  
Serra do Mel/Mossoró region 
The second biggest region with irrigated tropical fruits production in Brazil is located in the semi-
arid region in the Rio Grande do Norte state. The region Serra do Mel/Mossoró is part of this huge 
region which extends over 20,000 ha and has approximately 306,000 inhabitants. At the beginning 
of the 1990’s, this region was nominated as the cluster of integrated development by the Northeast 
Bank due to its potential in producing irrigated fruits. The production from this region is 
considered as an example of technological progress (Gomes da Silva, 1999). The main harvested 
fruits are melons, bananas and mangoes. Crops like coconuts and cashew nuts, which are usually 
planted in dry areas, are increasingly cultivated in irrigated areas as well (Costa et al., 2007). 
Cashew nuts are the major economic products of Serra do Mel farmers and melon for the Mossoró 
ones.  




4.2 Policies and institutions of Brazil’s fruit sector 
In Brazil, a number of different policies, organizations and instutions have an influence on the 
fruits and vegetables sector. Major characteristics of these are outlined in the following. A special 
focus is put on the two surveyed regions Petrolina/Juazeiro and Mossoró/Serra do Mel. 
IBRAF4 aims at promoting the growth and development of the country’s fruit agribusiness through 
the disclosure of technical and marketing information along the sector. Together with the Trade 
and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX-BRASIL), IBRAF coordinates the “Brazilian Fruit 
Program” – a National Plan to promote the fruit sector in Brazil. The first phase was successfully 
implemented in 1998. Its objectives were the creation of strategic actions for selected types of 
fruits, and increasing the market access for a greater number of small fruit producers. In a new 
phase (2003/2004), it was decided that the sector should continue to export to consolidated 
markets (Germany, United States, United Kingdom and France) but also to invest in new ones 
(Spain, The Netherlands, Portugal, Scandinavia, Canada, Asian Countries, Arab Countries and 
Latin American Countries including Mexico, Chile and Argentina) (Brazilian Fruit, 2007). 
Currently, the program includes fresh fruits [lime, apple, mango, melon, papaya, grape, pineapple, 
banana, orange, tangerine, peach, persimmon, watermelon, figs and strawberries] and processed 
fruits [pulps and juices, cashew nuts, coconut water among others] (Brazilian Fruit, 2007). Apart 
from this national program, the government also promotes the development of the fruit production 
in selected regions, as outlined in the following. 
4.2.1 Importance of organizations in the Petrolina/Juazeiro region 
In the past, the Petrolina/Juazeiro region was underdeveloped and lacked basic infrastructure. The 
development process in the region began first in the late 1960s. Government infrastructure 
investments, particularly large-scale land and water management projects (reservoirs, delivery 
canals, and settlement and irrigation), triggered the region’s development. CODEVASF, a federal 
government agency which was created to promote the development of the Sao Francisco River 
Basin, carried out most of these projects (Rocha et al., 2007).  
The Brazilian government has substantially contributed to the development of the 
Petrolina/Juazeiro region through investments in many organizations. The most important one is 
the CODEVASF, but the Northeast Bank and the Support Agency for Small and Medium-sized 
                                                 
4 Is a private and non-profit organization created between Brazilian fruit producers’ groups in the early 1990s. 




Firms (SEBRAE), Producers and Exporters Association of the São Francisco River Valley 
(VALEXPORT) and the EMBRAPA have also contributed to the success of the development of 
the regions. This will be briefly described in the following.  
SEBRAE in Petrolina 
In 2004, the SEBRAE and the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial 
Quality (INMETRO)5 settled an agreement which aims at promoting the sustainable inclusion of 
small and medium enterprises or farmers in the market in order to stimulate their economic and 
social development. This is expected to be achieved by providing technical support from the 
producers through weekly visits and enable them to obtain PIF and GlobalGAP certification. In 
addition, financial support was given by SEBRAE covering 50% of the certification cost, and the 
remaining 50% of the certification cost should have been paid back by the farmer. According to 
the agreement, the financial support amounts to €5,550 per farmer. This amount should be paid 
back in three years-based installments (Agenda SEBRAE de Notícias, 2005). 
Since 1999, SEBRAE had invested €370,400 in research for the development of new varieties of 
seedless grapes on approximately 4,000 ha, in the region, as covered by the Fruitculture Program. 
The project was supported by EMBRAPA and the VALEXPORT. Overall, the Fruitculture 
Program supported is based on three pillars: technology, management and trading. The target is to 
make small farmers competitive on both national and international levels by providing them with 
field visits and training courses.  
EMBRAPA Semi-Arid (CPATSA) 
EMBRAPA is a federal agricultural research agency with a branch located in Petrolina, and 
focusing on products for non-irrigated areas. Only by the end of the 1990s, the EMBRAPA Semi-
Arid division did re-evaluate its priority list and started to develop research on irrigated 
agriculture. It actively became involved in the study of export crops. Hirsch (2005) pointed out 
that the presence of EMBRAPA in the Sao Francisco Valley is fundamental to the sustainable 
development of the region.  
In 1999, the branch of EMBRAPA Environment, in cooperation with the EMBRAPA  Semi-Arid, 
VALEXPORT, the Irrigated District Nilo Coelho and other national and international 
organizations, elaborated an environmental program for the Sao Francisco Valley, called 
                                                 
5 INMETRO was created by law in December 1973.  




“Environmental quality in the irrigated fruitculture in the Brazilian Northeast – Ecofrutas”. This 
program was the starting point for the implementation of the PIF certification of grapes and 
mangoes in the region. For the experimental stage, 14 grapes and mango exporting companies 
were selected to participate in the program. The first stage was financially supported by 
VALEXPORT [with resources obtained by The National Fruitculture Developing Program]. The 
second stage was however, financially supported by the MAPA and the National Council for 
Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) to support not only the production of grapes 
and mangoes but also of apples, peaches, bananas and citrus fruits (EMBRAPA CPATSA, 2006). 
CODEVASF 
The success of irrigated agriculture in Petrolina/Juazeiro relates partly to heavy investments in 
irrigation infrastructure carried out since the late 1960s by the CODEVASF. This organization not 
only built water reservoirs, pumping systems and delivery canals, but also expropriated lands for 
irrigated agriculture. These irrigation projects cover more than 40,000 ha in the region and attract 
further private investments in irrigation that led to a total of 80,000 ha of irrigated land in 1997 
(Damiani, 2003). 
The initial CODEVASF’s strategy was the establishment of a tomato-processing industry during 
the early 1980s. Unfortunately, this industry turned out to generate limited results and not to 
deliver the expected development effects. The region was also an important melon producer before 
becoming a leader in mango and grapes production. Production problems due to heterogeneity of 
products and the inability to guarantee a certain level of quality led to a decrease in prices and the 
production was interrupted. Investments in grapes and mango production began during the 1980s, 
and the exports first started to grow during the late 1980s, especially due to the introduction of 
seedless grapes (Rocha et al., 2007). 
In sum, CODEVASF’s actions had a positive impact on the development of the region because of 
three aspects: (i) it provided the necessary incentives to attract potential investors to the region; (ii) 
it stimulated these newcomers not only to bring capital but also to technology and share their 
knowledge with locals, and (iii) it applied effective selection and control mechanisms that 
stimulated production, penalized speculation, and delivered highly competent producers with an 
entrepreneurial mind-set (Rocha et al., 2007). 
 





CODEVASF also stimulated the creation of VALEXPORT in 1987, an association which was 
considered as necessary for at least the following powerful reasons: (i) to collect information and 
search for exports markets, and (ii) to press the federal government to carry out policies and other 
interventions that helped fruit producers to export, such as investments in infrastructure (Rocha et 
al., 2007).  
Initially, VALEXPORT consisted only of a small group of four large firms, but by 1997, it 
covered around 200 members, of which 66% were small-scale producers and the remaining 
agricultural firms. Since its creation, VALEXPORT had been involved in many projects and 
cooperation agreements with federal, state and local organizations, as well as research 
organizations and private laboratories (Damiani, 2003). In 1994, the first project aimed to support 
the irradication of the fruit fly in the region, followed in 1995 by a research program of seedless 
grapes. In the period between 1994 and 2003, there were totally 24 projects developed by 
VALEXPORT in the SFV. 
Northeast Bank 
The development of the region was also supported by the Northeast Bank, one of the main public 
banks in the Northeastern region. The Bank had an instrumental role in providing credits to 
farmers, but was also actively engaged in technology transfer. Damiani (2003) mentions that, the 
Bank was not only involved in the process of providing credits to firms and settlers, but at the 
same time it also acted as an intermediary in the transfer of technology between these players. The 
Bank required small-scale farmers to use the same technology as large-scale farmers in order to 
grant them credit lines. Bank officers control the farmers through regular visits. However, some 
farmers in the region are not satisfied with the ability of this Bank to process credits in a timely 
manner. Thus, in practice, there is a lack of financing for the agricultural activities in the region, 
especially for the small and medium sized farmers (Hirsch, 2005). 
4.2.2 Importance of organizations in the Mossoró/Serra do Mel region 
 
SEBRAE in Mossoró 
Considering the economic importance of cashew nuts production for small-scale producers in the 
Northeast region of Brazil, SEBRAE and the Bank of Brazil launched the project “revitalization of 
the cashew mini-factories” in 12 cities of the Rio Grande do Norte state in 2004. The project aims 




at first including small cashew nuts producers and second, organizing them in cooperatives or 
associations (SEBRAE, 2004). According to Notícias (2006), one of the first successfully 
established cooperative was the ‘Cooperativa dos Beneficiadores Artesanais de Castanha de Caju 
do Rio Grande do Norte’ (COOPERCAJU) located at Serra do Mel city. This is a producer 
cooperative with 182 members of which 46 members have organic certification. Since 2006, the 
cooperative started to export to international markets. Even though the COOPERCAJU is 
responsible for trading around 10% of all nuts production in the state, the cooperative still faces 
many limitations in promoting production. Parreiras (2007) highlights the need of further research 
to assure that more rural families continue working in this field instead of migrating to cities. 
EMBRAPA Tropical Agro industry (CNPAT) 
The original mandate for EMBRAPA Tropical Agro industry (CNPAT), which is another 
specialized center of EMBRAPA, was the development of cassava and cashews, but not fruits. It 
was only in the mid 1990s that EMBRAPA-CNPAT renamed and reoriented this center towards 
research in tropical fruits. In 2003, it was responsible for conducting experiments and 
implementing the Integrated Fruit Production scheme in the cashew and melon sectors in the 
region.  
4.3 Survey design and implementation 
4.3.1 Mango and grapes 
A survey of 303 farmers was conducted between July and October 2006 in the surrounding areas 
of Petrolina/Juazeiro. The survey was conducted after a pilot test which was performed to identify 
questions in the questionnaire which respondents may find problematic to answer. The final 
version of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2.  
The two-stage stratified sampling technique was applied as outlined by Levy & Lemeshow (1999). 
The first stratum included small6 (<12 ha), medium (>13 and <49) and large producers (>50 ha) in 
both regions. The final step involved the identification of producers with certification, the ones 
without certification and those in the process of becoming certified. A total of 18 strata were 
identified. To ensure that this sample population could yield significant results from econometric 
analysis, a statistical power analysis was made to determine the sample size, whereby expected 
                                                 
6 Definition of land size according to SEBRAE of Petrolina 




effect size, i.e., expected differences of means of two populations or the alternative hypothesis, can 
be detected with a certain power and significant level. This approach requires information on 
population means (μ) and standard deviation (σ) based on lists of producers. The sample size of 
each stratum was calculated using the program Russlenth7. The sample sizes and the population 
from which the samples were obtained are presented in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5: Population and sample sizes of the producers in Juazeiro/Petrolina 
Type of producer Population Sample size 
Juazeiro Petrolina Jua/Petro  
Farm’s land size Certification Farmers  Farmers  
Total 
population Farmers  % 
Total sample 
size 
Without 587 2799 2212 90 39.0 120 
In process 30 149 119 30 13.0 59 Small  
With 0 91 91 30 13.0 30 
Without 4 58 54 30 13.0 34 
In process 4 67 63 30 13.0 34 Medium 
With 0 20 20 20 8.7 20 
Without 1 1 0 0 0.0 1 
In process 0 1 1 1 0.4 1 Large  
With 4 24 20 0 0.0 4 
                             Total 630 3210 2580 231 100 303 
Source: Own compilation based on the list of producers 
Table 4.6 presents the figures of mangoes and grapes farmers in the surveyed regions. Considering 
both regions, 68% of the total farmers are producing mango while 26% of them are concentrating 
on grapes production, and 5% of the total farmers produce both fruits.  
Table 4.6: Population of grapes and mango farmers in the region 
Juazeiro Petrolina Both municipalities   
Type of fruits Total of farmers % Total of farmers % Total of farmers % 
Mango 64 88.9 144 62.3 208 68.6 
Grapes 1 1.4 78 33.8 79 26.1 
Mangoes and grapes 7 9.7 9 3.9 16 5.3 
 Total 72  231  303 100.0 
Source: Own compilation 
                                                 
7Available on the website: http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~rlenth/Power/ (Accessed on August 2006) 




4.3.2 Cashew nuts 
After the data collection related to mangoes and grapes, the survey continued with 85 cashew nut 
farmers from October to December 2006 in the region of Serra do Mel/Mossoró. The study 
considered small producers (<49 ha) of cashew nuts with certification and farmers without 
certification. The population of the producers with certification was 47 and the producers without 
certification were around 1,000 (see Table 4.7). There are no medium (>50 and <99 ha) and large 
producers (>100 ha) in the region8. The final version of the questionnaire is available in Appendix 
3.  
Similar as in the mango and grapes case, the study in cashew nuts also followed a two-stage 
stratified sampling technique as described by Levy & Lemeshow (1999). The first stratum 
included only small producers in the regions. The final step involved the identification of 
producers with certification and those without certification. A total of two strata, from which the 
data were collected, were identified. The sample size of each stratum was also calculated with the 
program Russlenth. The sample sizes and the population from which the samples were obtained 
are presented in Table 4.7.  
Table 4.7: Population and sample sizes of the producers, in Mossoró region 
Population size  Sample size  
Type of producer 
Mossoró Serra do Mel Total Mossoró Serra do Mel Total 
Small without certification 1000 0 1000 60 0 60 
Small with certification 0 47 47 0 25 25 
Source: Own compilation based on list of producers 
4.3.3 Melons 
A list of producers has been provided by the Comitê Executivo de Fitossanidade do Rio Grande do 
Norte (COEX). There are 26 companies of melons located in the region (Table 4.8). The 
categorization into small, medium and large farmes is according to the definition of COEX. 
                                                 
8 Definition of land size according to SEBRAE of Mossoró 




Table 4.8: Population of the melon producers in Mossoró region 
Size of producer Ha Number of producers 
Small <100 11 
Medium ≥100 up to 499 12 
Large ≥500 3 
Total  26 
Source: Own compilation based on a list of producers provided by COEX 
Six interviews were carried out with melon growers, considering their access to international 
markets, either directly or indirectly, and their farm size (Table 4.9). Direct access means that 
farmers export to international buyers without a trader. Indirect access to international markets 
means that farmers sell the fruit production to a trader or a bigger company, being responsible for 
the exports. Each interview has the character of a case study.  
The methodology of case studies is recommended when the researcher aims to increase the 
understanding of the subject (Yin, 1994). According to the author, general applicability results can 
be obtained from the qualitative data. In addition, case studies meet three branches of the 
qualitative method: describing, understanding and explaining. Further details on procedures for 
constructing a case were also mentioned: case studies can have single or multiple-case designs. 
Single designs are applied in cases where there is no chance for replication, while multiple design 
refers to cases with replication. Therefore, generalization of results from both designs is 
straightforward in the case of theory but not in the case of populations (Yin, 1994). Further, 
interviews are considered one of the most important sources of case study information. There are 
several forms of possible interviews: open-ended, focused and structured or survey types. In open-
ended interviews, key respondents are asked to comment on certain events. In focused interviews, 
the interviewer asks a set of questions in a short period of time. In the third type of structured 
interviews, the researcher organizes and details the questions in advance.   
Accordingly, multiple-design cases were conducted through personal structured interviews with 
the owners or managers of the companies (Appendix 4). The study seeks to understand the 
characteristics of these farmers, their perception of certification and their marketing chains. The 
interview was recorded with the interviewees’ permission. In order to preserve the integrity of the 
farmers, names were not mentioned.  
 




Table 4.9: Case studies selected according to the type of producer  
Size of producer Exports directly Exports indirectly 
Small 1 0 
Medium 1 2 
Large 2 0 
Total 4 2 
Source: Own compilation based on information released by COEX 
4.3.4 Data cleaning and missing data  
Data cleaning was conducted after the data entry. It implies detecting and removing errors and 
inconsistencies in order to improve data quality. Usually, data quality problems are present in 
single data collections due to spelling mistakes during data entry, missing information or other 
invalid responses. The major purpose of cleaning data is to identify overlapping data, in particular 
by matching records referring to the same farmer. In general, data cleaning involves two steps: 
detection and correction of errors in a data set. Errors were detected using mainly three 
procedures: descriptive statistics, scatterplots and histograms.  
. 
 




5 Certification in the fruit sector in Brazil 
There are different certification schemes which are applied to fruit production in Brazil. These are 
GlobalGAP, Integrated Fruit Production (PIF), Fairtrade and Organic. Section 5.1 briefly discusses 
the role of certification in Brazil. Sector 5.2 describes major requirements of the certification 
programs, steps to certifiy and monitoring. Finally, Section 5.3 discusses how food standards and 
regulations from the European Union and the United States affect the Brazilian fruit sector.  
5.1 The role of certification in Brazil 
There are a few studies on certification which have been carried out in Brazil. Major results will be 
briefly presented. A more detailed description of the four certification schemes will follow in the 
next section. The adoption of selected certification schemes in the fruit sector differs by region and 
product in Brazil. According to the statistics from INMETRO (2007), there are more than 1,500 
producers with Integrated Fruit Production (PIF) certification or being in process of having it. 
They are responsible for nearly 1 million tons of fresh fruit produced on 40 thousand ha. Figure 
5.1 shows the percentage of the total 1,521 producers spread over the country producing one of the 
16 types of fruits. In the SFV, there are totally 49 mangoes producers and 101 grapes producers 






















Figure 5.1: Number of producers with Integrated Fruit Production in 2006 
Source: INMETRO (2007) 




With respect to organic certification, Darolt (2000) verifies the evolution of organic production in 
Brazil and points out that the lack of updated statistics makes it difficult to evaluate this alternative 
agricultural system. Nevertheless, the author gathered data from the organic certifying companies 
and associations and concluded that around 100 thousand ha have been planted by 4,500 farmers 
concentrated mainly in the states of Paraná, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and Espírito Santo in 
the year 2000.  
Agrotecnologia (2007) presents data regarding the number of farmers with GlobalGAP certificate. 
In 2007, there were more than 68,000 producers spread all over the world, with approximately 
10,000 being fruits and vegetables growers. Table 5.1 presents figures with respect to Brazilian 
certified GlobalGAP producers and cultivated area.  
Table 5.1: Number of and area occupied by Brazilian producers certified with GlobalGAP in 
2007 
Product Number of producers % of total prod. Area (ha) % of total area 
Soybeans 7 1.3 18,900 34.1 
Maize 1 0.2 8,000 14.4 
Melons 12 2.2 5,396 9.7 
Apples 28 5.2 5,162 9.3 
Mangoes 17 3.1 4,261 7.7 
Grapes 245 45.4 3,797 6.8 
Oranges  2 0.4 3,141 5.7 
Bananas 10 1.9 1,857 3.3 
Lime 177 32.8 1,680 3.0 
Pineapple 21 3.9 1,527 2.8 
Papaya 6 1.1 1,032 1.9 
Other fruits9 14 2.6 746 1.3 
Total 540 100.0 55,499 100.0 
Source: Agrotecnologia (2007) 
In total there are only 540 Brazilian farmers who are certified according to GlobalGAP standards. 
This national figure is - in comparison with the global figure - relatively small. Most of the 
certified farmers are grapes (45%) and lime growers (33%). In terms of land, soybeans and maize 
crops require huge areas, occupying 48% of the total area certified involving only 8 farmers. On 
the other hand, fruit culture is characterized as an activity with intensive labor and is compatible 
with small productive areas. Therefore, it represents an important alternative to producers who 
                                                 
9 Includes watermelon, guava, figs and taro. 




depend largely on family labor force. There are no official data available on Fairtrade certification 
in Brazil though it does play some role in the survey regions. Implementation of Fairtrade 
certification started in 2005 only.  
Cintra et al. (2002) focus on the impact of certification adoption by mango and grape farmers in 
the Sao Francisco Valley. The results show that the adoption process is considered advanced, if 
compared to the remaining exporter regions in the country, and that its adhesion has not caused 
drastic changes in their productive system. Additionally, the producers seem to be aware of quality 
and food safety standards demanded by the international market. Producers having a certificate 
have preference when buyers and traders are selected as potential exporters. Data was collected by 
interviewing producers and experts in the region. But neither the sample size nor the farm sizes 
were mentioned and therefore, it is difficult to draw more general conclusions for the whole 
region.  
Dörr & Marques (2005) conduct three case studies on Brazilian companies that export apples to 
the EU. It was observed that the challenges of the sector are ensuring that the fruit is acceptable to 
the European consumers. The biggest problem the companies face is to export the fruit through 
consignment apart from attending clients’ requirements. These requirements are related to 
certification, the maximum residual of pesticides allowed, hygiene, traceability, among others.  
Cavichiolli et al. (2005) highlight that certification is considered as passport to access international 
markets. The authors’ analysis relates to responses of fruit producers in different regions in Brazil 
regarding positive and negative aspects of having certification. These are listed in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Positive and negative aspects of having certification 
Certification leads to higher quality of the fruit 
Better market access 
Increase in volume exported  
Positive aspects 
Improved farm organization and more skilled labor 
When there is a price premium, it is usually not high enough 
Certification cost is too high 
High bureaucracy to obtain certification 
If the producers adopt different schemes they need specialized workers 
Small and medium producers have difficulties to abide to the certification rules 
Negative aspects 
The Brazilian consumer does not know about certification schemes 
Source: Cavichiolli et al. (2005) 




According to Pereira (2007), the benefits of having certification include (i) the enrichment in terms 
of the experience by the producer; (ii) better farm organization; and (iii) training; among others. It 
could be possible that the economic analysis between investments and benefits of a certification 
process cannot capture all gains in terms of productivity, efficiency, decrease of environmental 
damages, concern about the consumers’ health, etc., which are maintained in the long run. 
Nevertheless, certification guarantees the quality and traceability, enabling Brazilian fruit 
producers to reach new international markets, even though it does not guarantee higher prices to 
the fruit producers. It can be concluded that organic certification is the most widespread applied 
program in Brazil, followed by PIF, GlobalGAP and Fairtrade.  
5.2 Description of each certification scheme 
The analysis focuses largely on comparisons among Integrated Fruit Production (PIF), 
GlobalGAP10, Fairtrade from the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO), and 
Organic Certification. Similarities and differences among them are investigated regarding the 
requirements for fruit producers. Appendix 5 presents a summary of the requirements, the so 
called control points of criteria among GlobalGAP, PIF and Fairtrade. The materials used in this 
analysis are based on information from Normative N. 012 (2003) for mango production and from 
Normative from N. 011 (2003) for grapes concerning PIF and GlobalGAP (2007a) for GlobalGAP. 
Data on Fairtrade standards for fresh fruits are based on FLO (2007) and standards on organic 
production are based on (International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements IFOAM, 
2008).  
5.2.1 Integrated Fruit Production (PIF) 
5.2.1.1 Definition and objectives 
Integrated Fruit Production was first implemented in Europe in 1970 aiming to reduce the level of 
pesticides used in fruit production. Argentina, South Africa, New Zealand, US and Chile adopted 
the program in 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998, respectively (Associacao Gaúcha dos Produtores de 
Maçã AGAPOMI, 2005). In Brazil, the Integrated Fruit Production (PIF) scheme started with 
apple production in the cities of Vacaria-RS and Fraiburgo-SC, in 1998. The producers’ concern 
was that, without an adequate certification program they would certainly be out of the international 
                                                 
10 Since 07th of  September 2007, EUREPGAP has changed its title and logo to GlobalGAP. 




market. Furthermore, other regions in the country started to implement the program supported by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Supply and Livestock (MAPA) (AGAPOMI, 2005). 
PIF is a program which was created in Brazil by the Normative N. 20 in 2002. The Normatives N. 
11 (2003) and N. 12 (2003) establish the requirements for grapes and mango production, 
respectively. In 2006, the Normative N. 58 instituted the control of agro-toxic residues in fruits 
designated to the European Union, in compliance with the MAPA in the National Plan of Security 
and Product Quality of Vegetal Origin (PNSQV). The purpose of this instruction is to guarantee 
the fruits’ quality and safety as well as the environmentally-friendly production.  
5.2.1.2 Description of the requirements 
Regardless of the fruit type, there are many requirements to be met by the producers to acquire the 
certificate. The level of compliance of requirements is divided in mandatory, recommended, 
forbidden and allowed with restrictions. Data were compiled considering each sub-thematic area 
within the major thematic area as one requirement having a different level of compliance (Table 
5.3). 
Table 5.3: Description of the PIF requirements according to the Normative N. 11 and N. 12 
Level of compliance 
Thematic areas  
Mandatory Recomm. Forbidden Allowed with restrictions total 
Capacity building 3 5 0 0 8 
Organization of the producers 1 1 0 0 2 
Natural resources 1 2 1 0 4 
Propagation material 1 1 1 1 4 
Implementation of the orchards 5 4 0 0 9 
Plant nutrition 1 1 1 1 4 
Soil management 3 2 1 1 7 
Irrigation 1 1 1 0 3 
Plant management  3 3 2 1 9 
Integrated crop protection 5 5 5 2 17 
Harvest and post-harvest process 5 5 3 1 14 
Residues analysis 1 1 1 0 3 
Packing process 9 9 2 4 24 
Traceability and book-keeping records 3 1 0 0 4 
Technical assistance and workers 1 1 1 0 3 
Total 43 42 19 11 115 
Source: Normative N. 11 and N. 12 (2003) 




According to the figures in Table 5.3, there are a total of 115 requirements of which mandatory 
thematic areas and recommended ones represent each around 37%. The forbidden sub-thematic 
areas relate to 16% of all requirements, while the remaining 10% is allowed with restrictions.  
However, differentiating between the three stages (i) crop management, (ii) harvest and post-
harvest and (iii) the remaining areas, it was found that the crop management stage represents 
almost 50% of total requirements, followed by harvest and post-harvest with 35% and finally 
nearly 15% for the remaining topic (Figure 5.2). Technical training of the farmers regarding Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP), including all stages of the crop development, until the post-harvest 
process, is provided.  











Figure 5.2: Summary of the PIF requirements  
Source: Normative N. 11 and N. 12 (2003) 
For PIF certification, book keeping records are required for inspections. The book keeping process 
along the production chain is well-defined, including three stages. Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 present 
a summary of book keeping requirements.    




Table 5.4: Summary of the thematic areas of the PIF book keeping 1 
Thematic area Data recorded 
Information 
Number of the plots: variety, number of plants, year of 
implementation, distance between plants and columns, area in ha, 
productivity 
Climatic records Pluviometer coefficient, temperature 
Machinery and spreading equipment Code, type, year 
Machinery and spreading equip 
Maintenance Type, date, reposition, maintenance, responsible person 
Source: PIF book keeping 1 (2003) 
While the book keeping 1 includes more general information, climate conditions and machinery, 
field book keeping 2 contains data with respect to each plot of the productive area. In this section, 
the producers have to control for possible diseases, plagues and natural enemies which may occur 
during the different stages of growth. The data regarding crop management, fertilizers, 
agrochemicals, irrigation and crop protection is also required in detail. A summary is presented in 
Table 5.5.  
 Table 5.5: Summary of the thematic areas of the PIF book keeping 2 
Thematic area Data recorded 
Data on each plot Date, variety, orchard formation,  number of plants per ha, spacing, area in ha, 
height, productivity in tons per ha 
Plot mapping Mapping of the farm 
Monitoring diseases Date, type of disease: part of the crop. Mango book keeping listed 6 main diseases 
while grapes listed 7. 
Monitoring plagues Date, type of plague: part of the crop. Mango book keeping listed 6 main diseases 
while grapes listed 9 plagues 
Natural enemies Date, both book keepings listed 4 natural enemies 
Crop management Date, plant development  stage, type of crop management,  tool used, reason  
Irrigation  Technical details on management 
Fertilizer Macronutrients: name of fertilizer, text, quantity, application procedure 
Organic fertilizer Date, type, quantity, procedure 
Crop protection Date, reason, product, quantity used, application procedure 
Agro-chemical products Date, stage of crop development, harvesting forecast, target plague, reason, 
product, quantity, application process  
Harvesting Harvesting quantity forecast, productivity per plot 
Source: PIF Book keeping 2 (2003) 
The post-harvest book keeping is related to data about the identification of the fruit, and an 
analysis of defective fruits. Furthermore, producers have to fill in the form of the packed fruit, the 




control of the sample quality, the hygienic control of the packing house and calibration control of 
the equipment (Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6: Summary of the thematic areas of post-harvesting book keeping 
 Area Data recorded 
Identification Producer’s name, plot, variety, time, number of boxes, weight 
Defect analysis Spots, deformation, bad-handling, mechanic damages, diseases 
Control of packed fruit Delivery, classification process, destination 
Quality control of sampling Date, identification code, category, weight, pH, percentage of defect, 
destination 
Cleaning control and 
sanitization  
Local, date, product, quantity, application procedure 
Source: PIF book keeping post-harvesting (2003) 
5.2.1.3 Certifying steps and monitoring 
Andrigueto (2002:42) describes the procedure when an individual or entity decides to become part 
of the Integrated Fruit Production system. Roughly, they must go through a waiting period 
necessary for provisions and requirements (Normative N. 20) of the PIF system, according to the 
individual fruit species, as published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply. 
The waiting period corresponds to one agriculture cycle. The conformity to acquire the PIF 
certificate is developed into six stages: regularization; request; auditing; decision; acquiring the 
certificate and maintenance. 
1) Registration: producers or entities should register at the National Register of Producers and 
Packing Houses. The registration will proceed according to the Conformity Evaluation 
Organization (CEO) forms, criteria and procedures; 
2) Request: producers or entities should make a formal request to the CEO at the beginning of the 
annual plant cycle. The adhesion is voluntary and the farms are monitored during 3 years in 
cyclical periods by an auditor. Within a period of 30 days, producers or entities can carry out 
pending requirements; 
3) Auditing: after the three cycles of production, the auditing process takes place. The auditor 
verifies the checklists and elaborates a final report for the CEO appreciation; 
4) Decision: based on the report, the CEO decides whether the certificate is issued or not; 




5) Acquiring the certificate: once approved by the CEO, the license of conformity is issued for a 
three- year period of contract, renewed yearly; 
6) Maintenance: monitoring and controlling processes are done by CEO, according to the Specific 
Auditing Plan. Producers and entities must have the book-keeping updates for inspection. A 
monitoring auditing report must be elaborated and approved by the CEO to keep the certificate. 
The certificate is valid for 12 months. 
5.2.2 GlobalGAP 
5.2.2.1 Definition and objectives 
GlobalGAP started in 1997 as an initiative from retailers belonging to the Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group (EUREP). It has subsequently evolved into an equal partnership formed by 
agricultural producers and their retail customers. Their aim was to develop widely accepted 
standards and procedures for the global certification of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) 
(GlobalGAP, 2007b). 
GlobalGAP is a private sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certification of 
agricultural products. The standard is primarily designed to reassure consumers about the way 
food is produced on the farm by minimising detrimental environmental impacts of farming 
operations, reducing the use of chemical inputs and ensuring a responsible approach to workers’ 
health and safety as well as animal welfare (GlobalGAP, 2007b). 
The characteristics of GlobalGAP which can be summarized as (a) a pre-farm-gate standard, 
which means that the certificate covers the process of the certified product from farm inputs like 
feeding or seedlings and all the farming activities until the product leaves the farm; (b) including 
annual inspections of the producers and additional unannounced inspections; and (c) consisting of 
a set of normative documents. These documents cover the general regulations, the Points of 
Control and Compliance Criteria and the checklist (GlobalGAP, 2007b). 
5.2.2.2 Description of the requirements 
Even though the organization possesses an updated version from July 2007, the analysis considers 
the former version, Version 2.1 from October 2004, valid during the data collection of this survey. 
There are three types of points of control within the GlobalGAP program that producers need to 
meet to obtain the GlobalGAP recognition: “major musts”, “minor musts” and 




“recommendations”. As regards “major musts”, a 100% of compliance is required, while for 
“minor musts” it is 95%. The “recommendations” do not require a minimum percentage. 
In total, there are 214 control points and compliance criteria of the GlobalGAP certificate. They 
are categorized as major musts which represent 23%, minor musts 46% and recommended 31%. 
Within the highlighted compliance points classified as major musts are crop protection with 31% 
and production handling with 24%. The item crop protection is also a control target in the minor 
musts category with 43%, followed by fertilizer use with 15% and finally, both produce 
production handling and worker health, safety and welfare with 14% each. Recommendations 
emphasize fertilizer use with 23% compliance points, worker health, safety and welfare with 14% 
and environmental issues with 12% (Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Summary of GlobalGAP points of control and compliance criteria  
 Compliance and control points Major Musts Minor Musts Recom. Total 
Traceability 1 0 0 1 
Record keeping and internal self-inspection 3 1 0 4 
Varieties and rootstocks 1 6 4 11 
Site history and site management 3 1 1 5 
Soil and substract management 1 3 6 10 
Fertiliser use 2 15 4 21 
Irrigation/fertigation 1 0 15 16 
Crop protection 15 43 6 64 
Harvesting 6 1 2 9 
Production handling 12 14 5 31 
Waste and pollution management, 
recycling and re-use 0 0 6 6 
Worker health, safety and welfare 2 14 9 25 
Environmental issues 0 1 8 9 
Complaint form 2 0 0 2 
Total 49 99 66 214 
Source: Own compilation based on EurepGAP checklist (2004) 
The same requirements cited above were grouped into three sets: the first one refers to all stages 
related to crop management (soil, fertilizer, varieties, etc); the second includes after harvesting and 
production handling and the third comprehends the remaining points such as traceability, 
environmental issues, book keeping, worker health, safety and welfare. According to the 
compilation, nearly 60% of the three categories of compliance relate to the crop management; 




within this, minor musts requirements sum 46% of the total, 31% are recommendations and finally 
30% are major musts (Figure 5.3). 




Points of Control and Compliance Criteria 





Figure 5.3: Summary of GlobalGAP requirements  
Source: Own compilation based on EurepGAP checklist (2004) 
5.2.2.3 Certifying steps and monitoring 
GlobalGAP (2007b) highlights that the standard requirements have to be applied equally around 
the world. Due to structural reasons small-scale farmers often face more difficulties to meet the 
requirements to the same extent as medium and large producers. As a result the small-scale 
farmers are at risk of missing out market access. GlobalGAP has, therefore, implemented group 
certification to facilitate market access for small-scale farmers. Group certification implies that 
smallholders form a group and obtain a certification together. It allows the farmers to significantly 
reduce certification costs such as inspection charges and overhead costs. In addition, since many 
requirements necessary for GlobalGAP certification can be centralized (e.g. pesticide controls), 
farmer groups can benefit from the scale effects. Group structures are also an easier way to provide 
farmers with advice regarding the implementation of the standard. The monitoring is done twice a 
year. The farmer is aware about the time of the first visit, while the second one takes place without 
informing. The certificate is valid for 12 months.  
 
 




5.2.2.4 Benchmarking among GlobalGAP and other schemes 
Initially, individual supermarkets had developed their own systems and labels. For example, in the 
UK, Tesco has developed “Tesco’s Nature’s Choice,” and Marks & Spencer created the “Farm to 
Fork” label. As a result, the various companies’ codes of practice became increasingly confusing, 
and the multiple inspections were costly and time-consuming. In response, firms have organized 
collective action to formulate and apply joint or industry-wide protocols embodying the core 
elements of GAP, Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), and HACCP. In doing so, they hoped to 
reduce problems created by having a plethora of industry standards. EurepGAP has been one 
prominent initiative as such at the level of primary production which developed into GlobalGAP 
later on.  
Jahn, Schramm & Spiller (2004b) argue that a wide variety of certification systems lead to 
increasing transaction costs. Therefore, they recommend an international benchmarking and the 
harmonization of standards. Retailers in particular introduced umbrella organizations to ensure the 
same quality level for all their products independent of the country of origin. GlobalGAP has 
developed certain benchmark procedures. Recently, the Belgian, Dutch, Danish and German meat 
sector has founded the “European Meat Alliance” to create common standards.  
On the contrary, as highlighted by WTO (2005:26), “harmonization to international standards is 
not always desirable, as it reduces product variety. Besides, it may not always be easy to agree on 
a global standard as local standards are often the outcome of specific technical requirements of 
domestic producers as well as the reflection of social values in a society”. 
The benchmarking process is based on existing national or regional farm assurance schemes 
recognized as an equivalent to GlobalGAP. Examples of benchmarking processes can be seen in 
South and Central America, Africa, and Asia, most recently in Japan and Thailand [such as 
ChileGAP, ChinaGAP, KenyaGAP, MexicoGAP, JGAP (Japan) and ThaiGAP]. They are backed 
by national governments, retailers, producers and exporters. The figures presented by GlobalGAP 
(2007b) show that worldwide 11 processes of benchmarking between a national certification 
scheme and GlobalGAP of fruit and vegetables as well as flowers have already been approved, 6 
cases are provisionally approved and 7 cases are in process.  
Garbutt & Coetzer (2005) explain in their paper that the GlobalGAP certification system tries to 
set the benchmark for the procedure and the importance of harmonizing different private sectors. 




The GlobalGAP certification system also tries to guarantee food assurance standards on a global 
level. The benchmarking process consists of a multi-staged process: (i) application; (ii) the 
technical review process (preliminary technical review, peer review, independent technical review, 
independent witness assessment, technical and standards committee review) and (iii) formal 
recognition of applicant’s standards.  
In a discussion by Espanion et al. (2005), benchmarking between GlobalGAP and PIF systems for 
fruits and vegetables in Brazil was mentioned. The authors pointed out some equivalence between 
PIF and GlobalGAP such as the guarantee of food safety, traceability, and the use of pesticides 
registered in the exporting or importing country as well as safety of the worker.  While PIF shows 
the details of each product, for example, color of the fruit, size, level of sugar, pH, texture, etc. 
GlobalGAP represents generic requirements for fruits and vegetables, meat, seeds, etc. The 
attempt of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply to benchmark is still ongoing.  
5.2.3 Fairtrade  
5.2.3.1  Definition and objectives 
The Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO) was created in 1997. It is recognized as a non-profit 
organization which offers the development of standards that benefit small farmers and their 
employees and also promote sustainable production as well as guarantee fair prices and an extra 
premium. Besides the minimum requirements, FLO expects that producers continuously improve 
the working conditions, increase the environmental sustainability and also invest in human capital. 
Furthermore, FLO supports producers with information regarding new business and market 
opportunities. Apart from fruits and vegetables, the range of products to which FLO is applied 
includes tea, coffee, cocoa, honey, juices, wine grapes, dried fruits, nuts and spices and non-food 
products such as flowers and plants, sports balls and cotton seed (FLO, 2006:3-5). 
According to FLO (2007a), Fairtrade requires fair and transparent trading conditions concerning 
prices, payment and quality procedures. The standards require that all products sold with the 
Fairtrade label must be produced by certified producers. Considering prices and price premium, 
the buyers shall pay the producers’ organizations at least the minimum Fairtrade price set by FLO. 
Producers and buyers should have a contract establishing the volume, quality, price and payment 
conditions. The payment requirement is for example that 50% of the price should be paid at the 




moment the product is delivered and the payment of the rest should follow 48 hours after receiving 
the product.  
5.2.3.2 Description of the requirements  
According to FLO (2007) the total number of requirements is 105, 55 being considered as 
“minimum” (or 52%) and 50 considered as “progress” (48%). The “minimum” must be achieved 
by all producers, while with respect to the “progress requirements”, permanent improvement must 
be visible as documented through a yearly report by the producer organizations. FLO tries to 
ensure that fair trade benefits are reaching small farmers and small producers’ organizations which 
have potential for development.  
In addition, FLO requires that these organizations should always follow the national legislation 
and in case of standards being higher than those issued by FLO, the former ones should prevail. 
The standards applied to small producers’ organizations are divided into four sections: social 
development, economic development, environmental development, and standards on labor 
conditions (Table 5.8).  
The first section considers social aspects such as democracy, participation, transparency and non-
discrimination, among others. In the economic development part, the concerns are about the 
premium, the ability to export and the organizational improvements. The environmental part 
focuses on the assessment, planning and monitoring based on an environmental plan, with each 
producer being responsible for ensuring his/her compliance. Thus, the maintenance of protected 
areas, the sustainability of native species, the improvement of the environmental and agricultural 
practices should be planned and reported. The concern is extended to the conservation of fauna 
and flora and to water management issues. The details about the use and non-use of agrochemicals 
are well defined. Recycling materials, fire, soil management and non-use of Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMO) deserve some attention in the analysis. The last section sets the standards on 
labor conditions according to International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions.  




Table 5.8: Description of the Fairtrade requirements  
 Minimum  Progress 
Social development   
Fairtrade adds development potential 1 1 
Members are small producers 2 1 
Democracy, participation and transparency 4 6 
Non-discrimination 1 1 
Economic development   
Fairtrade price premium 2 1 
Export ability 6 1 
Economic strengthening of the organization 2 0 
Environmental development   
Impact assessment, planning and monitoring 11 0 
Agrochemicals 7 10 
Waste 0 6 
Soil and water 6 0 
Fire 0 3 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) 1 3 
Standards on labor conditions   
Forced labor and child labor 5 0 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining 3 4 
Conditions of employment 2 7 
Occupational health and safety 2 6 
Total 55 50 
Source: Own compilation based on FLO (2007) 
An overview of the four sections is presented in Figure 5.4. There is higher emphasis on 
environmental development issues (45% of the minimum and 44% of the progress requirements) 
and standards on labor conditions (22% and 34%, respectively).  
















Figure 5.4: Summary of Fairtrade requirements  
Source: Own compilation based on FLO (2007) 
5.2.3.3 Steps to acquire certification and monitoring 
Fairtrade certification is accomplished by an international certification company, the FLO-CERT 
GMBH, in more than 70 countries (FLO, 2006; FLO-CERT, 2007). The steps to be followed for 
certification can be divided into: application, initial inspection, evaluation, acquiring certification 
and after certification. 
The application process begins with filling the application form. The purpose is to provide some 
information and clarify the rules of FLO. Afterwards the inspection takes place in order to evaluate 
the compliance of the producer or trader with the relevant Fairtrade standards. In a next step, the 
correction of the earlier non-conformities is evaluated. Once all of them are fixed, the organization 
issues a one-year period certificate. Before the end of a certification cycle, a renewal inspection is 
done in order to verify the compliance with the standards.  
5.2.4 Organic certification 
5.2.4.1 Definition and requirements 
According to IFOAM (2007), organic standards have long been used to create an agreement within 
organic agriculture about what an “organic” claim on a product means, and to some extent, to 
inform consumers about it. Certification is a voluntary activity, although the market began to 




demand it for sales transactions. The Organic Guarantee System (OGS) Commitee is designed to 
facilitate the development of organic standards as well as to provide an international guarantee. It 
unites the organic world through a common system of standards, verification, and market identity. 
Furthermore, organic certification is a procedure to verify that the production process conforms to 
certain standards. In other words, certification is primarily an acknowledgement that these 
products have been produced according to organic standards.  
Table 5.9 presents the summary of organic requirements according to IFOAM (2008). They are 
divided in (i) organic system, (ii) type of production (plant and crop production and genetically 
modified organisms); (iii) processing and handling; (iv) labeling; and (v) social justice. The 70 
organic agriculture’s requirements are classified in “required” and “prohibited” standards. The 
requirements on the sections which address more attention are crop production and 
processing/handling with 14 or 25% of the required standards for each of them. However, 
processing/handling also has 7 of the requirements classified as prohibited. The requirements on 
the sections GMO, labeling and social justice are fewer.  




Table 5.9: Description of the organic requirements 
 Required Prohibited 
Organic system   
Ecosystem management and biodiversity 2 1 
Resource management 6 0 
Collection of wild products 3 1 
Plant production and animal husbandry   
Conversion requirements 2 0 
Conversion for plant production 1 0 
Split production and parallel production 2 0 
Maintenance of organic management 1 0 
Avoiding contamination 3 0 
Crop production   
Seed, propagation material and seedlings 3 0 
Soil convervation and crop rotation 3 0 
Management of soil fertility 5 2 
Pest, disease, weed and growth management 3 0 
Processing/handling   
Principles 5 0 
Ingredients and processing aids 2 2 
Processing methods 1 4 
Packaging and containers 1 1 
Cleaning, disinfecting, sanitizing processing facilities 3 0 
Pest and disease control 2 0 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) 2 0 
Labeling 4 0 
Social justice 3 2 
Total 57 13 
Source: Own compilation based on IFOAM (2008) 
Regarding ecosystem and biodiversity principles, IFOAM (2008) notes that organic standards 
must ensure firstly that the biodiversity is maintained or enhanced on the farm holding on crop 
and/or non-crop habitats. Secondly, socially significant elements of the landscape on the farm 
holding such as historic features or sacred sites must be preserved. The principle applied to 
resource management relates to a set of requirements that standards have to meet, such as: 
• crop production, livestock production, processing and handling systems employ measures 
to reduce or recycle residual materials; 




• measures are employed to prevent land degradation; 
• management systems ensure that water resources are used sustainably; 
• measures are employed to prevent pollution and preserve water quality; 
• the living soil is maintained and improved; and 
• land preparation by burning vegetation is restricted.  
The conversion of a plant production system takes at least 12 months. The objective is to establish 
a suitable period of organic management prior to the organic status of a crop, during which 
contaminants are reduced and healthy soils and sustainable ecosystems are being established. The 
organic management aims at sustaining production at all production stages in order to ensure that 
organic practices are implemented along the entire production chain from propagation to the final 
product including the production of seeds and propagation materials. Further, organic crop 
production sustains and enhances the health of the soil and ecosystem. The management of soil 
fertility requires the enhancing of the soil-ecosystem by incorporating green manure and other 
biodegradable inputs. The substances used are on the IFOAM Indicative List of Substances for 
Organic Production and Processing. The prohibited practices refer to the use of synthetic nitrogen 
fertilizers, phosphates and sodium nitrate as well as producing crops in hydroponics systems 
(IFOAM, 2008). 
The standards on processing and handling require that risks of product contamination and 
environmental pollution are identified and minimized, transparency and traceability in the organic 
processing chain are guaranteed, and measures are taken to prevent co-mingling of organic 
products with non-organic products in processing, packing, storage, and transport. A product 
labeled as organic or in-conversion should comply with the applicable organic standards where 95 
to 100% of the ingredients are organic. The labels identify the person or company responsible for 
the product and the body that assures conformity to the applicable organic standard (IFOAM, 
2008). 
Organic agriculture has a social policy that is in accordance with the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) conditions; employees and contracted workers have the freedom to associate, 
to organize, to bargain collectively, to have equal opportunities, are not discriminated and are 
guaranteed human rights and fair working conditions (IFOAM, 2008). 




5.2.4.2 Procedure to certify and monitoring 
According to FAO (2001) producers and exporters of organic fruits and vegetables seeking to sell 
their products under the organic label in developed countries have to obtain organic certification. 
This can be done by the certification bodies of the countries targeted for export, or by other foreign 
certification bodies, or under a partnership agreement between these two types of certification 
bodies. To date, relatively few developing countries have certification bodies within their borders, 
although the situation is changing. 
In Brazil, according to the Organic Planet (2007), there are 18 certifying companies able to certify 
organic products such as fruits, vegetables, dairy products, sugar, poultry, coffee and grains. The 
Institute of Biodynamic Certification Association (IBD) is one of the companies which deals with 
the certification and control of organic and biodynamic production. According to this company, 
the certification procedures involve, apart from other requirements, a process to convert the land 
lasting from 2 to 3 years. This process is accompanied by extension workers who inspect the land 
and guide the producers during all stages. The monitoring is done once a year (IBD, 2007). 
5.2.5 Summary 
This chapter presents a detailed review of the PIF, GlobalGAP, Fairtrade and organic certification 
schemes. Farmers have a certificate assured for 12 months. The monitoring occurs three times a 
year for PIF certified farmers, twice for GlobalGAP and once for organic and Fairtrade ones. 
Particularly, farmers with PIF certification have to comply with 115 requirements. In order to 
acquire GlobalGAP certification, farmers have to comply with 214 requirements. A comparison of 
the compliance points of PIF and GlobalGAP reveals that PIF has 85 of the total requirements set 
as mandatory or with some restrictions, while GlobalGAP has 148 major and minor musts. Most of 
the requirements from GlobalGAP are inclusive in PIF, but differences exist with respect to their 
level of importance and distribution over various stages. PIF focuses with 57 of the total 
requirements on the crop management compared to 128 of GlobalGAP. In both cases, the second 
major stage is the post-harvesting process and related issues. Additionally, it has been found that 
farmers with GlobalGAP certification utilize the book keeping provided by PIF, although 
GlobalGAP itself does not require any book keeping. It means that the process to certify with 
GlobalGAP becomes easier and faster when the farmer has already PIF. PIF provides through 
normatives, specific procedures with regard to plant management and post-harvesting for each 




type of fruit. GlobalGAP in contrast presents overall requirements to be applied for all fruits and 
vegetables, not observing their different characteristics.  
The analysis of the Fairtrade requirements reveals that it focuses on small producers’ 
organizations. All producers must achieve 55 out of the 105 of the requirements. Considering both 
types of requirements, minimum and progress, it was found that the stage which receives most 
attention is the environmental part with 48 requirements, followed by the labor conditions with 29. 
Fairtrade certification does not have its own book keeping. It focuses more on the overall process 
instead of on particular characteristics and procedures of the production system. It guarantees a 
minimum price premium for farmers, in contrast to other certification systems.  
An analysis of the organic certification standards reveals that the program disposes requirements 
as required (total of 57 out of 70) and prohibited (total of 13) but does not specify their level of 
compliance. In addition, the requirements are not directed to any kind of product or crop in 
particular. Major emphasis is put on the production system. Organic certification does not include 
any book keeping obligation.  
5.3 Third country standards affecting Brazilian fruits exports  
Apart from certification, selected food standards and regulations from other countries affect 
Brazilian fruits exports. The following section presents a description of regulations from the 
European Union and the United State, the two major export markets of Brazilian fruits.  
Access to markets in the European Union depends on meeting a variety of regulations. The extent 
of regulation and its complexity has increased significantly in the last decade. The European Union 
fruit standards were regulated first in 1972. Regulation (EEC) 1035/72 specifies the size, color, 
and caliber and other quality requirements of fruits and vegetables. In 1990, the Council Directive 
(EEC) 90/642 determined the maximum residue levels (MRL) of pesticide products and its 
requirements for traceability to this sector.  
Furthermore, the Regulation (EC) 466/2001 sets the maximum levels for certain contaminants in 
foodstuffs. In 2004, the Regulation (EC) 852/2004 presented the general rules on the hygiene of 
foodstuffs including the procedures for verification and compliance. The main objective is to 
ensure a high level of consumer protection with regard to food safety along the chain. In 2005, the 
Regulation (EC) 2073/2005 on microbiological criteria for foodstuffs included precautionary 
measures. Additionally, the Regulation (EC) 396/2005 established new maximum residue levels of 




pesticides in food, plant and animal origin products. The Regulation (EC) 178/2002 sets the 
general principles and requirements of EU food law related to all stages of production, processing 
and distribution (complemented by Regulation 882/2004). Many regulations had been also created 
specifically for fruits and vegetables. Regarding specifically watermelons e.g., the Regulation (EC) 
1862/2004 sets the respective marketing standards, while the Regulation (EC) 2789/1999 sets them 
for grapes. 
The Regulation EC (834/2007) establishes a set of objectives, principles and basic rules for 
organic production as well as a permanent importing regime and consistent controlling for organic 
products. For instance, food will be only able to carry the EU organic logo if at least 95% of the 
ingredients are organic. FAO (2001) highlights that organic fruits and vegetables exported to the 
European Community, Japan or the United States must meet import requirements relating to size, 
grade, quality and maturity. A certificate based on an inspection must be issued by the country’s 
relevant authority to indicate compliance with standards.  
Similarly to the EU, also the US has certain regulations which affect exports of fruits from Brazil. 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), quality standards are based on 
measurable attributes that describe the value of the product. Standards for each product describe 
the entire range of quality requirements for a product, and the number of grades varies by 
commodity. For example, USDA defines the standards related to grading, level and application of 
pesticides, maturity requirements and packing for table grapes for mangoes (USDA, 2007). 
To be accepted as a potential exporter, the area where melon is harvested must be free of the 
anastrepha grandis, which is a type of tropical fruit fly. Only in 2002 (Decree N. 16245) some 
municipalities in the Rio Grande do Norte and Ceará states were considered as fruit fly free area. 
According to APHIS (2008), the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service has to ensure that all consignments of melons from Brazil to the US are 
accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate issued by a Brazilian National Plant Protection 
Organization that includes a declaration indicating that the fruit was grown in such a free area. In 
response to this law, COEX 11 was created in 1990 in the Rio Grande do Norte state. In addition, 
quarantine treatment by immersion in hot water is used for fruits that are hosts of tropical fruit 
flies. This also applies to Brazilian mangoes for example (APHIS, 2001).   
                                                 
11 The interview took place at COEX, on 11/12/2006.  
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6 Data analysis of the fruit sectors 
This chapter analyzes the primary data deriving from the field survey. In the descriptive statistics, 
the producers have been divided by type of fruit, namely mango and grapes producers, cashew nut 
producers, and melon producers. The objective is to first assess the differences and similarities 
among certified, non-certified and those farmers who are in process to obtain certification. Section 
6.2 then presents some econometric results.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics of the survey 
In the first group, the mango and grapes producers, a total of 155 surveyed farmers (51%) have no 
certification, those in process comprise 94 (31%) and those who are already certified comprise 54 
(18%). Further, the analysis on the cashew nuts considers small producers without certification as 
one group (70% or 60 producers) and small producers with certification as another (30% or 25 
producers). Finally, the results from six interviews with melon farmers, labeled as cases A-F, are 
discussed. While the first three cases A, B and C relate to non-certified farmers, D, E and F refer to 
certified ones. 
The descriptive statistics based on the survey are presented in the following separately for each 
type of fruit. It is structured according to the (a) socio-economic factors, (b) farm characteristics, 
(c) investments done on the farms and certification costs, (d) benefits of certification, (e) 
availability of information, and (f) farmers’ expectation about the future. 
6.1.1 Socio-economic factors 
Mango and grapes  
The survey collected data regarding socio-economic characteristics of mango and grapes 
producers, including age, gender and level of education. With respect to age, it was found that the 
producers are on average 49 years old. It was expected that the ones who have adopted 
certification would be younger than the non-certified producers since they might be more open to 
new technologies or practices (D’Souza et al., 1993). However, there is hardly a difference 
between the two groups: certified producers were on average 48.8, while non-certified ones were 
50.5 years old. Thus, the expected result is not supported by the data. Similarly, it was expected, 
that producers who are certified would have more years of schooling and long-term experiences in 
growing fruits than the non-certified ones. However, the results show that on average certified and 
non-certified producers have both 7.7 years of schooling. The farmers in process have the highest 
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level of education with 10.2 years of schooling. The figures on the years of experiences show that 
certified producers have on average 7.3 years of experience in grapes and 9.2 years in mango 
production while the non-certified producers have only 5 years and 7 years, respectively. While 
the years of schooling do not seem to influence the decision to adopt certification, the years of 
experience do.  
The data show that mango and grapes were the main source of income for 91% of the certified 
producers, for 80% of the producers in process, and for 75% of the non-certified producers. Apart 
from producing mangoes and grapes, farmers are also involved in the production of other tropical 
fruits such as coconuts, guava, melons, banana and papaya (15% of non-certified producers and 
2% of certified ones). This result reflects the high dependence of the producers on fruits in general, 
but also indicates a stronger trend towards specialization for certified producers.  
Cashew nuts 
Data on the importance of the cashew nuts production shows that for 18% of the non-certified 
producers and 32% of the certified producers, cashew nuts production is the main source of 
income. This also indicates that certified farmers are more specialized than non-certified ones. 
Apart from producing cashew nuts, farmers are also involved in other activities such as off-farm 
activities (32% and 4% for non-certified and certified producers, respectively), in other agriculture 
activities (4% and 44%), or they are retired (37% and 44%).  
Certified cashew nuts producers are 57.3 years old on an average while non-certified ones are 43.3 
years old. Regarding education, on average, certified producers have 7.3 years of schooling 
compared to 3.8 years in the case of non-certified farmers. Additionally, non-certified producers 
have 3.2 years of experience in producing cashew nuts on average, while the certified producers 
have only 1.2 years. This indicates that cashew nuts growing is a relatively new agricultural 
activity for all surveyed farmers.  
6.1.2 Characteristics of the farms 
Mango and grapes  
A comparison of the mean values between the groups clearly indicates that certified mango and 
grapes farmers have much more land (100 ha and 93 ha) and more irrigated area (40 ha and 29 ha) 
compared to non-certified (Table 6.1). Indeed, an irrigation system is necessary for fruit 
production in the surveyed region. There are two types of irrigation systems: the drip and micro 
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sprinkler which are considered very sophisticated while furrow and conventional sprinkler are less 
sophisticated. The study reveals that most of the certified farmers use very sophisticated irrigation 
systems (83%). However, also a high percentage of the non-certified farmers have very 
sophisticated systems (59%).  
The type of used irrigation system plays an important role with respect to the productivity of the 
farm. The results show that mango yields on average amount to 19.3 tons per ha for non-certified 
producers, 20.5 tons per ha for producers in process, and 25.9 tons per ha for certified producers. 
Concerning grapes, the productivity for non-certified producers is nearly 16.3 tons per ha, while 
for those in process and for the certified ones, 18 and 23 tons per ha are achieved. Thus, certified 
farmers achieve in the given sample higher yields than non-certified ones. But they also have 
relatively higher net income. Regarding the average net income of grapes farmers, it was found to 
be around R$12,70012 per ha for non-certified farmers, R$15,850 for those in process and 
R$20,150 for the certified ones. Concerning mango farmers, the average net income is 
approximately R$9,000 for non-certified farmers, R$8,300 for those in process and R$10,100 per 
ha for the certified ones13.  
    
 
                                                 
12 1US$ = R$2 at the time of data collection 
13 The total income refers to the fruit production only, however other income sources were found to be negligible.  




Table 6.1: Farm characteristics of mango and grapes farmers 
Non-certified Producers in process Certified  
N=155 N=94 N=54  Variables 
Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation Ch², t test 
Mango        
Land size (ha) 20.0 66.8 18.2 27.2 101.0 299.1 0.003*** 
Irrigated area (ha) 10.3 10.1 11.7 21.8 39.8 86.1 0.000*** 
Yield (tons per ha) 19.3 8.9 20.4 9.3 25.9 9.6 0.003*** 
Total income (R$) 125,263 187,526 141,236 219,134 1,215,991 3,434,017 0.000*** 
Income (R$/ha) 17,050 21,095 8,325 5,839 10,076 8,960 0.000*** 
Production costs (R$) 58,314 79,995 62,831 98,081 463,108 1,279,293 0.000*** 
Costs (R$/ha) 7,965 3,601 7,631 3,897 11,814 4,390 0.000*** 
Total net income (R$) 67,048 123,327 78,405 124,005 752,882 2,171,144 0.327 
Net income (R$/ha) 9,085 21,095 8,325 5,839 10,076 8,960 0.887 
Grapes        
Land size (ha) 34.7 113.5 8.2 3.1 93.5 304.9 0.194 
Irrigated area (ha) 14.4 35.6 6.3 4.1 28.9 77.1 0.198 
Yield (tons per ha) 16.3 10.5 17.9 7.9 22.9 8.5 0.014*** 
Total income (R$) 188,878 450,182 348,396 269,089 606,227 861,867 0.006*** 
Income (R$/ha) 28,947 20,279 31,513 13,917 42,748 21,177 0.016*** 
Production costs (R$) 89,279 156,313 160,348 110,438 324,250 485,235 0.083*** 
Costs (R$/ha) 16,249 8,779 15,666 7,222 22,612 10,049 0.005*** 
Total net income (R$) 99,598 297,713 188,048 161,734 281,977 456,505 0.012*** 
Net income (R$/ha) 12,698 14,129 15,847 8,788 20,145 15,288 0.085*** 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
 Source: Own compilation   




The total land size and the area occupied with cashew nut trees show that certified farmers have 
more land (53 ha) and a larger area covered with cashew nut trees (29 ha) than non-certified ones. 
Irrigation is not used for cashew nut production in the surveyed region. Farmers rely on rainfall 
and on ground water instead. 
With regard to cashew nuts, the productivity in 2005 is, on average, 253 kg/ha and 302 kg/ha for 
non-certified and certified producers, respectively. The productivity depends on the number of 
trees per ha, the type of tree, their age, rainfall (recommended above 600 mm), adequate 
management and the technology used. However, no further details on these factors are available 
from the survey. Since most surveyed cashew nut farmers are not aware of their production cost, a 
further analysis on total cost and total net income is not available. Instead, the total income is 
calculated using the price received and the volume sold. The average income in 2005 is around 
R$2,033 for non-certified and R$7,886 for certified producers. Thus, also for certified cashew nuts 
growers, the yields and net income are relatively higher.   
Melon 
Comparing certified and non-certified growers of melons, it is found that the certified ones have 
more land allocated to this fruit, have a higher productivity and more years of experience in the 
field. All surveyed producers harvest the Yellow type of melon and some Piel del Sapo, both 
considered as common varieties. Certified growers plant additionally other varieties classified as 
nobles14. Taking into consideration the soil and climatic conditions, a drip irrigation system is 
needed for a successful production. 
Since the production of melons is very capital intensive, with investments per ha ranging between 
R$11,000 to R$ 15,000 per ha, the trading company or importer provide a certain percentage of the 
value required to finance a portion for the coming harvesting year to the producer in advance. 
Alternatively, it is found that the producer invests his or her own resources. This was the case for 
one non-certified producer; two certified producers indicated that they financed 90% and 70%, 
respectively from their own financial resources. A third possibility refers to taking loans from 
commercial banks, however, this is considered as the last and not favored option due to the high 
                                                 
14 Cantaloupe, Orange Flesh and Galia. 
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rates of interest. Only two producers indicated that they took very small amount of loans from the 
bank. 
6.1.3 Investments and certification costs 
Mango and grapes 
Farmers have to invest on their farms in order to qualify for certain certification schemes. All 
producers pointed out the new infrastructure and reconstruction on their farms in 2005 and their 
estimated amount in Reais which arose due to certification. In order to make the analysis easier, 
the items were categorized into four groups (Table 6.2): 
i) group 1: machines, tractors and spraying equipments; 
ii) group 2: deposits for empty packages, tools, agro-chemicals, fertilizer, agro-chemical 
mixture room and water station;  
iii) group 3: office building, computers, house for the caretakers, lodgings for employees, 
kitchen,  toilettes and signaling plates, and  
iv) group 4: sheds for packing, cold storage and packing houses.  
It is observed that producers with certification have done more investments in new infrastructure 
on their farms: investments related to group 2 and group 4 had a mean value of around R$48,000 
and R$45,000, as opposed to only very minor investments done by non-certified ones. The mean 
values spent on reconstruction were low. The results indicate that most of the certified farmers 
have invested on their farms in new infrastructure rather than on reconstruction in order to meet 
the certification requirements. 
The last analysis refers to the cost of the certification which includes the yearly cost of monitoring 
and renewal of the certificate, paid to the certifying agency. Besides, there are costs associated 
with the tests of agro-toxic residues, water, soil and leaves. For the producers who belong to 
different certification schemes, it is not possible to differentiate between values spent on the 
individual schemes. Partly, this is due to the problem that the same infrastructure is used for 
different types of certification schemes. The results show that overall, farmers paid yearly R$1,000 
for certification. The yearly costs of the tests are quite similar for certified farmers.  
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Table 6.2: Cost of new infrastructure, reconstruction and tests for mango and grapes 
farmers 
Producers Chi²,t test 
Description of the variables 
Non-cert. Process Certif. Sig. 
Investments due to certification     
Group 1 (mean value in R$ in 2005) 568 0.0 12,555 0.000*** 
Group 2 (mean value in R$ in 2005) 367 3,465 47,575 0.067* 
Group 3 (mean value in R$ in 2005) 684 2,990 16,313 0.009*** 
Group 4 (mean value in R$ in 2005) 167 1,478 44,962 0.001*** 
Cost of certification 0.0 33 1,093 0.000*** 
Tests 74 72 646 0.000*** 
Certified [n=54]; in process  [94] and non-certified producers [n=155] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
It was investigated whether producers with certification invest a higher amount of their own 
resources than producers without certification. The average amount invested on their farms in 
2005 by mango and grapes certified producers was R$143,000 compared to R$45,900 by 
producers without certification and R$43,900 by those who are in process. However, it must be 
considered that the farms of the certified farmers are relatively large. 
Cashew nuts 
Certified cashew nuts farmers invested in 2005 R$852, compared to R$107 by producers without 
certification. These results show that certified farmers generally invest more but at a very low 
level. Unlike the investments done in infrastructure and reconstruction in the grapes and mango 
sectors, the cashew nuts sector requires a basic infrastructure. The total amount spent by all 
cashew nuts producers in new infrastructures was R$37,300 and R$7,100 in reconstruction. For 
the certification, the certified farmers indicated that they do not pay anything. Since the certified 
producers are members of the cooperative, the organic certificate is assured by the group and not 
individually. The monitoring is done once a year, but farmers are not aware of the cost.  Further, 
none of the producers, whether certified or not, have tested water, soil, leaves or conducted any 
other kind of test.  
Melon 
The estimated values on new infrastructure and reconstruction indicate that all certified farmers 
concentrated more on the latter. Comparing the amount invested, two of the certified farmers 
(Case D and E) are quite similar (R$60,000 or R$500 per ha), while the third one (Case F) 
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presented a value of R$1,000,000 (R$555 per ha). Non-certified farmers plan to invest in their 
farms huge amounts: one plans to build a packing house estimated at R$1,000,000; the other two 
expect to invest around R$300,000 (R$1,500 per ha) and R$80,000 (R$615 per ha).  
With respect to monitoring, the certified farmers mentioned that the certifying company which 
they are working with is a foreign one with a branch in Brazil. Monitoring vary between one to 
three times a year. It is interesting to note that one of the farmers faced three annual audits and 
paid R$15,000, while another paid an amount of R$11,300 for only one visit. The third certified 
farmer who indicated that he received 2 visits a year, paid only around R$6,000. Thus, there seem 
to be large differences with respect to the monitoring and the costs of certification.  
6.1.4 Benefits of certification 
Mango and grapes 
All producers were asked to rank different favorable aspects of certification according to their 
importance. Looking individually at each group of producers, the analysis reveals that the major 
advantage is related to receiving a higher price. This was perceived by 100% of the certified, 82% 
of producers in process and 75% of the non-certified ones. Decreasing the production cost was 
mentioned by 89%, 61% and 35% of producers who are certified, those in process and those who 
are not certified respectively. To decrease the use of agro toxics and pesticides is mentioned by 
89% of certified farmers, 66% of those in process and 33% by non-certified ones, as the third most 
favorable aspect of certification (Table 6.3).   
Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the results of certified farmers’ expectation of receiving a 
price premium with the actual price premium received. The survey reveals that almost all 
producers with certification received a price premium. Regarding the price received per fruit, the 
survey reveals that the certified group received R$0.83 per kg of mango and R$1.86 per kg of 
grapes, before certification and R$1.31 and R$2.40, respectively, after certification. This is 
equivalent to an increase of 58% and 28% for mango and grapes, respectively, due to certification. 
The price levels of the non-certified farmers are comparable with those the certified farmers 
received prior to certification.  
Having certification also contributes towards environmentally-friendly production. The findings 
reveal that having an environmental plan and recycling empty agro toxic packages were the main 
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processes that have been used to maintain environment friendliness. Certified farmers are more 
likely to have an environmental plan (89%) and to recycle packages (83%).  
Table 6.3: Benefits of certification in the case of mango and grapes 
Producers Chi², t test 
Description of the variables Non-
cert. Process Certif. Sig. 
Economic aspects     
Expectation of receiving price premium (in %) 74.8 81.9 100 0.000*** 
Price received per kg of mango before certifying (mean value in 
R$ in 2004)  0.8 0.7 
0.83 0.750 
Price received per kg of grapes before certifying (mean value in 
R$ in 2004) 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.208 
Price received per kg of mango after certifying (mean value in R$ 
in 2005)  - - 1.31 - 
Price received per kg of grapes after certifying (mean value in R$ 
in 2005) - - 2.4 - 
Environmental aspects     
To decrease the use of pesticides and agro-toxics (in %) 32.9 66.0 88.9 0.000*** 
To decrease the production cost (in %) 34.8 60.6 90.1 0.000*** 
To have an environmental plan (in %) 0.0 57.4 88.9 0.000*** 
To recycle empty agro-toxic packages (in %) 0.0 66.0 83.3 0.000*** 
Certified [n=54], in process  [94] and non-certified producers [n=155] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
Cashew nuts 
The analysis on the benefits of having certification reveals that the major advantage is related to 
food safety for 88% of the certified producers and 8% of the non-certified ones. Receiving a higher 
price was mentioned as a second benefit, and to decrease the environmental damages was 
indicated by 76% of certified producers and by 8% of non-certified ones.  
Regarding the expectation of receiving price premia, the following is found: 92% of producers 
with certification and 58% of producers without certification have a positive expectation of 
receiving a price premium. Furthermore, nearly 88% of the certified producers have received a 
price premium. The price received per kg of cashew nuts before certifying was similar between the 
two sets of farmers, namely, around R$1.20, while the price received per kg of kernel was higher 
for certified farmers (R$7.11) compared to R$5.35 for non-certified ones. Hence, those farmers 
who decided to certify received an 82% higher price per kg of nuts and 62% per kg of kernel in 
2005 (Table 6.4).  
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Furthermore, with respect to the environmental benefits, certified and non-certified producers 
mention the following main measures they have adopted to maintain environmental friendliness: 
having an environmental plan, avoiding burning, practicing adequate soil management, using less 
pesticides and agro-toxics on the trees and recycling the packages. Certified farmers concentrated 
more on avoiding burning on the farm (92%) compared to (71%) non-certified ones and having an 
adequate soil management (88%) and (10%), respectively. All certified farmers, but only 30% of 
the non-certified ones indicated that they use less pesticides and agro-toxics. Thus, the recycling of 
used agro-toxics packages was considered by only 32% of the certified farmers and 71% of the 
non-certified ones as an advantage. The findings on having an environmental plan were indicated 
by 96% and 90% of the certified and non-certified producers. 
Table 6.4: Benefits of certification in the case of cashew nuts 
Producers Chi², t test 
Description of the variables 
Cert. Non-cert. Sig. 
Economic aspects    
Positive expectation of receiving a price premium (in %) 92.0 58.3 0.002*** 
Price received per kg nuts before certifying (mean value in R$ in 2004) 1.26 1.21 0.750  
Price received per kg kernel  before cert. (mean value in R$ in 2004) 7.11 5.35 0.094* 
Price received per kg nuts after certifying (mean value in R$ in 2005) 2.29 - - 
Price received per kg kernel  after certifying (mean value in R$ in 2005) 11.51 - - 
Environmental aspects    
Avoiding burning on the farm (in %) 92.0 71.7 0.033** 
Having an adequate soil management (in %) 88.0 10.0 0.000*** 
Use of less pesticides and agro-toxics (in %) 100.0 30.0 0.000*** 
Recycling used agro-toxics packages (in %) 32.0 71.7 0.001*** 
Having an environmental plan (in %) 96.0 90.0 0.332 
Certified [n=25] and non-certified producers [n=60] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
Melon 
Opposed to farmers without certification, producers with certification expected to receive a price 
premium, but this expectation was not met. Instead, the farmers mentioned that certification 
enabled them to remain in the market of fresh melons. One of the certified farmers (Case F) 
answered that the level of exports and the quality of his/her melons increased. The two remaining 
certified producers (Case D and E) expected to increase the planted area. Also, those farmers 
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without certification had a clear plan to increase the planted area and to obtain certification in the 
future. Besides, all certified farmers agreed that training courses and increased awareness about the 
certification requirements of the workers play an important role with regards to the benefits.  
With respect to environmental benefits, two certified farmers (Case D and F) answered that they 
have an environmental plan, plant native vegetation and map fauna and flora species. Having a 
conservation area was mentioned by all farmers. Nevertheless, to maintain natural fences, to avoid 
burning, to minimize soil degradation and to recycle empty packages were mentioned by five 
farmers (except Case B) as advantages of certification. 
According to the results, two certified farmers highlighted that the clients ask if the farm is 
certified with a certain scheme. From the perspective of the three farmers without certification, 
there is an increasing need for promoting and ensuring quality, safety and no residues in fruit 
production. This was perceived by the uncertified farmers, although they also indicate that 
domestic consumers do not seem to be concerned about their health or aware about the meaning of 
food safety. Thus, certification is expected to provide a control of the whole chain. The main 
challenge faced by all producers is the Normative N. 58 launched in 2006 by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food, which monitors agro toxics residues in fruits 
produced under the PIF system. More specifically, farmers who aim to export to the EU are 
obliged to have PIF certification.  
6.1.5 Availability of information  
Mango and grapes 
Table 6.5 shows the main sources of information concerning certification. This information on 
certification refers to the year 2004 when most of the farmers were not certified yet and the 
process to certify was only starting in the survey region. Data on information sources were 
aggregated into three groups: (1) organizations - EMBRAPA, SEBRAE, CODEVASF; (2) social 
network15, internet, TV; and (3) cooperatives, groups and associations. Some of the farmers 
mentioned more than one group as a source of information. Almost all interviewed producers 
indicated that they were informed about certification schemes from EMBRAPA, SEBRAE, or 
CODEVASF. Slightly over 50% of all producers indicated that they received information from 
cooperatives, groups and associations (Group 3); 44% of these adopted certification later on. 
                                                 
15 Social network is characterized by interactions among people in the neighbourhood to communicate and share 
information. 
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About 25% of all farmers obtained information from a social network, internet or TV (Group 2), 
but most of these (17%) are not certified today. Thus, organizations which belong to the Group 1 
play a significant role in providing information to the producers, but also Group 3 seems to 
influence farmers’ decision on whether to adopt certification. 
Additionally, 15% of non-certified and 11% of in process producers indicated that they have 
acquired knowledge and updated information mainly through brochures available from SEBRAE 
and EMBRAPA. Apart from the written material, 11% of each group - certified and in process 
producers - participated in training courses offered by both organizations. Even 16% non-certified 
farmers indicated that they participated but they did not adopt certification. EMBRAPA’s role in 
research is considered as being important by 89% of the certified, 73% of those in process and 
56% of non-certified farmers. But also CODEVASF is judged by most farmers as being very 
important in providing technical assistance and knowledge transfer. This opinion is shared by 
82%, 67% and 93% of certified, non-certified and in process growers, respectively.  
Table 6.5: Availability of information for mango and grapes farmers 
Producers Chi², t test 
Description of the variables 
Non-cert. Process Certif Sig. 
Knowing about certification     
Group 1: EMBRAPA, SEBRAE, CODEVASF (in %) 98.9 89.7 90.7 0.020** 
Group 2 : social network, internet, TV (in %) 16.8 7.4 1.8 0.004*** 
Group 3: cooperative, associations (in %) 4.5 3.2 44.4 0.000*** 
Acquiring knowledge     
Via brochures from both EMBRAPA and SEBRAE (in %) 15.5 10.6 0.0 0.008*** 
Via training courses from both EMBRAPA and SEBRAE (in %) 16.1 11.7 11.1 0.502 
Via development of research from EMBRAPA (in %) 56.1 73.4 88.9 0.000*** 
Via technical assistance from CODEVASF (in %) 67.1 92.6 81.5 0.000*** 
Certified [n=54], in process  [94], non-certified producers [n=155] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation   
Cashew nuts 
Non-certified cashew nut farmers and those who are already certified were also asked to indicate 
the main source of information regarding certification (Table 6.6). With respect to the certified 
group, the question was again referred to 2004 when they were not certified yet. The results show 
that 88% of the certified producers received information from the social network, via internet or 
TV, while 88% of the non-certified growers were informed through cooperatives or buyers. In this 
Chapter 6 Data analysis on the fruit sectors 
 
 92
sector, group 1 organizations (EMBRAPA, SEBRAE) do not play any role. It is important to 
highlight that the information especially regarding the organic certification spread via the social 
network is mainly among the certified group, while the cooperatives try to provide information to 
producers who are not certified yet.  
In contrast, in terms of knowledge transfer and updates, 32% and 48% of certified and non-
certified farmers mentioned that the extension workers of SEBRAE and Institute of Technical 
Assistance and Rural Extension of Rio Grande do Norte (EMATER)16 were the main source of 
information about organic certification. Brochures and training courses are stressed to be important 
for 40% of non-certified and 28% of those already certified, respectively.  
Table 6.6: Availability of information for cashew nuts farmers 
Producers Chi², t test 
Description of the variables 
Cert. Non-cert. Sig. 
Knowing about certification schemes:    
Group 1: EMBRAPA, SEBRAE (in %) 1.2 3.2 0.014** 
Group 2: social network, Internet, TV (in %) 88.0 0.0 0.000*** 
Group 3: cooperative, buyer (in %) 1.7 88.0 0.000*** 
Acquiring knowledge through    
Brochures from SEBRAE and EMATER (in %) 4.0 40.0 0.000*** 
Training courses offered by SEBRAE and EMATER (in %) 28.0 13.3 0.000*** 
Extension workers of SEBRAE and EMATER (in %) 31.7 48.0 0.098* 
Certified [n=25] and non-certified producers [n=60] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
Melon 
The high level of melon exports to different markets leads the certified farmers to have different 
certification schemes according to each buyer. According to the results, GlobalGAP was adopted 
by three farmers in 2002, 2003 and in 2005. However, PIF was only adopted in recent years. 
Melon farmers delay the adoption of PIF mainly due to its non-acceptance in the international 
market. Asking the non-certified farmers which certification program they would accept, they 
indicated that their choice would be GlobalGAP or PIF. One of the PIF certified farmers also 
intends to enter the Fair Trade market, BRC and UsGAP17 certification schemes depending on the 
type of buyer. Furthermore, farmers revealed where they obtained information regarding 
                                                 
16EMATER provides training courses and consultancy to small and medium farmers   
17 Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) protocol aiming to access the US market. 
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standards. Five farmers mentioned that the main source of information was the buyer with whom 
they were trading. The updates are done basically through the certifying company and via internet.  
6.1.6 Future expectation and perspectives 
Mango and grapes 
With respect to future expectations, all certified producers are likely to remain in the business in 
the long-run. About 90% of the certified producers, 85% of those in process and 53% of the non-
certified ones indicated that they intent to export to other markets in the future. Around 33% of the 
certified producers aim to target Japan, 20% the US and 13% any markets to which they have 
access. Farmers in process mentioned the US with 38%, Europe with 18% and Japan with 19%. 
Cashew nuts 
Certified producers intend to remain in the business of producing nuts much longer than the non-
certified ones. 100% of the certified producers are likely to remain in fruit production for an 
undetermined number of years and 66% of the non-certified ones as well. Farmers have no 
expectation to change the type of buyer or to upgrade to a more sophisticated marketing channel.  
Melon 
The surveyed melon producers also have positive future expectations. However, two uncertified 
farmers (Cases A and B) and one certified one (Case F) believe that certification schemes exclude 
the less capable growers from the market. The increasing level and number of requirements per se 
selects farmers who are able to comply with them. With respect to market changes, two certified 
farmers (Case D and E) intend to continue producing the same type of melon and dealing with the 
same clients in the future. Case F aims to conquer new markets and diversify the range of clients 
while Case B believes that once he or she is being certified he or she will be able to export directly 
to international markets. Finally, Case A together with other farmers plan to organize themselves 
and export as a group.  
6.1.7 Summary 
The findings reveal that certified mango, grapes and melon farmers are more specialized and 
highly dependent on the income obtained from these fruits and are more experienced compared to 
the others. Unertified cashew nuts growers are also engaged in other agricultural activities like 
livestock and beekeeping and are less experienced. With respect to the productivity and net income 
for mango, grapes, melon and cashew nuts, also higher figures are achieved by certified farmers. 
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Certified mango and grapes farmers clearly invested a higher amount of private resources on the 
farm compared to the two remaining groups. The investments on the cashew nuts farms out of 
private resources are generally low. In the case of melon farmers, it was found that farmers are 
either obtaining resources from buyers in advance or are investing own resources. Certified mango 
and grapes farmers had invested mainly in new infrastructure, while certified melon ones focused 
more on reconstruction.  
The benefits of certification are also based on whether a higher price will be received. 100% of 
grapes and mangoes certified farmers expected to receive a higher price due to certification and 
they also received it. Analyzing the price receipt before and after certifying, it was found that 
farmers had a price increase of 58% per kg for mango and 28% per kg of grapes. Farmers who 
decided to certify received an 82% higher price per kg for nuts and 62% per kg for kernels in 
2005. Melon producers with certification did not receive a price premium, but it enabled them to 
remain in the market.  
For mango and grapes farmers, acquiring information on certification from organizations 
(SEBRAE, EMBRAPA and CODEVASF) play a significant role while the social network does 
not. However, the social network is important in providing information for cashew nuts farmers 
who finally adopted certification. Cashew nuts farmers who did not adopt were informed mainly 
through the cooperative and buyers. For melon farmers, the buyer was mentioned as the main 
source of information. Mango, grapes and cashew nuts farmers have the expectation to remain in 
the fruit business for a long time, but they intent to access additional or other markets in the future.  
6.2 Econometric results 
Section 6.2.1 presents the description of the variables, data used in the logistic regression and 
discusses the estimation procedure. Section 6.2.3 discusses the econometric estimates for the all 
fruits model, section 6.2.4 the econometric estimates for mango and grapes and lastly, section 
6.2.5 presents the results on the cashew nuts model. A brief summary closes this sub-chapter.   
6.2.1 Description of variables and data used in the logistic regression 
This section presents the variables and data used in the econometric models. For the logistic 
regression model, explanatory variables need to be selected according to their relevance. The 
number and type of variables to be included vary depending on the objectives and hypotheses 
being tested, and sometimes by the limitations imposed by data availability. Generally the 
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explanatory variables cover characteristics of the producers, characteristics of their farms and 
trading relations. They include:  
• Education: more educated farmers are more likely to accept new ideas and adopt new 
production technologies. Education is expected to be positive and significantly associated with 
the adoption of certification (D’Souza et al., 1993; Niemeyer & Lombard, 2003); 
• Gender: adopters are more likely to be male because principal decisions on farming livelihood 
are usually delegated to or made by male counterparts [positive correlation]; 
• Manager: having a manager to run a farm may indicate that there are better professional skills to 
manage the farm and thus, the likelihood increases;  
• Level of specialization: the high dependence on the income obtained through the harvest of a 
specific fruit may play a significant role in the decision. The decision of compliance with a 
certification scheme is expected to be positively correlated with this variable;  
• Family members: it is expected that more members of the family would carry on the activity. 
Therefore, the greater the amount of family members engaged, the higher the probability to 
certify.  This would confirm the findings by D’Souza et al. (1993) that the use of hired labor on 
farms that adopted certification is likely to be less than on conventional farms;  
• Living village: Analysis of the residence of the farmers, i.e., whether they live in the city, village 
or on the farm provides an indication of the potential engagement of the farmer put into farming. 
The long distance from the farm to the village or the existence of a social network may lead 
producers to decide not to live on the farm, but in the village instead. Also wealthier farmers are 
more likely to live in cities than less wealthier farmers; 
• Non-agricultural income: farmers who are engaged in other income-generating activities 
besides the cultivation of fruits, have lower chances to certify than those who are highly 
dependent on the income obtained by fruits; 
• Type of irrigation system: the level of technology of an irrigation system, whether it is less or 
more sophisticated may influence the decision-making positively. Luning et al. (2002:383) 
assumed that food quality is dependent on both dynamic properties of the food product and 
related to applied technological conditions;  
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• Size: small-sized farms are expected to have a lower chance to certify. However, the chances to 
certify would increase if they would receive more support from government or do group 
certification. Thus, the outcome is ambiguous; 
• Irrigated area: the higher the proportion of the currently irrigated area towards the potential area 
to be irrigated, the greater is the probability of certification; 
• Years of experience: this study expects to find a positive correlation between years of 
experience and the decision to certify. The longer a farmer produces, the greater the chances to 
adopt certification.  
• Variety: the variety influences the productivity and consequently the level of income obtained 
from cashew nuts. It is expected that farmers who have the “dwarf” variety have lower 
productivity which would decrease the likelihood to certify; 
• Trust_relat: the type of relationship between buyer and farmer is characterized by a trust-based 
type of contracts. The probability to certify may decrease or increase with this type of 
contractual arrangement, depending on whether the buye adopts certification or not; 
• Years trading with a buyer: if there is a long-term relationship between farmer and buyer, the 
buyer may more easily persuade the producer to adopt certification, because the farmer is more 
likely to follow the buyers’ advice to certify. However, if the buyer has no incentive to trade 
with certified products, then the opposite is more likely to be the case. 
The variables presented in this section were used to assess empirically the determinants that lead 
farmers to adopt certification. Four models are estimated: (i) all fruits, (ii) mango, (iii) grapes and 
(iv) cashew nuts. Appendix 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the 
fruit model. Appendix 7 and Appendix 8 present the descriptive statistics for the binary variable in 
the mango and grapes models, and for cashew nuts, respectively. Table 6.7 presents the variables 
which are used in the logistic regression for the four models and their expected signs. Table 6.9, 
Table 6.10, Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 present logistic regression results (pseudo R-square, odds 
ratio, standard error, t-statistics, p values and 95% confidence intervals) for the all fruits model, 
mango, grapes and cashew nuts, respectively.  
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Table 6.7: List of variables for the econometric analysis  
Variables Description Expected sign  
Adopt_cert =1 if producer adopts certification; 0= otherwise  
Explanatory variables  
Mango =1 if farmer produces mango; 0= otherwise + 
Grapes =1 if farmer produces grapes; 0= otherwise + 
Education years of schooling  + 
Gender =1 if head is male; 0=otherwise + 
Family_HH number of family members of the household + 
Manager = if a manager is running the farm; 0= otherwise + 
Level_special Level of specialization  of the producer  + 
Size  =1 if size of the farm is small; 0= otherwise +/- 
Non_agric_income =1 if producer has income from non-agriculture sectors; 0= otherwise - 
Type_irrigation =1 if type of irrigation used is micro sprinkler and drip; 0= otherwise + 
Irrigated_area Share of current irrigated area towards the potential area to be irrigated + 
Living_village =1 if producer lives in rural communities; 0= otherwise +/- 
Year_exper Years of experience producing fruits + 
Variety =1 if variety of cashew nuts is dwarf; 0=otherwise - 
Years trading with a 
buyer Years trading with the buyer  +/- 
Trust_relat =1 if contract arrangements between buyer and producer is trust-based type of contract; 0= otherwise +/- 
Source: Own compilation 
6.2.2 Estimation procedure 
When having data, where endogeneity is a problem, consistent estimates can be obtained by 
suitably instrumenting the relevant variable using the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator. 
However, where endogeneity is not a significant problem, the Ordinary Least Squares estimator 
(OLS) is more efficient than instrumental variables. Thus both OLS and 2SLS are consistent if all 
variables are exogenous. Therefore, it is desirable to have a test for endogeneity of the variables 
‘main source of income’ and ‘productivity’- two variables where an endogeneity problem may 
exist - that shows whether 2SLS is necessary (Wooldridge, 2003). 
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A Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was performed under the conventional production function 
framework. While the assumption is that the conventional model may be mis-specified relative to 
the decision making, it is nevertheless considered useful in providing a simplified basis for 
carrying out the necessary endogeneity tests. The endogeneity test was performed separately for 
the two variables ‘main source of income’ and ‘productivity’. Table 6.8 shows the results. The 
Wu-Hausman F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq test show the same results for the ‘main 
source of income’ and ‘productivity’ for the separate models. For the model all fruits, the variable 
‘productivity’ reveals to be exogenous while ‘main source of income’ turns out to be endogenous. 
The instrumental variables tested for the former is ‘share of irrigated area compared to the 
potential area’, and for the latter is ‘level of specialization’ of the farmer. Similarly, productivity 
has shown to be exogenous also in the case of the mango and grapes models.  The instrumental 
variables used were ‘share of current irrigated area of potential’ and ‘irrigation system’. Thus, the 
first stage reveals that both variables are significant.  
In the cashew nuts model, the results turn out exogenous when testing the variable ‘number of 
crops’ as an instrumental variable for ‘if cashew nut is the main source of income’. However, the 
results are endogenous when testing with the variable ‘other agricultural activities’. It means that 
the variable ‘main source of income’ is endogenous; hence the variable ‘other agricultural 
activities’ is highly correlated with the dependent variable.  
In the regression analysis, the variable ‘level of specialization’ is included in the model and hence, 
the output has higher significance. With regard to ‘productivity’, the instrumental variable tested 
‘share of current area’ was not significant. It indicates that ‘productivity’ is an exogenous variable. 
According to Franca & Gondim (1999), increasing the productivity of the cashew nuts is a sine 
qua non condition to ensure the sustainability of the chain. Although ‘productivity’ reveals to be 
an exogenous variable in all tests, a high correlation is found between this variable and ‘manager’ 
and ‘size of the land is small’ and the dependent variable18. 
                                                 
18 The procedure for the endogeneity tests in STATA provides the 2SLS estimation results at the same time. The 
Wu-Hausman F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-square test are used to test the H0 hypothesis that 
regressors are exogenous. The t-statistic is then computed to test whether the OLS estimates are significantly 
different from the 2SLS estimates. 
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Table 6.8: Tests of endogeneity ‘productivity’ and ‘main source of income’ 
Wu-Hausman F-test Durbin- Wu-Hausman Chi-sq test Variable 
F P-value Chi-square P-value 
Model: all fruits      
Productivity 0.00316 0.95521 0.00325 0.95453 
Main source of income 3.68186 0.005576 3.76253 0.05241 
Model: Mango and grapes     
Productivity 0.51616 0.47306 0.53834 0.46312 
Model: cashew nuts     
Productivity 0.05610 0.81343 0.06451 0.79951 
Main source of income 0.84354 0.36133 0.93426 0.33376 
Source: Own calculation 
To check for the collinearity problem, a sample estimation of the correlation between the 
explanatory variables in the models was carried out (see the correlation matrix in Appendices 6 to 
9), showing significant correlation between some of the variables. The degree of multicollinearity 
can vary and have different effects on the model. When perfect collinearity occurs, i.e. when one 
independent variable is a perfect linear combination of the others, it is impossible to obtain an 
adequate estimate of regression coefficients with all the independent variables in the model.  
If the correlation coefficient between any pair of explanatory variables is greater than 0.9 in 
absolute value, it is argued that it would serve as an indication of a strong linear relationship and 
cause potential bias to the analysis (Hill et al., 2001). None of the correlation coefficients is greater 
than 0.9. There are no formal criteria for determining the magnitude of correlation that cause 
poorly estimated coefficients. 
Heteroscedasticity exists when the variances of all the observations are not the same, leading to 
consistent but inefficient parameter estimates. More importantly, the biases in estimated standard 
errors may lead to invalid inferences (White, 1980). Heteroscedasticity was detected when 
estimating the four models and was corrected using the robust standard error. The ‘pwcorr test’ 
displays all the pair wise correlation coefficients between the variables significant at the 5% level 
using the Bonferroni adjustment to calculate those significance levels (Baum, 2006).  
Three post estimation tests were performed in order to check specification errors or omitted 
variables. The first post estimation test included the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test which 
is obtained by calculating the Pearson chi-square statistic from the observed and expected 
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frequencies of binary responses (STATA, 2007). The second one refers to the model 
discrimination, assessed by examining the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics 
(ROC) curve, which shows the likelihood that the predicted will be higher for observations where 
the outcome of interest is observed than for observations where the outcome is not observed 
(STATA, 2007).  
The last test proceeded was the link test, which is used to detect a specification error. It is issued 
after running the logistic regression. The idea behind the test is that if the model is properly 
specified, one should not be able to find any additional predictors that are statistically significant 
except by chance. The test used the predicted values (_hat) and predicted value squared (_hatsq) as 
the predictors to rebuild the model. The variable ‘_hat’ should be a statistically significant 
predictor, since it is the predicted value from the model, and ‘_hatsq’ should not have much 
predicted power. However, when ‘_hatsq’ is significant, it means that the model has relevant 
omitted variables (STATA, 2007).  
6.2.3 Econometric estimates for the all fruits model 
The adjusted Wald test for the model indicates that the model has good explanatory power at the 
1% level. The R² is 0.09. A low R² is expected since an upper bound R² for binary-choice models 
is about 0.33 (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1981). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test shows that the model 
presents a good adequacy. The area under the ROC curve for the regression is 0.69 which reveals 
that the model presents adequate discrimination. The link test presents results according to the 
expectations: _hat is significant while _hatsq is not, meaning that the model does not have relevant 
omitted variables. The regression results for all fruits, which include mango, grapes and cashew 
nuts farmers are presented in Table 6.9 (see Appendix 9 for more details on the commands).  
According to the findings, more educated producers are more likely to certify. The odds are 1.07 
meaning that the chances increase by 7% as the producers have four more years of education. 
However, this result is not consistent with the results of Hattam & Holloway (2005) where their 
education variable was found to have a negative influence and, in their case does not have a 
significant result on the adoption decision of small-scale producers of avocado. Nevertheless, the 
results are in line with the findings of D’Souza et al. (1993) where farmers with at least a high 
school education have a 20% increase in the likelihood of adoption.   
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The variable “level of specialization” refers to the dependence on the income obtained by 
producing and harvesting specific fruits. Although the odds ratio is 0.91, the negative result shows 
that 9% of the farmers are less likely to certify if they are very specialized. One reason could be 
that farmers are also focusing on harvesting other fruits or to some extent are dependent on other 
sources of income, besides the agriculture sector. Carambas (2005) found that the variable 
“agriculture is the main source of income” which is similar to what was meant in this study by 
“level of specialization” is negative and insignificant.  
The negative effect on the decision whether to certify increases by 55% at 1% level of significance 
if farmers are dependent on non-agricultural income. The results found are in line with those 
discussed by Hattam & Holloway (2005) who also found the variable “other sources of income” 
positive, which may be particularly important in providing extra income to aid adoption.  
Farmers and buyers have basically three different types of contractual arrangements: written, only 
verbal and trust-based. The analysis is considering the variable trust-based. Producers who trade 
with the respective buyer using this type of arrangement, present 41% lower probability to certify 
(odds are 0.57). This result is significant at the 5% level.  
The econometric estimates reveal that farmers who live in a village are 49% less likely to certify. 
The odds are 0.61 being statistically significant at 5% level. The experience of producers in 
harvesting this specific fruit was expected to have a positive effect on the decision making [odds 
are 1.01], however the variable turned out to be insignificant. Carambas (2005) also found a 
positive and insignificant coefficient for years of experience. The proportion of the current 
irrigated area in ha compared to the potential area that can be irrigated at the farm, shows the 
possibility to increase the productive area. It is important to highlight that besides these plots of 
land, farmers still have area which is not suitable to irrigate, mainly due to soil conditions or 
because it is considered a preservation area. Although the results are not statistically significant, 
the odds ratio is positive.   
The remaining variables are not statistically significant. Among them is gender, which has a 
negative odds ratio. It means that female-headed farms are more likely to become certified but the 
variable is highly insignificant. The type of irrigation used, whether it is less sophisticated (furrow 
and conventional) or more sophisticated (sprinkler and micro sprinkler), has an odds ratio of 1.44. 
For mango and grapes, the type of irrigation is a key determinant to succeed in this production 
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while cashew nuts farmers do not utilize any system. Even though the results are not significant, 
there is a positive correlation between using a sophisticated system and the decision to certify.  
Table 6.9: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for all fruits producers 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z | 95% CI 
Gender 0.92 0.318 -0.24 0.814 0.468 1.801 
Education 1.07 0.029 2.61 0.011** 1.017 1.131 
Type_irrigation 1.44 0.348 1.53 0.126 0.901 2.319 
Level_special 0.91 0.033 -2.54 0.011** 0.848 0.978 
Irrigated_area 1.28 0.444 0.73 0.467 0.653 2.530 
Non_agric_inc 0.45 0.123 -2.90 0.004*** 0.268 0.775 
Living_village 0.61 0.148 -2.00 0.045** 0.385 0.989 
Year_experience 1.01 0.028 0.45 0.651 0.958 1.069 
Trust_relat 0.57 0.150 -2.11 0.034** 0.344 0.960 
Dependent variable: certified and non-certified producers; n=388 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(9, 388)=41.23   p<0.0000 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.0900 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(7)= 6.64    p< 0.4672 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.6911 
Source: Own calculations 
6.2.4 Econometric estimates for the mango and grapes models 
This analysis focuses on the 303 grapes and mangoes producers spread in the Juazeiro and 
Petrolina regions (see Appendices 10 and 11 for details on the Stata commands).  The regression 
estimates were done separately for each fruit aiming at capturing the effect of the determinants on 
the decision to certify. The adjusted Wald test for the model indicates that it is highly significant at 
the 1% level. The R² is 0.11 for grapes and mangoes, respectively. Thus, the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
test shows that both models present a good fit. The area under the ROC curve for the regressions is 
0.73 for both cases which reveals that the model presents adequate discrimination. Likewise, the 
link test presents results according to the expectations meaning that the model does not have 
relevant omitted variables. The regression results are presented in Table 6.10 and Table 6.11.  
The first variable to be analyzed is the type of fruit that the farmers are harvesting. Comparing the 
results of mango and grapes farmers, mango and grapes present an odds ratio of 0.41 and 2.19, 
being statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. The results indicate that producers, who are 
mango growers, have lower chances to certify while those who concentrate on grapes production 
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are two times more likely to certify. Producers with a higher level of education are more likely to 
adopt certification. The odds are the same for both fruits: 1.09 and also the differences between the 
groups are highly significant. For four more years of schooling, the chances to certify increase by 
9%.  
The small size of the farm contributes negatively to certify. Both, mango and grapes growers have 
an odds ratio of 0.53, which means that the probability decreases by 47% in case the farmers 
possess less land than 12 ha. Burton et al. (1998) mention that in the UK, managers of smaller 
holdings are more likely to adopt certification, but farm size per se does not explain the timing of 
that decision. The dependence on the income obtained from non-agricultural sectors also has a 
negative impact on the decision. In the case of grapes farmers, the probability decreases by 61% 
while for mango ones, the chances decrease by 64%. It indicates that the higher the dependence on 
non-agricultural income, the less likely the farmers are to certify. 
For each additional year of experience the chances to adopt certification increase by 9%. The 
results are highly significant at the 1% level. The contract arrangement “trust-based” contributes to 
decrease the level of producers to certify by 61%. The results are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The uncertainty of favourable arrangements and payment conditions may influence the 
decision making.  
For farmers of both fruits, the variable gender has a positive impact on the decision to certify, 
although the results are not statistically significant. It means that male-headed households are more 
likely to certify than female-headed households. Having a manager to run a farm reflects positively 
on the level of returns of the farm as presented on the descriptive statistics. Farmers who harvest 
only mango have an odds ratio of 1.10 while those harvesting grapes have an odds ratio of 1.15. 
The positive effect of this variable is highlighted by both regressions.  
The use of a sophisticated type of irrigation system increases the chances of both mango and 
grapes farmers to certify, although the differences between the groups are not statistically 
significant. The variable which refers to the share of the current area irrigated indicates that 
farmers who present a smaller rate have more chances to certify.  
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Table 6.10: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for mangoes producers 
Variables Odds ratio Robust Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% CI 
Mango 0.412 0.129 -2.83 0.005*** 0.223 0.761 
Gender 1.078 0.411 0.20 0.842 0.510 2.278 
Education 1.097 0.333 3.03 0.002*** 1.033 1.165 
Manager 1.106 0.385 0.29 0.771 0.559 2.188 
Size 0.530 0.160 -2.10 0.036** 0.293 0.958 
Non_agri_income 0.393 0.140 -2.61 0.009*** 0.195 0.793 
Years_experience 1.094 0.040 2.46 0.014*** 1.018 1.175 
Type_irrigation 1.128 0.348 0.39 0.695 0.616 2.067 
Irrigated_area 0.489 0.272 -1.28 0.201 0.164 1.461 
Trust_relat 0.393 0.137 -2.67 0.008* 0.198 0.778 
Dependent variable: certified and non-certified producers; n=303 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(10, 303 )=33.13   p<0.0003 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.1198 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(8)= 5.72    p< 0.6785 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.7353 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 6.11: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for grapes producers 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>|z| 95% CI 
Grapes 2.194 0.678 2.54 0.011** 1.197 4.020 
Gender 1.101 0.430 0.25 0.805 0.511 2.370 
Education 1.094 0.340 2.92 0.003*** 1.030 1.163 
Manager 1.155 0.400 0.42 0.676 0.586 2.278 
Size 0.525 0.157 -2.15 0.031** 0.292 0.944 
Non_agri_income 0.363 0.132 -2.77 0.006*** 0.177 0.743 
Years_experience 1.091 0.047 2.34 0.019*** 1.014 1.174 
Type_irrigation 1.120 0.344 0.37 0.711 0.613 2.047 
Irrigated_area 0.478 0.267 -1.32 0.188 0.159 1.434 
Trust_relat 0.397 0.138 -2.65 0.008** 0.200 0.795 
Dependent variable: certified and non-certified producers; n=303 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(10, 303 )=28.49   p<0.0015 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.1177 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(8)= 6.59    p< 0.5813 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.7359 
Source: Own calculations 
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6.2.5 Econometric estimates for the cashew nuts model 
The logistic regression results for the cashew nuts model are presented in Table 6.12 (Appendix 12 
presents more details). The adjusted Wald test indicates that the model is significant. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test shows that the model presents a good fit, even though the sample size is only about 
85 producers. The area under the ROC curve is 0.82 revealing that the model has adequate 
discrimination. The link test also presents a suitable result which means that the model does not 
have relevant omitted variables.  
 The variable “education” is the one with the strongest positive and significant impact on the 
decision making of the producers. The odds ratio of the variable “education” is 4.63, which means 
that for each four additional years of schooling, the odds to certify increase by 363%.  
The number of family members of the household does influence the decision to certify by 42% at 
5% level of significance. Hattam & Holloway (2005) pointed out that organic farmers rely more 
heavily on family labor. In the production system of cashew nuts, it is more likely that producers 
run the farm by themselves, instead of having a caretaker or a manager. In fact, cashew nuts are a 
product which is not labor intensive. The figures on permanent and temporary workers are low, 
with only the family members counting as the main labor force.  
This study has found a positive influence of “non-agriculture income” which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Considering the set of variables being tested, non-agricultural income 
plays a more important role. The odds ratio of this variable is 6.06, which means that for each 
additional non-agricultural source of income, the chances to certify increase by 506%. The results 
show that the lower the dependency on the cashew nuts income, the higher the probability to 
certify. However, the literature suggests the opposite: the higher the dependency on the income of 
a certain crop, the higher is the incentive to certify. 
With repect to the gender of the head of the household the estimated odds are negative but not 
significant. It indicates that chances to adopt certification would increase if the family is female-
headed. Further, the variable number of crops that producers are engaged in, besides the cashew 
nuts, leads to a positive odds ratio. This shows a positive association between the number of crops 
and the decision to certify. The current area of cashew nuts compared to the land occupied with 
other types of crops has a negative influence on the decision to certify. It indicates that the higher 
the share of the current area used for cashew nuts, the lower the chances to certify. Considering the 
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variety namely dwarf, farmers have lower chances to certify compared to those who cultivate other 
varieties. Additionally, the variable “years trading individually” has a negative impact on the 
decision of the producer.  
Table 6.12: Logistic regression results on the certification decision for cashew nuts producers 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% CI 
Gender 0.295 0.246 -1.46 0.144 0.057 1.517 
Education 4.631 3.109 2.28 0.022** 1.242 8.266 
Family_HH 1.421 0.213 2.34 0.019** 1.059 1.907 
Non-agric_income 6.066 4.398 2.49 0.013** 1.465 14.120 
Number_crops 1.054 0.0528 0.97 0.330 0.951 1.159 
Share_current_area 0.801 0.465 -0.38 0.704   0.256 2.502 
Variety 0.500 0.308 -1.12 0.262 0.149 1.676 
Years_trading_ind 0.926 0.700 -1.01 0.315 0.799 1.074 
Dependent variable: certified and non-certified producers; n=85 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(8, 85)=15.02  p<0.0058 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.2401 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(6)= 2.39    p< 0.8809 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.8298 
Source: Own calculations 
6.2.6 Summary 
Data from the survey of mango, grapes and cashew nuts farmers were used in a logit model to 
determine the characteristics associated with the adoption of certification. The first model included 
388 farmers of mango, grapes and cashew nuts. The second and the third models included 303 
mango and grapes farmers separately. The last one estimated the determinants to certify for 85 
cashew nuts producers. 
The results of the first model revealed that education plays a significant and positive role. 
Variables such as non-agricultural income, living in a village and trust-based contracts have a 
negative and significant effect on the decision-making to certify. Analyzing separately the mango 
and grapes models, the results revealed that grapes growers are more likely to certify than mango 
ones. There are two variables which have a positive and significant effect: education and 
experience. However, small-scale farms, the dependency on non-agricultural income and a trust-
based arrangement have a negative but significant effect. Finally, the findings on the cashew nuts 
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model show that the dependency on the income from the non-agriculture sector, education, size of 
the family play a major role on the decision to certify. Many variables have a negative and 
insignificant effect such as gender, variety, years of trading with an individual buyer and current 
area with cashew nuts.  
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7 Comparative analyses 
The first section discusses the marketing chains of mango and grapes, cashew nuts and melon. The 
discussions start by an overview of the chains, followed by an analysis of the distribution of 
functions along the chains, the harvesting processes, final destinations of the fruits and finally, 
contractual arrangements. Section 7.2 compares certified farmers with one or more certificates and 
the size of small and medium farms. Section 7.3 presents some econometric results.  
7.1 Marketing chain analysis 
Section 7.1 analyses the trade linkages between producers and buyers of fresh mango, grapes, 
cashew nuts and melon in Brazil. It takes up the concept of governance in global commodity 
chains from Gereffi (1994) - as described in Chapter 3.2 - in order to examine how the competitive 
strategies of international and national buyers have led to particular governance structures. They 
determine not only the types of products to be produced, but also production and quality systems, 
the extent and location of post-harvesting processing. The first marketing chains discussed are 
those for mango and grapes, followed by cashew nuts and melons.   
7.1.1 Marketing chain analysis for mango and grapes sectors 
An analysis of the marketing chain identifies major agents and the transactions between mango 
and grapes farmers and buyers. In general, an investigation of the functioning of the trading 
process in both fruit sectors may contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of the 
whole sector. A differentiation is again being made between farmers who are certified and those 
who are not.  
Figure 7.1 shows the respective marketing chains relevant in Brazil. Basically producers of grapes 
and mangoes have two options: either they sell to individuals (specific buyers, middlemen, 
exporting company) or to a group (group or association of producers, cooperative). Around 92% of 
the non-certified and only 4% of the already certified farmers reported selling to individuals. 
Nearly 96% of the certified producers belong to a group, cooperative or association exporting 
mainly to the international market (Table 7.1).  













buyer comes to the











Packaging of grapes boxes
 
Figure 7.1: Marketing chains of grapes and mangoes  
Source: Own compilation 
The reasons leading non-certified farmers to trade with individuals are explained by the fact that 
there is no other possible buyer. The certified producers selling to groups perceived this as an 
advantage because first, they have assurance that their products would be sold (89%) and second, 
they follow the recommendation of EMBRAPA, SEBRAE or other organizations (41%). 
Furthermore, the analysis also considers the number of years that the producers have been trading 
with buyers. The non-certified producers have been operating with their respective buyers for an 
average of 6.5 years, while the certified ones have an average of only 3.2 years.  
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Table 7.1: Description of the variables on marketing chain  
Producers Chi² 
Description of the variables 
Cert. Non-cert. Sig. 
Selling to individual buyers (in %) 3.7 92.4 0.000*** 
Selling to a group, cooperative or association (in %) 96.3 7.6 0.000*** 
Years of trading with the buyer/cooperative (mean values) 3.2 6.5 0.000*** 
Mangoes    
Selling to individual buyers (in %) 6.9 91.8 0.000*** 
Selling to a group, cooperative or association (in %) 93.1 8.2 0.000*** 
Years of trading with the buyer/cooperative (mean values) 3.4 6.9 0.000*** 
Grapes    
Selling to individual buyers (in %) 6.9 89.4 0.000*** 
Selling to a group, cooperative or association (in %) 93.1 10.6 0.000*** 
Years of trading with the buyer/cooperative (mean values) 3.9 4.7 0.000*** 
Certified [n=54] and non-certified producers [n=249] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
There are differences with respect to packaging, post-harvesting and contractual arrangements 
between certified and non-certified producers which will be further analysed in the following.    
Harvesting process  
Maturity is one of the main factors determining the quality of a product. Post harvest technologies 
deal with separation, sampling, sizing, and sorting as well as with grading. The fruit sector is 
unique due to its high perishability (Irtwange, 2006). For Newman (2007), one of the constant 
challenges fruit growers face is to ensure that the production reaching consumers is of a 
consistently high quality. Therefore, determining when to harvest fruit to sell or long-term storage 
plays an important role in successful post harvest crop management.  
The marketing standards of mangoes (Mangifera indica L.) and grapes (Citrus paradise Macfad.) 
are presented by the Europe Fresh Quality Guide (2007) according to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The standards include its definition, minimum 
requirements, developments and conditions, classification, sizing by weight, presentation, 
contaminants and hygiene.  
Considering the specificities of each type of fruit, the harvesting process can be done using plastic 
or paper boxes, or pallets. Fruits handled in boxes are supposed to be better preserved while fruits 
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packed in pallets have to be repacked again and this process may damage the product. 
Nevertheless, sometimes when fruits are sold in pallets to local markets [short distances], they are 
repacked in boxes for international markets or for transport over long distances in the domestic 
market.  
As Table 7.2 shows, harvest of grapes is done using paper and plastic boxes by 100% of producers 
with certification and around 77% of the non-certified ones. Mangoes have been packed in pallets 
by 94% of the non-certified producers, while 93% of the certified producers use paper and plastic 
boxes. 
Further, producers have mainly two options with respect to the post-harvest procedure: either they 
sell the production directly to the buyer after harvest or utilize a packing house. Producers, who do 
not have their own packing house, may decide to utilize one from the group, cooperative or 
association. The advantages of using a packing house are technical (keeping the fruit stored in 
suitable conditions and temperature in order to maintain the fruit quality) and managerial 
(producers are less vulnerable to climate shocks and market fluctuations and are able to settle 
better negotiations through market opportunities). The findings highlight that nearly 97% of the 
certified producers of mangoes utilize a subcontracted packing house for post-harvest handling 
compared to 76% of certified grapes producers. In contrast, about 88% and 95% of non-certified 
mangoes and grapes producers reported that they do not subcontract a packing house, i.e. the fruit 
is sold directly after being harvested. Some producers decide to transport the products to the 
respective buyer using their own means of transport, while others wait for the buyer to collect the 
products at the farm gate. The survey shows that regardless of the fruit and of certification, the 
buyer comes with a truck to collect the fruit at the farm. This is true for about 80% of the certified 
and almost 100% of the non-certified producers. It means that farmers are not responsible for the 
transportation having lower transaction costs but maybe also receiving lower prices. Choosing the 
most efficient post harvest system is also closely connected with the contractual arrangements, 
which will be discussed in the following section. 
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Table 7.2: Description of the variables on post-harvesting  
Producers Chi², t test 
Description of the variables 
Cert. Non-cert. Sig. 
Grapes    
Post-harvesting of grapes is done using paper and plastic boxes (in %) 100.0 77.3 0.000*** 
Use of a subcontracted packing house for post-harvest handling (in %) 75.9 4.5 0.000*** 
Buyer transports the fruit (in %) 79.3 100.0 0.000*** 
Mangoes    
Post-harvesting is done in using paper and plastic boxes (in %) 93.1 3.6 0.000*** 
Use of a subcontracted packing house for post-harvest handling (in %)  96.6 11.8 0.000*** 
Buyer transports the fruit (in %) 79.3 98.5 0.000*** 
Certified grapes producers [n=29] and non-certified grapes producers [n=66]; certified mango producers [n=29] 
and non-certified mango producers [n=195] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
Final destination of the fruits  
Table 7.3 presents results on the final destination of the grapes and mangoes production. With 
respect to non-certified producers, they almost all mention that their mangoes and grapes are sold 
on the domestic market. However, most of the producers are not aware of where the fruit is sold to 
after the gate. Thus, it is possible that the fruits are repacked and exported without the producers 
knowing about it. Certified farmers provided information on the destination of their fruits for the 
periods before certification and after certification. Interestingly, the percentage of farmers saying 
that their fruits are sold on the domestic market is lower than that of non-certified farmers: 48% of 
grapes farmers and 68% of the mango farmers indicate that their fruits were sold on the domestic 
market because they obtain certification. After having obtained certification, the shares decreased: 
only 22% of the grapes farmers and 20% of the mango farmers say that their fruits are sold on the 
domestic market.  
The data also reveals that the importance of the European market as a final destination increased 
for both grapes and mango producers after certification. The number of certified farmers 
mentioning Europe as a final consumer market almost tripled over time. The role of the United 
States is also important as a final market for Brazilian fruits, however, the share of grapes farmers 
mentioning the US decreased by 30%, while that for mangoes almost doubled. The importance of 
the other countries as final destinations is almost negligible, although they slightly increased for 
certified farmers when comparing before and after certification. The shift of export flows might be 
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explained by the introduction of GlobalGAP, being an initiative of European retailers. However, 
also other factors like transport capacities or trade agreements may play a role.  
Table 7.3: Details on grapes and mango exports in 2005, percentage of the total volume 
Certified Non-certified Description of the variables  
(mean value in percentage) Before certifying After certifying Current 
Grapes    
Domestic Market  48.0 22.0 92.3 
US  31.0 20.7 3.2 
Europe 20.6 54.0 3.8 
Other 0.4 3.3 0.7 
Total 100 100 100 
Mangoes    
Domestic Market  67.8 20.0 93.3 
US 15.3 28.7 0.7 
Europe 16.3 49.5 5.1 
Other 0.6 1.8 0.9 
Total 100 100 100 
Certified grapes producers [n=29] and non-certified grapes producers [n=66]; certified mango producers [n=29] 
and non-certified mango producers [n=195] 
Source: Own compilation 
Contractual arrangements 
Producers of fruits and vegetables operate in an unusually risky economic environment. While 
these farmers face the same sort of production risk common to other agricultural products, they 
also produce a perishable commodity whose price is subject to large fluctuations. Ligon (2001) 
points out that one important practice which helps to shield fruit and vegetables producers from 
price and production risk are contracts. The author emphasizes the importance of written contracts 
between the producer and the first handler, or intermediary who takes hold of the fruit.  
In this study, the contractual arrangements between producer and buyer can be divided into three 
categories: written contracts; trust-based verbal contracts19; and verbal contracts only. As Table 
7.4 shows, 87% of the certified farmers reported dealing with the buyer through a trust-based 
verbal contract. The remaining 13% even have a written contract. With respect to the non-certified 
                                                 
19 The verbal contract based on trust relates to settlements between producer and buyer after a certain number of 
successful negotiations. 
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producers two third (about 73%) have a trust-based verbal contract. A written contract was given 
only in 3% of the cases. The remaining 24% indicate to have a verbal contract only.  
Analyzing the type of contract by fruit, the study shows that written contracts are much more often 
given to grapes farmers, especially the certified ones. Only 4% of the mango farmers receive a 
written contract, but most certified mango farmers indicate to have a trust-based verbal contract, 
compared with only 73% of the non-certified producers. 
Table 7.4: Description of the variables on contractual arrangements 
Producers Chi², t test 
Description of the variables 
Cert. Non-cert. Sig. 
Both mango and grapes    
Verbal contract with trust (in %) 87.0 73.5 0.015** 
Verbal contract (in %) 0.0 23.3 0.000*** 
Written contract (in %) 13.0 3.2 0.008*** 
Only mangoes    
Verbal contract with trust (in %) 95.6 72.8 0.000*** 
Verbal contract (in %) 0.0 23.6 0.001*** 
Written contract (in %) 3.4 3.6 0.723 
Only grapes    
Verbal contract with trust (in %) 75.9 69.7 0.345 
Verbal contract (in %) 0.0 24.2 0.002*** 
Written contract (in %) 24.1 6.1 0.017** 
Certified grapes producers [n=29] and non-certified grapes producers [n=66]; certified mango producers [n=29] 
and non-certified mango producers [n=195] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
A deeper analysis of the contractual clauses may provide a better understanding of the 
characteristics of the transactions. The analysis below tries to illustrate the contractual 
arrangements between mango and grapes growers and their respective buyers (Table 7.5).  
The analysis relates to the verbal trust-based agreement. Farmers who deliver their fruits to a 
middleman or exporter indicate that they had eleven negotiations, while those who sold to a group 
or cooperative had only four negotiations. Interesting is the result that all groups or cooperatives 
pay in cash, while 15% of the individual buyers pay in rates and 16% do not pay at all. Thus, the 
farmers are better off when selling to a group or cooperative. However, a group or cooperative is 
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more likely to set the price while the producers selling to individual middlemen or exporters have 
a little more flexibility in negotiating the price.  
Table 7.5: Contractual trust-based arrangements  
Verbal trust-based  Details of the negotiation 
 (mean value) Individuals (N=189) Group/cooper. (N=47) 
Number of  trading relations  11.0 4.0 
Payment in cash (in %) 74.6 100.0 
Payment in rates (in %)  15.3 0.0 
Non-payment cases (in %) 16.4 0.0 
Price determined by the buyer (in %) 34.4 95.7 
Price determined by the producer (in %) 92.6 2.7 
Buyer is not flexible in the negotiations (in %) 92.1 97.9 
Source: Own compilation   
7.1.2 Marketing chain of the cashew nuts sector 
The marketing chain of cashew nuts is simpler when compared to the marketing chains of 
mangoes and grapes but it entails its own peculiarities. The following sections give an overview of 
the chain, the final destination of the products and the contractual arrangements. A simplified 
presentation of the cashew nuts marketing chain is presented in Figure 7.2. The diagram reveals 
how certified and non-certified farmers trade with individual buyers and the cooperative. 
Producers sell their products either to an individual or to a cooperative. In this sector, there are no 
other associations or groups besides the cooperative. The findings reveal that 83% of the non-
certified farmers trade with individual buyers, while 78% of the certified ones trade with the 
cooperative. The final destination of the products sold to individual buyers is mainly the domestic 
market, while those sold to the cooperative are targeted to both international and domestic 
markets. Individual buyers come to the farm to collect the cashew nuts production, while the 
farmers transport their kernel production to the cooperative. Basically, the type of relationship 
between buyer and farmer is a verbal trust-based agreement.  
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Figure 7.2: Marketing chain of cashew nuts  
Source: Own compilation 
Final destination of the products  
This section focuses on the final destination of the products (Table 7.6). Among the possibilities, 
farmers have the choice to sell both processed nuts (kernels with higher value added) and 
unprocessed nuts (nuts with lower value added). Thus farmers can also buy raw cashew nuts from 
their neighbors, process them and sell the kernels.  
The results show that 90% of the farmers before adopting certification sell cashew nuts in the 
domestic market. After certifying, 82% of the same farmers sell their production of kernels to the 
cooperative which trades high shares of the products in international markets while small shares 
remain in the domestic market. Thus, the cooperative plays an important role for farmers to 
upgrade. With respect to the non-certified producers, 88% mentioned that their cashew nuts 
production is sold on the domestic market.  
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The final destination also depends on the modes of transportation. After the harvest, some 
producers decide to transport the products to the respective buyer using their own means of 
transport while others wait for the buyer to collect the products at the farm gate. The decision of 
whether to transport the products themselves depends not only on the characteristics of the 
producer but also on the type of product. For instance, 87% of the non-certified and 32% of 
certified producers have their cashew nuts transported by the buyer. With respect to the kernels, 
52% of the certified producers transport them themselves to the buyer, while 16% of the certified 
farmers indicate that their kernels are being picked up from their farms.   
Table 7.6: Final destination of cashew nuts and kernel production and modes of transport 
Certified 





Cashew nuts (non-processed)    
Domestic Market (in %) 89.5 10.6 88.3 
Kernels (processed)    
Domestic market (in %)  7.5 8.0 13.7 
International market (in %) 3.0 81.4 0.0 
Transportation    
Buyer comes to the farm to buy the cashew nuts production (in %)  32.0 86.7 
Buyer comes to the farm to buy the kernel production (in %)  16.0 6.6 
Producer takes the kernel production to the final buyer (in %)  52.0 6.7 
Certified producers [n=25] and non-certified producers [n=60] 
Source: Own compilation 
Contractual arrangements  
Almost 76% of the certified farmers and 64% of the non-certified ones report dealing with the 
buyer through a trust-based verbal contract. Further, about 33% of non-certified producers have a 
verbal contract with the buyer compared to 16% of certified ones. Only 8% of the certified 
producers have a formal written contract.  
Table 7.7 shows the results on the trading negotiations considering the trust-based type of contract. 
In general, certified farmers have been trading only during 3 harvesting periods with the 
cooperative and non-certified farmers during 5 harvesting periods with individual buyers. The 
buyers are not only inflexible in the negotiations (67% for individuals and 83% for the 
cooperative) but also exert high power in determining the price. Besides, the cooperative acquires 
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a higher quality of kernels (87%). Regarding payments, the cooperative pays part of the payment 
in advance (57%) and part in cash (37%). Payments done by individual buyers are mainly in cash 
(78%). The non-payment rate is very low.  
Table 7.7: Negotiations trust-based between buyer and producer of cashew nuts 
Trust-based verbal  




Number of trading relations 5.6 3.4 
Payment in cash (in %) 77.8 37.1 
Payment in advance (in %) 4.4 57.0 
Payment in rates (in %) 17.8 4.9 
Non-payment (in %) 8.4 4.7 
Price determined by the buyer (in %) 91.1 91.3 
Price is determined by the producer (in %) 2.2 0.0 
High quality kernels (in %) 46.7 87.0 
Buyer acquires any type of cashew (in %) 73.3 4.3 
Buyer is not flexible in the negotiations (in %) 66.6 82.6 
Source: Own compilation   
7.1.3 Marketing chain analysis of the melon sector 
The analysis of this chain is unique when considering the type of marketing channel, final 
destination and the contractual arrangements. The discussion starts with an overview of the chain.  
Figure 7.3 shows the marketing chain of selected producers from the melon sector. The cases A, B 
and C relate to non-certified farmers and the cases D, E and F to the certified farmers. The 
contractual relationship between non-certified farmers and the trading companies is based on 
formal contracts. Likewise, the majority of the certified ones have a formal contract with the 
international buyer, but a verbal and consignment type of contract with the domestic buyers.  
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Figure 7.3: Marketing chain of the melon sector 
Source: Own compilation  
Marketing channel  
Around 80% of certified farmers designate their melons to the international market and 20% to the 
domestic market. In the domestic market, fruits are mainly sold on wholesale markets in Sao Paulo 
and in supermarket chains. Two non-certified farmers, for instance, trade all production with 
wholesalers in different states in Brazil including Sao Paulo. However, one non-certified farmer is 
not aware about the final destination of his or her melons. In addition, the findings reveal that the 
volume which remains in the domestic market is usually comprised of fruits of low quality. More 
specifically, it derives from overproduction or/and fruits which have not met the standards 
(quality, size and brix20) indicated in the contract.  
                                                 
20 Brix is used to measure the approximate amount of sugar in fruits and vegetables and to determine ideal 
harvesting times. 
Chapter 7 Comparative analyses 
 120
Contractual arrangements  
Moreover, negotiations between Brazilian fruit farmers and international buyers are based on a 
type of pre-fixed contract named consignment, which depends on market oscillations (Nachreiner 
& Santos, 2002). Further, Gomes (2004) argues that many small and medium fruits farmers also 
participate in markets by engaging in informal contractual arrangements with large-scale farmers. 
They benefit from these relationships by receiving clear standards based on which to produce, 
input packages and technical assistance from production through post-harvest. Therefore, 
contractual ties with large producers enable many small and medium farmers to participate in 
markets that are more demanding than the local ones. Not only do small and medium farmers 
benefit from contractual ties, but also large firms which establish a range of contracts.  
With the aim of understanding the contractual arrangements between farmers and buyers, all 
interviewees were asked to detail their own situation. The contractual arrangements vary according 
to the form of exports. Even though two certified farmers have a consignment or verbal type of 
relationship in the domestic market, they are highly dependent on daily price fluctuations. Hence 
there is no guarantee of payment; farmers have to build a relationship based on trust with the buyer 
to assure the payment. Therefore, one of them intends to trade with supermarket chains. 
Moreover, a further analysis shows that two non-certified farmers deliver their total melon 
production to the trading company and the latter takes over all the responsibility. Evidently they 
depend on daily price fluctuations as well, but their payment is assured. On the contrary, the 
farmers who export either directly or indirectly to international markets mention to have a written 
contract. The procedure of settling contracts and particular details on the fruit characteristics is 
similar. Usually contracts are set within March and April for the coming harvesting season which 
comprehends the period between August and February specifying the quality, price, quantity, brix 
and size. 
7.1.4 Summary 
Coordination in the supply chain of mango and grapes and the degree of vertical coordination is 
increasing through certification. The results reveal that certified farmers, regardless of the fruit, 
shift from arm’s-length market to quasi-hierarchical relationships attributed mainly to a high level 
of asset specificity. In other words, there is a shift from market-based global value chains 
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governance to more explicit coordination. The findings on the cashew nuts chain lead to a modular 
value chain type of governance characterized by network relationships in the case of trading with 
the cooperative, and market type of governance with arm’s length market relations in the case of 
individual buyers. For the melon chain, transactions done directly and indirectly in international 
markets are characterized as captive value chain type of governance where quasi-hierarchical 
relationships dominate (buyer defines the product and control over the suppliers). In contrast, 
negotiations settled in domestic markets present low asset specificity and low coordination, 
classified as market type of governance with arm’s length market relationship.   
7.2 Comparative analysis of certified producers and farm’ sizes 
Section 7.2.1 aims to discuss the main economic factors between farmers who adopted one versus 
two certificates. A similar analysis from the type of certification scheme perspective is done in 
Section 7.2.2. Section 7.2.3 focuses on the role of the farm size for adopting certification.   
7.2.1 Certified mango and grapes farmers: one versus two certificates 
Data regarding the 54 certified producers are used to analyze producers with only one certificate 
(57% or 30) and those having two (43% or 22). Single certified refers to producers having only 
one and double to those having two. Results are presented in Table 7.8. Two tripled certified 
farmers are excluded from this analysis.  
Surprisingly, single-certified mango and grapes farmers harvested more tons per ha compared to 
farmers with two certificates. Therefore, the total production cost per kg of grapes and mangoes is 
higher for double-certified than for single-certified. As a result single-certified farmers also receive 
higher net income per ha compared to double-certified ones. This is true for mangoes as well as for 
grapes. However, the price received per kg by single- and double-certified farmers differs by fruit. 
For grapes, the price before and after is lower for single-certified farmers than for double-certified 
ones; such a difference does not exist for mangoes. In terms of percentage, single-certified farmers 
received a 61% higher price for mangoes compared to 55% of the double ones. Grapes farmers 
before adopting one certificate received R$1.75, while those with two received R$2.09. After 
adopting certification, single-certified ones received R$2.23 and double ones R$2.70. An increase 
of 27% and 29% is found, respectively.  
SEBRAE is considered a very important organization in supporting certification by all farmers 
while EMBRAPA was indicated mainly by single-certified farmers. Approximately 90% of the 
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farmers mention to obtain knowledge from EMBRAPA. In addition, SEBRAE is considered by 
96% of the farmers as the source where they obtain knowledge and updates through training 
courses. Another potential source of information and updates is the social network the farmer has.  
Further, single-certified farmers have invested a significantly higher amount on new infrastructure 
on their farms.  Nevertheless, farmers with two certificates spend yearly R$2,403 for certification 
(including monitoring and renewal process of the certificates). The single-certified farmers spend 
half of this amount (R$1,213).  
Table 7.8: Description of the variables: one certificate versus two certificates 
Description of the variables 
  
Number of certificates Chi²,t test 
 One cert. Two cert. Sig. 
Investments on new infrastructure (R$) (mean value) 182,249 45,356 0.062* 
Cost of certification (R$) (mean value) 1,213 2,403 0.003*** 
Grapes (mean value)    
Productivity (tons/ha) 24.6 19.9 0.165 
Production cost (R$/kg) 0.92 1.25 0.129 
Total production cost (R$/ha) 22,929 22,462 0.895 
Total income  (R$/ha) 43,052 42,198 0.920 
Net income (R$/ha) 20,623 19,236 0.629 
Price received before certifying (R$/kg) 1.75 2.09 0.425 
Price received after certifying (R$/kg) 2.23 2.70 0.240 
Mango (mean value)    
Productivity (tons/ha) 29.3 23.5 0.112 
Production cost (R$/kg) 0.44 0.47 0.302 
Total production cost (R$/ha) 13,045 10,945 0.210 
Total income (R$/ha) 24,104 20,328 0.426 
Net income (R$/ha) 11,058 9,392 0.920 
Price received before certifying (R$/kg) 0.82 0.84 0.890 
Price received after certifying (R$/kg)  1.32 1.30 0.923 
One certification scheme [PIF n=5, GlobalGAP n=21, Faitrade n=4]  
and double [PIF&Global n=8, PIF&Fair n=14] 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and *at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
In the surveyed region, farmers started to adopt certification in 2003 and 2004. There is no 
significant difference between the time of adoption and the type of schemes. However, the 
adoption of a certain certification scheme influences the decision of the farmer whether to continue 
to trade with the current buyer or to shift. Table 7.9 compares the number of years that farmers 
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obtained certification [a] and the number of years that they have been selling to a specific buyer 
[b]. This analysis may indicate whether certification plays a positive role in changing the buyer: 
a)    If a>b, it means that the producers did not change the buyer after adopting 
certification; 
b) If a<b, it means that the producers switched to a new buyer after becoming 
certified and  
c) If a=b, it means the producer changed to a new buyer in the same year certification 
was attained.  
It was found that 73% and 96% of the producers with one and two certificates, respectively, 
change the type of buyer after having certification. Generally, this means that the producer 
changes from an individual buyer to a group or cooperative. 20% of the single-certified producers 
and only 4% of the double-certified ones, highlight to have changed the type of buyer in the same 
period of adoption. Finally, for 6% of the farmers with one certificate the adoption of certification 
does not play an important role in changing the type of buyer.  
Table 7.9: Comparison between the years the producer became certified [a] and the year 
he/she started to sell to a specific buyer [b] 
Comparing [a] and [b] 
Number of certificates  
a>b a <b a=b  
One certificate (in %) 6.7 73.3 20.0 
Two certificates (in %) 0.0 95.8 4.2 
One certification scheme [n=30] and double [n=22] 
Source: Own compilation  
7.2.2 Comparative analysis by certification scheme 
The following analysis focuses on the selected certification schemes adopted by certified mango 
and grapes farmers. It looks closely to the major economic differences among each certification 
scheme as well as to their combinations. As Table 7.10 shows, results are omitted in some cases 
where the sample is not representative. Farmers having PIF and GlobalGAP are denominated by 
PIF&Global and those having PIF and Fairtrade by PIF&Fair.  
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PIF&Global certified farmers possess more irrigated areas (64 ha), followed by those with 
GlobalGAP (33 ha) compared to small irrigated areas of the remaining groups. Data on the 
productivity reveal that farmers with GlobalGAP have higher productivity for both fruits. In order 
to comply with the requirements, farmers need to invest in infrastructure on their farms. The 
findings clearly indicate GlobalGAP certified farmers as those who invested the highest amount in 
new infrastructure (R$245,000). PIF&Global certified farmers invested approximatly R$136,000. 
The investments done by the others are considerably smaller.  
With respect to the production cost per kg of mango, very similar results are found for single and 
double-certified farmers. Thus, the total production cost, total income, the net income is higher for 
GlobalGAP certified farmers if compared to the other farmers. However, GlobalGAP certified 
mango farmers had received the highest net income. PIF&Global certified mango farmers are not 
far behind with regard to the net income. Besides, PIF&Global certified farmers pay certification 
costs of R$7,000 for both certificates, while GlobalGAP paid around R$1,700. Fairtrade and 
PIF&Fair farmers are responsible only for a share of the costs, since the association takes over the 
responsibility. PIF farmers, for instance, receive subsidies from SEBRAE.  
A comparison between before and after certifying shows that PIF&Global and GlobalGAP grapes 
certified farmers received an increased price of R$0.50 per kg and PIF only R$0.30. However, in 
terms of percentage, GlobalGAP certified farmers received an increase of 27% in price, 
PIF&Global received 20% and PIF farmers received 17%. With respect to mango, the difference 
between before and after adopting certification reveals a value of R$0.40 per kg. GlobalGAP 
certified farmers and Fairtrade ones indeed received an increase of 57% in prices.  
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Table 7.10: Comparing certification schemes 
Type of  certification scheme 
Description of the variables 
PIF GlobalGAP Fairtrade PIF&Global PIF&Fair 
Chi²,t test 
Sig. 
Irrigated area (mean values in ha) 6.3 33.0 4.2 64.4 2.3 0.011** 
Investments in new infrastructure (R$) 54,660 244,471 15,065 136,062 0.0 0.479 
Cost of maintenance of the certificate (R$)  315 1,637 108 6,998 106 0.000*** 
Grapes (mean value)       
Productivity of grapes (tons/ha) 18.1 26.5 - 15.9 - 0.000*** 
Production cost  (R$/kg) 0.86 0.95 - 1.31 - 0.723 
Total production cost (R$/ha) 15,566 24,448 - 19,996 - 0.159 
Total income (R$/ha) 30,716 47,252 - 41,285 - 0.830 
Net income (R$/ha) 15,150 22,803 - 21,289 - 0.871 
Price received before certifying (R$/kg) 1.7 1.8 - 2.4 - 0.329 
Price received after certifying (R$/kg) 2.0 2.3 - 2.9 - 0.603 
Mango (mean value)       
Productivity (tons/ha) - 33.0 25.2 - 22.5 0.104 
Production cost (R$/kg) - 0.44 0.47 - 0.46 0.246 
Total production cost (R$/ha) - 14,584 11,733 - 10,285 0.154 
Net income (R$/ha) - 20,626 17,744 - 16,065 0.004*** 
Price  received before certifying (R$/kg) - 0.9 0.7 - 0.7 0.536 
Price received after certifying (R$/kg) - 1.4 1.1 - 1.1 0.269 
Farmers certified with PIF [n=5], GlobalGAP [n=21], Fairtrade [n=4], PIF&Global [n=8] and PIF&Fair [n=14] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
7.2.3 Comparative analysis of different mango and grapes size farms   
This section aims to verify the main differences and similarities of economic variables among 
small and medium size farms that belong to one of the three groups: certified, in process and non-
certified. Table 7.11 shows the data regarding type of certification schemes adopted by the 
different sizes of producers. Analyzing the figures from the producers’ size perspective, they 
reveal that 70% of the certified producers are small and 30% of them are medium. Small farms 
have less than 13 ha while medium ones have 13 ha or more. The six cases of large size farmers 
were excluded from this analysis. Hirsch (2005) points out that the Juazeiro/Petrolina region 
comprehends basically small farmers. They represent about 70% of the total farmers of the region 
but they have only 17% of the cultivated area. The remaining 30% is split between medium and 
large growers. 
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Table 7.11: Small and medium farm size 
Farm’s size 
Small Medium 
Total of famers 
Type of producers 
Total % Total % Total % 
Non-certified farmers 120 40.4 34 11.3 154 51.9 
In process of obtaining certification 59 19.9 34 11.4 93 30.3 
Certified farmers 30 10.1 20 6.7 50 16.8 
Total 209 70.4 88 29.6 297 100 
Source: Own compilation 
The productivity of medium certified and in process mango farmers is very similar. For the non-
certified farmers, the productivity is a bit higher for the medium size farms. Also, results on the 
productivity for grapes show that the medium-sized farmers have the highest productivity, 
however the difference for certified farmers is much larger than those for uncertified farmers 
(Table 7.12).  
There are major differences with regard to the net income between small and medium farmers. 
Mango medium size farms have a higher income compared to small ones. However, small non-
certified grapes farmers have the highest net income compared to the other small-scale farmers, 
while medium certified ones present the highest net income per ha compared to the medium-sized 
farmers. An analysis of the production cost per kg reveals that mango farmers present similar 
figures for small and medium famrs. However, for grapes farmers the difference is larger. For 
instance, small and medium certified farmers have a difference in cost per kg of R$0.13.  
Considering that medium farmers have more irrigated area, it is expected that they would have a 
higher harvested volume. Nevertheless, the total production is definitely dependent on the type of 
irrigation system used. The results show that medium farms, regardless of the type of farmers, 
have a more sophisticated system (varying from 88% to 100%). Thus, 70% of the small certified 
ones have also a more sophisticated system.  
The prices received per kg of mango before adopting certification show that they were similar 
(R$0.70 and R$ 0.80), while the prices per kg of grapes range between R$ 1.40 and R$ 1.90. Small 
grapes farmers receive a 38% higher price after certifying while the medium ones receive 27%. In 
the case of mangoes, small producers receive a 62% and medium a 47% higher price due to 
certification.  
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All farmers were informed about certification through SEBRAE and EMBRAPA. The 
cooperatives, groups and associations do not play an important role as being the primary source of 
information. It indicates that these organizations are interested that more farmers become 
members. Although certified farmers are usually members of one of these organizations, certainly 
they obtain information on certification and updates after they became members. Further, 
SEBRAE is indicated by small and medium size farmers as a very important organization 
supporting certification schemes. EMBRAPA is considered very important mainly by medium 
farmers. 
Hirsch (2005) points out that the presence of EMBRAPA in the Sao Francisco Valley is 
fundamental to the sustainable development of the region because of the need to diversify the 
production with the growth potential of planted area and irrigation infrastructure. Thus, according 
to the survey results, SEBRAE offers training courses which are attended by almost all farmers. It 
is interesting to note that all certified farmers mention to benefit from both research and training 
courses from EMBRAPA and SEBRAE, respectively. 
Table 7.12: Comparative analysis on the land size of all type of farmers 
Non-certified farmers Farmers in process Certified farmers Chi²,t test Description of the variables 
Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Sig. 
Grapes        
Productivity of grapes (tons/ha) 15.4 16.3 16.1 19.1 20.7 27.1 0.004*** 
Production cost (R$/kg) 0.93 0.83 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.000*** 
Total production cost (R$/ha) 16,294 13,269 14,100 16,623 19,133 23,252 0.001*** 
Total income (R$/ha) 26,059 28,703 24,254 35,949 30,548 48,024 0.002*** 
Net income (R$/ha) 9,765 15,433 10,154 19,326 11,415 24,771 0.000*** 
Price received before certifying (R$/kg) 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.40 1.76 0.253 
Price received after certifying (R$/kg) - - - - 1.94 2.23 - 
Mango        
Productivity of mangoes (tons/ha) 18.4 21.9 20.9 19.8 23.2 23.6 0.001*** 
Production cost (R$/kg) 0.40 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.45 0.42 0.000*** 
Total production cost (R$/ha) 7,500 9,483 7,413 8,604 10,440 14,161 0.000*** 
Total income (R$/ha) 16,158 18,317 15,118 19,165 16,636 26,450 0.158 
Net income (R$/ha) 8,656 9,833 7,705 10,561 6,196 12,288 0.000*** 
Price received before certifying (R$/kg)   0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.734 
Price received after certifying (R$/kg)   - - - - 1.14 1.17 - 
Non-certified farmers [n=154], in process [n=93] and certified [n=50] 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level 
Source: Own compilation 
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7.2.4 Summary 
The analysis was based on farmers with one certificate and those with two. Single-certified mango 
and grapes producers have higher productivity compared to double-certified ones. 
Notwithstanding, single-certified mango farmers receive higher income and a higher price after 
adopting certification. However, double-certified grapes farmers have higher net income, although 
they have twice the annual cost of certification. After adopting certification, 73% and 96% of the 
single and double-certified producers change the buyer in the next harvesting season.  
The main findings based on the certification schemes adopted by certified mango and grapes 
farmers show that GlobalGAP certified ones have higher productivity for both fruits. GlobalGAP 
certified mango and grapes farmers have also more irrigated area and receive the highest net 
income. PIF&Global paid the highest cost of certification. GlobalGAP certified mango farmers 
and Fairtrade ones receive an increase of 57% in prices after adopting certification, while 
GlobalGAP certified grapes farmers receive an increase of 27%. 
The last analysis is based on a comparison analysis among small and medium farms without 
certification, in process and already certified. Medium mango and grapes farmers have higher 
productivity than small ones. As a result they have also higher net income. Small-certified grapes 
farmers receive a 38% higher price after certifying while medium ones receive 27%. In the case of 
mangoes, small producers receive 62% and medium ones 47% higher prices per kg.  
7.3 Econometric results  
This section presents the description of the variables and data used in the logistic regression 
(Section 7.3.1). The econometric estimates for the decision of adopting two versus one certificate 
are discussed in Section 7.3.2.  The results on the decision of adopting PIF are discussed in Section 
7.3.3. 
7.3.1  Description of variables and data used in the logistic regression 
This section presents the variables and data used in the econometric models. For the logistic 
regression model, explanatory variables need to be selected according to their relevance. Generally 
the explanatory variables cover characteristics of the producers, characteristics of their farms, 
trading relations and post-harvesting. They include:  
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• Age, Education: younger and more educated farmers are more likely to accept new ideas and 
adopt new production technologies. Education is expected to be positive and significantly 
associated with the adoption of certification, whereas age is likely to be negatively correlated 
(D’Souza et al., 1993; Niemeyer & Lombard, 2003); 
• Manager: having a manager to run a farm may indicate that there are better professional skills to 
manage the farm and thus, it is more likely to certify;  
• Living_city: living in the city or on the farm provides an indication of the potential engagement 
of the farmer put into farming. Wealthier farmers are more likely to live in cities than less 
wealthier farmers; 
• Experience: this study expects to find a positive correlation between years of experience and the 
decision to certify. The longer a farmer produces, the greater the chances to adopt certification; 
• Bank_access: having access to credit in commercial banks for investments on the farm increase 
the chances to adopt certification; 
• Member_association: being member in an association of producers enables farmers to access 
more sophisticated marketing channels and settle better contractual arrangements. Thus, they are 
more likely to certify; 
• Ha: the area in ha impacts on the harvested volume and thus, on the level of income. The higher 
the number of ha, the greater the chances to certify; 
• Total labor: the number of employees working on the farm influences positively the chances to 
adopt two certification schemes; 
• Non_agricultre_income: farmers who are engaged with other activities besides the cultivation of 
fruits, have lower chances to certify than those who are highly dependent on the income obtained 
by fruits; 
• Type_irrigation: the level of technology of an irrigation system, whether it is less or more 
sophisticated may influence the decision-making positively. Luning et al. (2002:383) assume 
that food quality is dependent on both dynamic properties of the food product and related to 
applied technological conditions;  
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• Harvesting: farmers have different methods to proceed with the post-harvesting of fruits in the 
field:  pallets, paper or plastic boxes. The type of post-harvesting method contributes to mantain 
the fruits quality. It is expected that farmers who handle mangoes in pallets have lower chances to 
certify, while grapes farmers are more likely if they utilize boxes; 
• Sub_packing: farmers utilize the packing house of the group, cooperative or association to 
whom they belong to after the harvesting. Farmers are more likely to certify;  
• Transportation: the farmer is not responsible for the transportation after the gate when the buyer 
comes to the farm to collect the production. Farmers have lower transaction cost and thus, higher 
chances to certify; 
• Year_buyer: the longer the relationship between farmer and buyer, the lower the incentive to 
certify (negative correlation); 
• Trading_indiv: farmers who trade with individual buyers do not receive support from a 
group/cooperative or association and hence have lower chances to certify. 
The variables presented in this section are used to assess empirically the determinants that lead 
farmers to adopt certain certification schemes. Two models are estimated: (i) adoption of two 
versus one certificates and (ii) adoption of PIF. Table 7.13 presents the variables which were used 
in the logistic regression for the two models and their expected signs. Table 7.14, Table 7.15, 
Table 7.16 and Table 7.17 present logistic regression results (pseudo R-square, odds ratio, standard 
error, t-statistics, p values and 95% confidence intervals), respectively.  
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Table 7.13: List of variables for the econometric analysis  
Variables Description Expected sign  
Two_certific 
Adopting_PIF 
=1 if producer adopts two certificates; 0= otherwise 
=1 if producer adopts PIF; 0= otherwise 
 
Explanatory variables  
Age Age of the producer in years - 
Education Years of schooling  + 
Manager = 1 if a manager is running the farm; 0= otherwise + 
Living_city =1 if producer lives in the city; 0= otherwise + 
Year_exper Years of experience producing mango or grapes + 
Bank_access =1 if farmer has access to credit in commercial banks; 0= otherwise + 
Member_associ =1 if farmer is member in an association of producers; 0= otherwise + 
Ha Ha of planted mango and grapes + 
Total_labor Number of employees + 
Non_agric_income =1 if producer has income from non-agriculture sectors; 0= otherwise - 
Type_irrigation =1 if type of irrigation used is micro sprinkler and drip; 0= otherwise + 
Harvesting 
=1 if post-harvesting of mango is done in pallets; 0= otherwise 
=1 if post-harvesting of grapes is done in boxes; 0= otherwise 
- 
+ 
Sub_packing =1 if producer subcontracts a packing house; 0= otherwise + 
Transportation =1 if the buyer comes to the farm; 0= otherwise  - 
Trading_ind =1 if farmer trades with individual buyers - 
Years trading with a 
buyer Years trading with the buyer  - 
Source: Own compilation 
7.3.2 Econometric estimates for the decision of adopting two versus one 
certificate  
This analysis focuses on the 148 certified grapes and mango producers in the Juazeiro/Petrolina 
region. The regression estimates were done separately for each fruit aiming to assess the 
determinants that lead farmers decide to adopt one or more certification schemes. The adjusted 
Wald test for the models indicates that the models have good explanatory power at 1% level. The 
R² is 0.36 and 0.51 for the grapes and mango models, respectively. For both models, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test presents a good adequacy, the ROC curve presents adequate discrimination and 
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there are no omitted variables. More details on the commands are presented in Appendices 13 and 
14. The regression results are presented in Table 7.14 and Table 7.15. 
For both models, the variable subcontracting a packing house plays a major role in the decision to 
adopt two certificates. Considering that fruits are perishable, farmers who utilize the packing house 
from the groups, cooperatives or associations they belong to, have better conditions to maintain the 
fruits with high quality. Mango farmers who have less planted area have 11% lower chances to 
adopt a second certificate at 5% level. Although for grapes farmers, having more planted hectares 
impact positively, the variable is insignificant. However, factor as the total labor (insignificant in 
the grapes model) increases slightly the probabilities.  
In addition, each more year of trading with the current buyer decreases the chances by 50% and 
31% to adopt the second certificate for mango and grapes, respectively. Further analysis in the 
marketing chain shows that in both models, there is a negative and significant (only for mango) 
effect to adopt two certificates if the buyer comes with a truck to the farm to collect the 
production.  Living in the city decreases the chances to adopt a second certification scheme by 
approximately 85% for both types of farmers. Once the farmer has one certification, the social 
network and the distance to places where courses are held no longer contribute with addicional 
information. Further, there are some variables which are not statistically significant. The variables 
whether a manager runs the farm and having a sophisticated irrigation system impact positively on 
the decision-making. For mango, age has a positive sign and education a negative one, whereas the 
opposite results were found for grapes. 
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Table 7.14: Logistic regression results on the decision of mango farmers to adopt two versus 
one certificate 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% CI 
Age 1.022 0.032 0.70 0.482      0.961 1.087 
Education 0.996 0.081 -0.04 0.969      0.849    1.170 
Manager 1.988 1.928 0.71 0.479      0.296    3.313 
Living_city 0.173 0.180 -1.69 0.091*      0.022    1.325 
Ha 0.806 0.045 -2.13 0.033**      0.810     0.991 
Total_labor 1.061 0.023 2.71 0.007***      1.016    1.107 
Type_irrig 2.747 2.141 1.30 0.195      0.596     3.661 
Sub_packing 3.684 3.211 2.29 0.017***      1.501    7.469 
Trans 0.184 0.171 -1.82 0.069* 0.299    1.137 
Year_buyer 0.502 0.082 -4.18 0.000*** 0.363    0.693 
Dependent variable: farmers having one and two certificates; n=148 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(10, 148)=48.01  p<0.0000 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.5122 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(10)= 102.63    p< 0.9852 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.9378 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 7.15: Logistic regression results on the certification decision of grapes farmers to 
adopt two versus one certificate 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% CI 
Age 0.985   0.025 -0.55   0.581      0.936    1.037 
Education 1.020 0.064     0.33 0.745      0.901    1.156 
Manager 1.087 0.970     0.09 0.925      0.189    6.245 
Living_city 0.156    0.132     -2.18 0.029**      0.029    0.826 
Ha 1.073    0.107     0.72 0.474       0.883   1.305 
Total_labor 1.003    0.009     0.41 0.684       0.985     1.022 
Type_irrig 1.860   1.266     0.91 0.362      0.490    3.062 
Sub_packing 3.785    2.087     2.66 0.008***       1.824    6.490 
Trans 0.261    0.360      -0.97 0.330       0.017    3.899 
Year_buyer 0.694       0.145      -1.74 0.082*      0.460    1.047 
Dependent variable: farmers having one and two certificates; n=148 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(10, 148)=31.71  p<0.0008 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.3649 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(10)= 142.15    p< 0.3417 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.8905 
Source: Own calculations 
7.3.3 Econometric estimates for the decision of adopting PIF 
This analysis considers 252 grapes and mangoes farmers. It looks at the determinants that lead 
farmers to adopt PIF. Table 7.17 and Table 7.16 present the results. The adjusted Wald test 
indicates that the model is significant. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test shows that the model presents a 
good fit. The area under the ROC curve is 0.76 revealing that the models have adequate 
discrimination. The link test also presents a suitable result which means that the model does not 
have relevant omitted variables (Appendices 15 and 16). 
The results show that younger mango and grapes farmers have 4% higher chances to adopt PIF at 
5% level. Also, more educated farmers who live in the city present a positive and significant 
influence. Grapes farmers having access to credit in commercial banks, present 122% higher 
chances. Nevertheless, the dependence on the income obtained from non-agricultural sectors and 
the total labor decrease the chances to adopt PIF.  
Mango farmers, who utilize pallets in the post-harvesting process in the field, have 68% lower 
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chances to adopt PIF. Grapes farmers, for instance, proceed with the post-harvesting in paper or 
plastic boxes, increasing significantly their probability. Although both results are insignificant, it is 
interesting to note that trading with individual buyers has a negative effect, while being a member 
of an association has a positive one. 
Table 7.16: Logistic regression results on the decision of mango farmers to adopt PIF 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% CI 
Age 0.969  0.0145    -2.09 0.036**      .941     0.997 
Education 1.210    0.0466      4.97 0.000***      1.122    1.305 
Living_city 2.497    0.876      2.61 0.009***      1.255    4.968 
Experience 1.061    0.0386 1.61 0.107        0.987     1.140 
Bank_access 1.575    0.541      1.32 0.186      0.803    3.089 
Member_assoc 1.116    0.433      0.28 0.776      0.521    2.391 
Total_labor 0.983    0.007     -2.12 0.034**       0.969    0.998 
Type_irrig 0.727    0.264     -0.88 0.381      0.356    1.483 
Non_agric_inc 0.311    0.126     -2.86 0.004***      0.140    0.698 
harvesting 0.321    0.128     -2.84 0.004***      0.147    0.703 
Trading_ind 0.442    0.285     -1.26 0.206      0.125    1.566 
Dependent variable: non-certified and PIF certified farmers; n=252 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(11, 252)=43.47  p<0.0000 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.1617 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(11)= 244.98    p< 0.3989 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.7634 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 7.17: Logistic regression results on the decision of grapes farmers to adopt PIF 
Variables Odds ratio 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% CI 
Age 0.968    .0140042    -2.23 0.025**      0.941   0.996 
Education 1.201    .0462129     4.77 0.000***      1.113    1.295 
Living_city 2.537    .9020662     2.62 0.009***      1.264    5.093 
Experience 0.948    .0710207    -0.71 0.477      0.818    1.098 
Bank_access 2.227    .7998685     2.23 0.026**      1.101    4.502 
Member_assoc 1.347    .4902528     0.82 0.413      0.660    2.749 
Total_labor 0.983    .0085331    -1.92 0.055*      0.966    1.000 
Type_irrig 0.609    .2179039    -1.39 0.166      0.302    1.228 
Non_agric_inc 0.337    .1368754    -2.68 0.007***      0.152    0.747 
harvesting 3.460    1.892639     2.27 0.023**      1.184    10.108 
Trading_ind 0.485   .3084847 -1.14 0.255      0.139    1.686 
Dependent variable: non-certified and PIF certified farmers; n=252 
*** Significant at 1% level;** 5%; * 10%  
Adjusted Wald Test                                                      F(11, 252)=38.18  p<0.0000 
Pseudo R2                                                                     0.1560 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test                       Chi2(11)= 253.16    p< 0.2386 
Area under the ROC curve                                             0.7667 
Source: Own calculations 
7.3.4 Summary 
Data from the survey of 148 certified mango and grapes farmers were used in a logit model to 
determine the variables associated with the decision of adopting one or more certificates. The 
second model, included 252 PIF certified mango and grapes farmers and non-certified ones. It 
aimed at assessing the relevant variables which influence the decision-making on whether to adopt 
PIF or not. The results from the first model revealed that utilizing the packing house from the 
group, cooperative or association plays the major role in the decision to adopt two certificates. In 
addition number of employees working on the farm has also a positive effect. Variables such as 
‘years trading with the buyer’ and ‘living in the city’ have a negative and significant influence on 
the decision making. Transportation and planted ha is only negatively significant for mango 
farmers. Analyzing the models on the decision of adopting PIF, the results show that younger, 
more educated farmers who reside in the city have more chances to adopt PIF. In the grapes case, 
farmers having access to credit and post-harvest in boxes have also higher chances. Mango farmers 
post-harvesting in pallets decrease substantially their chances for PIF.  
Chapter 8 Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
 137
8 Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
8.1 Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
Brazilian fruit exports generated US$370 million as a result of the production of 35,000 tons of 
fruits, harvested on 2,000 ha, in 2004. Mango and grapes are the major fruits exported from the 
Juazeiro/Petrolina region, while melon and cashew nuts are the major products from the 
Mossoró/Serra do Mel region. However, Brazilian exports still have a huge potential to grow: only 
2% of the total produced volume had been exported in 2004 (IBRAF, 2004). In recent years, 
several certification schemes have been implemented. These are specifically the Integrated Fruit 
Production (PIF), GlobalGAP, Fairtrade and Organic certification schemes. It is not clear, 
however, to what extent these certification schemes offer an opportunity to the farmers to increase 
their access to international markets or whether they might have the effect of a non-tariff trade 
barrier.  
At the same time, in developed countries, particularly in the European Union and the United 
States, demand for higher levels of food safety has led to the implementation of certification 
programs that address more types of safety-related attributes and impose stricter standards. 
Certification systems play an important role in any market that is burdened with a high degree of 
information asymmetry and quality uncertainty. Thus, producers and exporters of fresh fruit and 
vegetables from developing countries like Brazil are increasingly required to demonstrate the 
safety and traceability of their produce up to the consumption stage. The producers also have to 
show that they have taken all possible precautions in terms of food and environmental safety along 
the chain, assured via a certification scheme.  
This thesis, therefore, aims at conducting an economic analysis in the Brazilian fruit chain with 
particular focus on four sectors: mangoes and grapes in the Petrolina/Juazeiro region, cashew nuts 
and melons in the Serra do Mel/Mossoró region. These are also the four main fruits exported to the 
US and to the EU. Specific key questions addressed in the study are:  
1) To assess the differences and similarities between certified, non-certified and those farmers 
in process of being certified. The characteristics of farmers and their farms including size, 
specialization and productivity, are investigated along with their perceptions about the costs and 
the benefits of certification and their future expectations. 
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2) To understand the functioning of the marketing chain of these four sectors. The objective is to 
identify the existing type of global value chain governance in the fruit sectors and provide a 
theoretical explanation for the reasons they arise. This will generate a better understanding of 
different forms of inter-firm coordination. 
3) To identify the determinants which lead producers to adopt certification. The objective is to 
identify the variables which determine the probability of farmers adopting one, two or even three 
certification schemes. 
4) To verify the impact of certification on different producers’ size. The objectives are to 
compare the certified and non-certified farmers of small and medium sizes and to identify whether 
small-scale farmers are possibly excluded from participation in certification schemes.  
5) To assess the importance, the similiarities and the differences between selected certification 
schemes (PIF, GlobalGAP, Organic and Fairtrade).  
To answer these questions, a survey of 303 mango and grapes farmers was conducted in the 
Juazeiro/Petrolina region in the Northeast of Brazil in 2006. In addition, a survey of 85 cashew 
nuts farmers and six case studies with melon farmers were conducted in the Serra do Mel/Mossoró 
region. The surveyed farmers are certified by one or more of the existing certification schemes for 
a few years now. Some farmers are in the process of getting certified. Non-certified farmers serve 
as a control group. The surveyed farmers are either of small, medium or large size. Details on the 
survey design, data collection as well as background information on the importance of the fruit 
production in Brazil are given in Chapter 4.  
To analyze the primary data, a conceptual framework of the marketing chain is first developed in 
Chapter 3. Theoretical and empirical approaches on the farmers’ decision to adopt certification in 
agro-food products are identified. While many authors have discussed empirical approaches to 
agro-food products, only few studies have focused on the theory as shown from the literature 
review in Chapter 2. Analyses on the marketing chain focus largely on the identification of the 
decision-makers in the chain. Papers applying the transaction cost approach discuss the 
characteristics of contracts, negotiations and transportation between farmers and buyers. Studies 
on the costs and the benefits of implementing a certain certification scheme provide a deeper 
understanding on important determinants that lead farmers to certify. For this survey, different 
approaches contribute to identify and categorize the determinants to adopt a certification scheme. 
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The comparative analysis of the four certification schemes which exist in the fruit sector in Brazil 
has shown that GlobalGAP and the Integrated Fruit Production (PIF) are similar certification 
schemes. However, they differ with respect to the number of requirements and their distribution 
over various stages (e.g. production, post-harvesting). In addition, PIF certification requires a book 
keeping system opposed to GlobalGAP. But since, GlobalGAP auditors accept the book keeping 
provided by PIF, farmers aiming to adopt GlobalGAP face an easier process when they have 
already PIF.  
Contrary to PIF and GlobalGAP, Fairtrade certification concentrates on producers’ organizations 
and cooperatives where small-scale farmers belong to and not on individual farmers. In addition, a 
lot of attention is paid to the labor and environmental conditions, besides the guarantee of a 
minimum price for farmers. With respect to organic certification, the requirements are not directed 
to a particular product or crop and their level of compliance is not indicated. Major emphasis is put 
on the production system. Organic and Fairtrade certification do not have an own book keeping for 
records. All four programs are subject to monitoring but with different frequency. PIF certified 
farmers are monitored three times a year, GlobalGAP requires monitoring twice a year and 
Organic and Fairtrade certified producers are monitored once a year.  
Some descriptive statistics are shown from the comparative analyses between certified and non-
certified farmers of grapes, mango, melon and cashew nuts from the survey areas in Chapter 6. An 
analysis of the characteristics of the farmers concludes that certified farmers are generally not 
better educated than non-certified ones, with the exception of melon farmers. The high dependence 
on the income from fruit production combined with a sophisticated irrigation system leads to 
higher net income for all certified farmers. In addition, certified farmers of the four types of fruits 
have higher productivity, more land allocated to the specific fruit and more years of experience in 
the field. Mango and grapes certified and in process farmers have invested high amounts in new 
infrastructure. On the contrary, all melon certified farmers have concentrated more on 
reconstruction. In the case of cashew nuts, the investments are relatively small. Despite the higher 
costs per ha, they receive net income which is slightly higher for the certified farmers but slightly 
lower for the farmers in process.  
The higher net income partly derives from the price premium paid for the certified fruits. Mango 
and grapes farmers receive an increase of price per kg by 58% and 28%, respectively. Cashew nuts 
farmers receive the highest rates: 82% per kg of nuts and 62% per kg of kernels. Melon producers 
do not receive a price premium after adopting certification, but it enables them to remain in the 
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market. Besides the price premium, farmers also consider environmental issues as important 
benefits. Mango and grapes farmers mainly aim at decreasing the use of pesticides and agro-toxics, 
and cashew nuts farmers focus on having a more holistic approach to environmental issues through 
their environmental plan. More specifically, they aim at avoiding burning and promote adequate 
soil management. Melon farmers also mention having an environmental plan but with a different 
focus set on the care of preservation areas. Further, all farmers of the four sectors plan to continue 
producing fruits in the long run. Mango and grapes certified farmers aim at increasing exports to 
new markets (e.g. Japan and the US).  
In the Juazeiro/Petrolina region, organizations like SEBRAE and EMBRAPA play a significant 
role in providing information with regard to certification. Besides, these organizations are also 
important in supporting training courses and developing research. Interesting to note is that 
farmers, after adopting certification become members in a group, cooperative or association which 
provide updates on important certification issues. In the Serra do Mel/Mossoro region, the social 
network is the main source of information for cashew nuts farmers, and the buyers for melon 
farmers.  
The descriptive analysis is being complemented by some econometric models in Chapter 6. The 
LOGIT model is used three times: first, for identifying the determinants of the adoption decision 
of certification and second, for determining the factors relevant for adopting two versus one 
certification scheme, and third, for testing the main factors that lead farmers to adopt specifically 
PIF. Several tests are performed to check the robustness of the models. To assure that the data is 
homogeneous, relevant variables are tested against heteroscedasticity using the Hausman test. In 
addition, the presence of multicollinearity among the variables is checked through correlation 
tables and also tests with regard to model specificities are done.  
The logistic estimates consider certified mango, grapes and cashew nuts farmers and in process to 
obtain certification as one group and non-certified farmers as another. The estimates of the all 
fruits model show that only education has a positive and significant effect on the decision to adopt 
certification. But there are a number of significant variables which have a negative impact. Thus, 
the chances to certify decrease when farmers are dependent on the income from non-agricultural 
activities, are living in rural villages and not on the farm and, trade with an individual buyer using 
a verbal trust-based arrangement. The estimates on grapes and mango models consider whether the 
farmer is a mango or grapes grower as part of the variables set. For instance, farmers who are 
mango growers, have 59% lower probability to certify. Grapes farmers have 119% higher chances 
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to certify. More educated and more experienced farmers are more likely to certify. On the other 
hand, small farms, dependency on income obtained from non-agricultural activities, the share of 
the current irrigated area, and the trust verbal-based contract arrangement contribute to decreasing 
the chances of adoption. In the cashew nut estimates, education is the one with the strongest 
positive and significant impact on the decision-making of the producers, followed by the variable 
number of family members of the household and dependency on the income obtained from non-
agriculture activities.  
Chapter 7 gives an overview of the grapes and mangoes marketing chains revealing that certified 
producers generally trade with groups, cooperatives or associations while non-certified farmers 
trade with individual buyers. Groups, associations or cooperatives are responsible for the 
collection of the production at the farms, for storage, classification and transportation to the final 
buyer. In addition, they trade and settle contractual agreements with international buyers. These 
results show that certified farmers have achieved a higher level of coordination and vertical 
integration along the chain. On the contrary, the majority of the non-certified farmers trade directly 
with individual buyers.  
The types of governance have been used to illustrate the way power operates in the fruit value 
chain. On the one hand, non-certified farmers of grapes and mangoes operate in the market-based 
global value chain. On the other hand, the results reveal that certified farmers, regardless of the 
fruit, shift from arm’s-length market to quasi-hierarchical relationships attributed mainly to a high 
level of asset specificity, i.e. a shift from market-based global value chain governance to a 
relational value chain. This is achieved through a close dialogue between more or less equal 
partners with a more explicit coordination, which shows the importance of the competitive 
strategies such as certification in driving changes.  
The cashew nut marketing chain shows that non-certified farmers trade mainly with individual 
buyers and certified farmers with cooperatives. The trading with the cooperatives is described by a 
modular value chain type of governance characterized by network relationships. However, trading 
with individual buyers is classified as a market type of governance with arm’s length relations. 
Although the cooperative contribute to upgrade mostly certified farmers, there is still potential in 
the region to shift farmers to an upper level of coordination. However, to reach this higher level of 
coordination, investments are needed in this sector mainly in modern equipments and new 
technologies such as irrigation systems.  
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Although some melon farmers are not certified, they have indirect access to international channels 
through trading companies. The contractual relationships between non-certified farmers and 
trading companies as well as between certified farmers and the international buyer are all based on 
written contracts. According to the concepts of governance, transactions done directly and 
indirectly with international buyers are characterized as a captive type of governance where quasi-
hierarchical relationships dominate [buyer defines the product and controls over the suppliers]. 
The results confirm that the sector is well-coordinated along the chain up to the international 
buyer. In contrast, selling melons in the domestic market presents a high risk of payment failure. 
The lack of guarantees through formal contracts with national buyers and the dependence on daily 
price fluctuations contribute to making the conditions to trade in the country unstable.  
Farmers who have adopted one certification scheme sometimes also adopt a second or a third one. 
Therefore, Chapter 7 also deals with the analysis of the adoption process depending on the number 
and the kind of schemes. The findings reveal that single-certified mango and grapes producers 
have higher productivities compared to double-certified ones. Notwithstanding, the income of 
farmers with one certificate is higher than that of the remaining group. Single certified mango 
farmers after adopting certification received a 61% higher price compared to double ones who 
received 55%. Thus, single certified grapes farmers note a price increase of 27%, while double 
ones receive 29%. The comparative analysis hardly shows differences between having one or two 
certificates. The cost of certification is also twice higher for double-certified farmers compared to 
single-certified ones.  
Econometric estimates on the decision of mango and grapes farmers to adopt two or one certificate 
show that utilizing the packing house from the group, cooperative or association plays the major 
role in the decision to adopt two certificates. In addition, the number of employees working on the 
farm has also a positive effect. Variables such as ‘years trading with the buyer’ and ‘living in the 
city’ have a negative and significant influence on the decision-making. ‘Transportation’ and 
‘planted ha’ is only negatively significant for mango farmers. In addition, econometric results on 
the decision of adopting PIF show that younger and more educated farmers who reside in the city 
have more chances to adopt PIF. In the grapes case, farmers having access to credit and post-
harvest in boxes have also higher chances. Mango farmers post-harvesting in pallets decrease 
substantially their likelihood of adopting certification.  
With respect to the size of the farms, there is a concern that small producers’ participation in the 
international fruit and vegetable trade could be diminishing as a result of the increasing prevalence 
Chapter 8 Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
 143
of certification and standards in the sector. Based on a comparative analysis between small and 
medium farms, medium farmers of mango have higher productivity than small ones. Hence, 
medium sized farms possess more irrigated area and have a more sophisticated irrigation system, 
they also achieve a higher income compared to small ones. Nevertheless, this study shows that 
small producers of mangoes and grapes receive a higher price per kg after certifying compared to 
medium ones. For instance, small and medium mango farmers receive a 62% and a 47% higher 
price, while small and medium grapes ones receive 38% and 27%, respectively. It can be 
concluded, that evidence on marginalization of small farmers is not found in this study.  
8.2 Policy recommendation 
The reasons motivating farmers to vertically integrate are the reduction in transaction costs 
resulting from the economies of scale and the need to ensure consistent quality supply through the 
adoption of certification. The low number of certified mango and grapes farmers in the 
Petrolina/Juazeiro region compared to the number of farmers harvesting fruits, indicates that the 
fruit sector has a huge potential to grow and expand. Targeted support from the government and 
private sector will likely contribute to an increased competitiveness of the fruit sector.  
Based on the findings from this study, certification is considered a catalyst to increase exports, 
with farmers benefiting in economic and environmental terms. On the one hand, farmers have an 
incentive to upgrade and are able to access the international market with certification. Mango and 
grapes producers having a certificate are more likely to find customers in the international markets. 
Thus, certification is indeed a passport to access international markets. On the other hand, 
certification excludes less capable growers from the market, meaning that the increasing level of 
requirements per se selects the farmers who are able to comply. But also the access to information 
may also restrict farmers from participation in certification programs. Thus, organizations 
supported by government should assure that information is available and that certification is a 
transparent and a voluntary process. Adopting two certificates does not necessarily pay off, but in 
some cases it might open the market to specific countries. 
In Juazeiro/Petrolina region, it is important that organizations like EMBRAPA, SEBRAE and 
others which support small farmers, promote and give incentives to farmers to participate in 
training courses, workshops and discussions with experts. They should also provide updates 
related to certification, disseminate information on new varieties and help finding solutions for 
plagues and diseases in the orchards. Information should equally reach farmers living in rural 
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villages and on the farm. Unfavorable factors are the distance from the rural village to the city 
center, where usually training courses and workshops are held, and the lack of adequate facilities. 
In this line, organizations should promote regional and local meetings.  
In the Mossoró/Serra do Mel region, there is an increasing need to inform e.g. cashew nuts farmers 
about the advantages to adopt certification and the opportunities with respect to market access, 
environmental benefits, and price premium. Organizations in the region, like SEBRAE and 
EMATER could contribute with courses and the cooperatives, with social gatherings.   
Although the major importer of melons is the EU, the status of pest-free zone of the fruit fly 
Anastrepha Grandis enables farmers from Brazil to also access the US market. The melon sector 
in Brazil is highly concentrated with a few farmers possessing advanced technology and control 
over the marketing channels. Contractual arrangements between international buyers and farmers 
as well as between trading companies and farmers are well-developed. However, arrangements 
with domestic buyers still open margin for improvement.  
Support to upgrade and increase efficiency along the chains is highly important mainly for non-
certified farmers. This would be possible via vertical integration, cooperation and coordination, 
including the use of written contracts, among the actors in the chain. Upgrading along the value 
chains can help moving towards quality standards, increased international access, and better 
contractual arrangements.  
Promoting the establishment of new associations, groups or cooperatives of small non-certified 
farmers contributes to development of the fruit sector. As has been found, farmers trade mostly 
with individual buyers and they become members of an organization once they certify. Hence, 
particularly small non-certified farmers are disadvantaged when negotiating over price and quality 
with individual buyers. Groups, cooperatives and associations, however, enhance communication 
and information-sharing among members and are helpful in identifying the problems and needs of 
producers in implementing certification. In addition, joining a group contributes to improve the 
efficiency of management, to increase the fruit quality, and to reduce the costs of certification.  
The Brazilian government and the private sector could promote the consumption of certified fruits 
via campaigns on the TV or fairs in strategic geographical locations. Domestic consumers should 
become aware of the environmental benefits of certified products. In particular, focus should be 
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given to the benefits of consuming healthier fruits. In addition, promoting the consumption of 
certified fruits would give incentives to more farmers to adopt certification.  
8.3 Limitations of the study and further research needs 
Several weaknesses and limitations of the methodology of the study could be identified and should 
be considered to avoid misinterpretation of the results leading to wrong conclusions. The first 
point relates to the geographical and climate conditions of the survey regions, which are unique in 
the country. Therefore, the land size which defines a producer as small, medium or large varies 
when comparing to farmers who harvest the same fruit in different regions of the country. In this 
survey the respective definitions of SEBRAE are adopted.  
Another point is the composition of the sample. The stratum of certified producers does not always 
specify the type of certification scheme a farmer belongs to. Thus, the distribution of the farmers 
among the different schemes is not representative. Additionally, the majority of the population size 
is composed of small size producers, so that more questionnaires are applied to them. Medium and 
large-scale producers are therefore considered to a lower extend.  
The cashew nuts sector presents peculiar characteristics. The sampled producers are all 
concentrated in a small area, do not have access to irrigation systems and hence are highly 
dependent on rain. In addition, cashew nuts farmers in general have significant difficulties in 
remembering the production cost. Therefore, the results on net income were not possible to 
calculate.  
The melon cases give an overview of the sector in the region. Considering farmers and traders, it is 
possible to identify to which extent they comply with standards, how they make decisions and how 
their level of compliance is. However, the case studies were not selected randomly, but are 
expressly based on their marketing channel to access either national or international markets. The 
difficulty in accessing the farms was outstandingly high. To collect these six cases, a time of two 
months period was needed. Two adversities are to be mentioned in this context: the harvesting 
period kept managers and owners busy, and there were restrictions to enter the farm. In order to 
have permission to enter the farm, the manager of COEX kindly arranged the contacts and an easy 
access to reach the farms was assured.  
A value chain analysis should incorporate the behavior of traders and consumers, however only the 
level of the producers is considered in this study to receive information about the traders and 
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consumers. Apart from these limitations related to the field research and the sampling, some 
methodological shortcoming need to be mentioned. For analyzing the survey of cross-sectional 
data, the binary logistic model is used to assess the determinants which lead farmers to adopt 
certification. However, these are the following: (i) having a relative small number of observations 
on certified farmers [the low number of certified farmers in the regions limits further data 
collection]; (ii) inability to estimate the impact of variables with regard to each certification 
scheme on the farm level; (iii) inability to include many important variables due to endogeneity, 
and (iv) missing valid instrumental variables. Another limitation of this study refers to the fact that 
certified farmers are not able to distinguish the cost of compliance and the price received with 
respect to each certification scheme. Therefore, this study considers the results sometimes based 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire applied for mango and grapes producers with and without 
certification 
Number of the questionnaire:_____________ 
Name of the producer: __________________ 
Number of the plot:_____________________ 
City:_________________________________ 
Date: ________________________________ 
I – Characteristics of the farm and of the producer 
 
1.1. Who is the head of the family? 
(   ) male 
(   ) female 
 
1.2. Is the head of the family also the manager of the farm? 
(   ) yes 
(   ) no 
 
1.3. Gender of the manager 
(    ) female 
(    ) male 
(    ) not applicable 
 
1.4. Age of the head of the family 
(    ) years 
 
1.5. Age of the manager 
(    ) years 
(    ) not applicable 
 
1.6. People living on the farm (to fill with the numbers of people): 
 
The owner’s family                          (  ) yes     (  ) no 
 
Where does the ower’s family live?  (   ) city   (   ) rural area 
                                 
Family of workers          (    ) yes     (   ) no 
                                        (    ) how many families? 
                                        (    ) men 
                                        (    ) women 
                                        (    ) kids (age above 18) 
                                        (    ) kids (age bellow 18) 
 
Family of caratakers       (    ) yes   (    ) no 
                                        (    ) how many families? 
                                        (    ) men 
                                        (    ) women 
                                        (    ) kids (age above 18) 
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                                        (    ) kids (age bellow 18) 
 
1.7. How many family members are working on the fruit culture? 
(   ) none 
(   ) the owner male 
(   ) the owner female 
(   ) sons 
(   ) daughters 
 
1.8. What is the size of the land?___ ha 
How many ha area effectively irrigated?____ 
How many ha are potencial to irrigated?_____ 
What is the type of irrigation system used?____________ 
 
1.9. Does the land belongs to the: 
(   ) family 
(   ) rented 
(   ) ownership from the government 
(   ) other situation. Which?___________ 
 
1.10. Does the family depend only on the income generated by the fruits? 
 (   ) yes 
 (   ) no 
if not, which are the main sources of income? ____________________ 
 
1.11. Did you use own resources to invest on the farm? 
 (   ) no 
 2005 2004 2003 2002 
 If yes, R$ R$ R$ R$ 
     
 
1.12. Do you have access to credit at commercial banks? 
(   ) no 
(   ) yes, which bank?__________  
 
1.13. Did you invest loans obtained from commercial bank to invest on the farm? 
 (  ) no 
 2005 2004 2003 2002 
If yes, R$ R$ R$ R$ 




1.14. What is the level of education of the head of the family and/or the manager? 
Options Head manager 
Does not know how to read and to write   
Only knows to write the name   
Fundamental school incomplete   
Fundamental school complete   
Secondary school incomplete   
Secondary school complete   
Undergraduate degree incomplete    
Undergraduate degree incomplete   
Posgraduate studies   
 
1.15. How many workers are employed with? 
________ Permanent workers with social benefits 
________ Permanent workers without social benefits  
________ Temporary workers with social benefits  
________ Temporary workers without social benefits  
 
1.16. What are you producing, since when and how many ha? (quantity in kg in 2005): 
Fruit since Ha volume 
Grapes    
Mangoes    
Papaya    
Banana    
Guava    
Coconuts    
Watermelon     
Melon    
 
II – Cost of information 
 
2.1 Are you in process to obtain certification? 
Fruits PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
 since no since no since no 
Grapes       
Mangoes       
 
 
2.2 Which fruit is already certified? 
Fruits PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
 since No since no since no 
Grapes       





2.3. Did you hire any workers due to certification? 
(  ) no 
(  ) yes, how many?___________ 
 
2.4 How long did it take to certify? 
Technique implementation: _____________ months 
Infraestructure: _______________________months 
 
2.5 How would you classifed the level of bureaucracy of this certificate? 
Option PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
Does know    
Very bureaucratic    
Acceptable    
Little bureaucratic    
Not bureaucratic    
 
2.7 In your opinion, was certification a voluntary or enforced process? 
(   ) does not know 
(   ) yes, PIF enforced, by whom?_________________ 
(   ) no, PIF was voluntary 
(   ) yes, Eurepgap enforced, by whom?_________________ 
(   ) no, Eureggap was voluntary 
(   ) yes, Fairtrade enforced, by whom?_________________ 
(   ) no, Fairtrade was voluntary 
 
2.8 Do you know why certification is needed? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to level of 
importance): 
(  ) no, I have no idea 
(  ) no, I need to fill many documents, but I do know why 
(  ) it is an excuse to make the farmers spend more money 
(  ) the domestic consumers are not aware about certification and therefore, are not willing to pay 
more 
(  ) more or less, is to register all stages of the production 
(  ) yes, it is requirement of the market seeking food safety 
(  ) yes, it is a guarantee that fruits are produced safely, according to the international standards 
(  ) other reason_____________________________________________ 
 
2.9 Who had required or requires you certification? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to level of 
importance): 
Options PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
No one, I adopted because I wanted    
The final client    
The cooperative or association to whom I sell the 
harvesting 
   
The trader    
The wholesaler in Brazil    
The middlemen in Brazil    




2.10 Why did they required certification? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to main answer): 
Options PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
It is requirement of the final consumer     
In my opinion, it is non-trade barrier    
Due to concerns with food safety    
Due to concerns on environmetal issues    
Due to concerns on social welfare    
 
2.11 How were you informed before adopting certification? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to main 
answer): 
Options PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
EMBRAPA    
SEBRAE    
CODEVASF    
Association of producers    
City Hall    
Neighbour    
Trader    
Internet    
TV    
Technique support    
Other    
 
2.12 What is the level of importance of the following organizations in supporting certification? 
(select with “x”): 
Options Extremely  
important 
Important  little 
important 
No importance 
Does not know     
EMBRAPA     
SEBRAE     
Cooperative     
Association of producers     
Cooperative     
Group of producers     
City Hall     
ONG     
other     
 
III – Certification cost 
3.1Cost of certification: 
Options R$ 
Auditoring by a Brazilian certifying company   
Auditoring by a foreign certifying company  
Monitoring  
Tests of agrochemical residues   
Test of water  
Test of leaves  




3.2 Where do you do the tests? 
 
Tests 
This city  Next city ITEP Another 
city 
Test of agrotoxics residues     
Test of  water     
Test of soil     
Test of leaves     
Other     
 
3.3 What did you need to build new and reconstruct at your farm due to certification? (fill the 
blanks witht the amount): 
New infrastructure Reconstruction Options 
yes R$ Yes R$ 
Signallig plates     
Office     
Loggings     
Caretaker house     
Deposit of fertilizers     
Deposit of agrochimic     
Deposit of tools     
Refectory     
Toiletes     
Agrochemical mixture place     
Deposit of emergency     
Deposit of empty agrochemicals packages     
Packing house     
 
3.4 What is the production cost per kg? 




3.5 Indicate what has been the support from EMBRAPA: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses  Technical 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources   Financial 




3.6 Indicate what has been the support from Non-Governmental Organization (ONG): 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) technical visits 
  
Technical 
(   ) pre-auditoring 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources   Financial 
(   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.7 Indicate what has been the support from SEBRAE: 
(  ) none  
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) technical visits 
  
Technical 
(   ) pre-auditoring 
(   ) Program “bonus certification” 
(   ) tests of agrochemical residues 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources  
  
Financial 
(   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.8 Indicate what has been the support from CODEVASF: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) technical visits 
  
Technical 
(   ) access to new technologies 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources    
Financial (   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.9 Indicate what has been the support from the COOPERATIVE OR ASSOCIATION: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
  
Technical 
(   ) technical visits 
(   ) pre-auditoring  
 Financial (   ) provides indirect financial resources  
 
IV -  Benefíts to certify 
 
4.1 Did you increase the volume exported due to certification? 
(  ) no, the volume exported was the same 
(  ) yes, the volume increased due to certification 






If yes, how much was the increase of exports? 
PIF Eurepgap FAIRTRADE  
Fruits % %  %  
Grapes    
Mangoes    
 
4.2 How many hectares have you designated to cahsew nuts, before and after adopting 
certification? 
PIF EurepGAP FAIRTRADE 
before after  before after  before after  
Fruits 
 ha  ha  ha  ha  ha  ha 
Grapes       
Mangoes       
 
4.3 Did you receive a price premium due to having certification? 
(   ) yes 
(   ) no 
 
4.4 Did you have any expectation to receive a price premium? 
 (   ) yes 
 (   ) no 
 
4.5 What was the price received before and after adopting certification? (Price in R$, per kg): 
PIF EurepGAP FAIRTRADE Other 
before after  before after  before after  before after  
Fruits 
price price price price price Price price Price 
Grapes         
Mangoes         
 
4.6 Were you aware about decreasing environmental damages at your farm? (Choose 1 for the fist 
option, 2 for the second, etc): 
(   ) I am not concern about this issue 
(   ) to follow the rules described by the manual of each certification scheme 
(   ) It is so complicated to conciliate fruit production and environment 
(   ) do not contaminate water wells and recycle empty agrotoxics packages 
(   ) to avoid burns 
(   )__________________________ 
 
4.7 Which of the following options did you consider important while you decided to certify? 
(Choose 1 for the first option, 2 the second, etc): 
(   ) nothing, I do not care about environment 
(   ) the production is organic, i.e., does not require pesticides 
(   ) conservations and adequate soil management 
(   ) to have an environmental plan 
(   ) to decrease the use of pesticides  
(   ) do not contaminate water wells 
(   ) to give an adequate destination of empty packages of agrotoxics  




4.8 Which of the following options did you use to sell your production before certifying? (Fill in 
% in 2005): 
Options PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
US    
EU    
Other    
Domestic market    
 
4.9 Which of the following options did you use to sell your production after certifying? (Fill in % 
in 2005): 
Options PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
US    
EU    
Other    
Domestic market    
 
4.10 Which are the advantages of having certification? (Choose 1 for the first more important, 2 
for the second, etc): 
Options PIF Eurepgap Fairtrade 
Do not know which could be the benefits    
There are no benefits    
To have a better farm organization    
To receive a price premium    
To follow the welfare requirements (do not 
have child labor, etc) 
   
To seek the welfare of workers    
The concern of food security    
To decrease environmental damages    
To decrease the use of pesticides and agro 
toxics 
   
The possibility to export to new markets    
To remain in the market    
To settle better negotiations     
To decrease the production cost    
To improve the quality of the fruit    
To have a differentiated product    




4.11 What are the main disadvantages of having certification? (Choose 1 for the most important, 2 




Only disadvantages     
I do not see any disadvantage     
To compete with producers without 
certification in the market 
    
Do not receive a price premium due to 
certified fruit 
    
´The cost of compliance are too high     
To have restricted use of certain products     
There is no return for such an afford     
 
4.12 Which are the main reasons that lead you to adopt certification? (Choose 1 for the most 
important, 2 the second, etc): 
Options PIF Eurepgap FAIRTRADE
To remain in the market    
The expectation to receive a price premium    
To protect and conserve the environment    
To produce a product with higher quality    
To have a certified fruit is a requirement from the 
buyer 
   
The facility to have support from SEBRAE, 
EMBRAPA 
   
Due to the farm size: opportunity to increase the 
volume exported 
   
Other reason: which one?     
 
4.14 Why did you decide for non-adopting certification? (Choose 1 for the most important, 2 the 
second, etc): 
(  ) financial condition 
(  ) lack of information 
(  ) lack of support of organizations like SEBRAE, EMBRAPA, CODEVASF and VALEXPORT 
(  ) difficulties to fil the requirements 
(  ) due to the farm size, the investment is too high 
(  ) I had problems with the buyer 
(  ) I do not intend to remain in the market many years 
(  ) Ido not intend to comply with any certification scheme 
(  ) other reason, which one?_______________________ 
 
V – Trading 
 
5.1 Do you have a packing house? 
(   ) no 






5.2 How do you do the post harvesting process? 
(  ) in the packing house 
(  ) in the field in pallets 
(  ) in the field:_____________ 
 
5.3 In case you do not have an own packing house, how do you proceed? 
(  ) Utilize a subcontracted one 
(  ) ___________  
 
5.4 How does the transportation of the fruits work? 
(   ) I take with my truck the production to the cooperative 
(   ) I take with my truck the production to the association 
(   ) Someone from the cooperative comes to my farm to take the production 
(   ) Someone from the association comes to my farm to take the production 
(   ) someone from the packing comes with a truck to the farm to take the production 
(   ) the buyer comes directly to my farm to take the production 
(   ) other, _______________ 
 
5.5 To whom to you sell your production? (Write the starting year and the percentage in 2005): 
Options Since when? 
Exporter company  
Association of producers  
Cooperative  
Group  
To the middlemen  
To a wholesaler  
 
5.8 Why did you decide to trade with individual buyers? (Fill 1 for the first answer, 2 for the 
second, etc) 
(   ) I do not have another option to sell 
(   ) I have infrastructure 
(   ) I have better market access 
(   ) I have higher flexibility in the contracts 
(   ) it is more profitable 
(   ) Other reason. Which?______________ 
 
5.9 Why did you decide to trade with the cooperative/group or association? 
(   ) I do not have other option to trade with 
(   ) Access to market 
(   ) due to the guarantee of selling  
(   ) due to contractual conditions 
(   ) information access 
(   ) because my neighbour does 
(   ) recommendation of EMBRAPA, SEBRAE or other organization 
(   ) I did not have other option to sell 






5.10 What is the final destination of your production (before certifying) (Fill in %): 
 International makets Domestic markets 







Grapes          
mangoes         
 
 
5.11 What is the final destination of your production (after certifying) (Fill in %): 
 International makets Domestic markets 




Local market middleman 
Grapes         
mangoes        
 
5.12 Why did you decide to trade your products in the domestic market? (Choose 1 for the first 
answer, 2 for the second, etc): 
(  ) do due easier access 
(  ) I had contractual problems with former buyers 
(  ) excess of supply 
(  ) a crop disease 
(  ) climate conditions 
(  ) the exchange rate was low 
(  ) the quality required was not reached 
(  ) Other reason, which?___________________ 
 
5.13How is the relationship between you and your buyer? (Fill Y=yes or N=no):  
Domestic market  





Local market middleman 
CONTRACT     
Percentage of the production you trade:     
Since when do you trade with     
Is the price fixed in the contract?     
Has the price minimum guarantee?     
Is the price consignated?     
Is the volume estipulated in the contract?     
Is the contract one harvest season?     
Is the quality estipulated?     
Does the buyer require certification?     
Have the clauses been met by the buyer?     
Is the client flexible when something 
unexpected happened? 
    
Did have a contract cancelled     
INFORMAL: ONLY  VERBAL      
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Percentage of the production you trade:     
Since when do trade with      
Is the payment done immediately?      
Is the payment done in advance?     
Is the payment done is partially?     
Is the price determined by the buyer?     
Is the price determined by you?     
Does the buyer buy any type of fruit?     
Is the client flexible in the negotiations?     
Does the buyer require that you have 
certification? 
    
Did you experience a case of non-
payment? 
    
 INFORMAL TRUST-BASED     
Percentage of the production you trade:     
Since when do trade with      
Is the payment done immediately?      
Is the payment done in advance?     
Is the payment done is partially?     
Is the price determined by the buyer?     
Is the price determined by the final 
industry? 
    
Is the price determined by you?     
Does the buyer buy any type of fruits?     
Is the client flexible in the negotiations?     
Does the buyer require that you have 
certification? 
    
Did you experience a case of non-
payment? 
    
 
5.14 How is relationship between you and your buyer? (Fill Y=yes or N=no):  
 Cooper. association Group 
CONTRACT    
Percentage of the production you trade:    
Since when do you trade with    
Is the price fixed in the contract?    
Has the price minimum guarantee?    
Is the price consignated?    
Is the volume estipulated in the contract?    
Is the contract one harvest season?    
Is the quality estipulated?    
Does the buyer require certification?    
Have the clauses been met by the buyer?    
Is the client flexible when something 
unexpected happened? 
   
Did have a contract cancelled    
INFORMAL: ONLY  VERBAL     
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Percentage of the production you trade:    
Since when do trade with     
Is the payment done immediately?     
Is the payment done in advance?    
Is the payment done is partially?    
Is the price determined by the buyer?    
Is the price determined by you?    
Does the buyer buy any type of fruit?    
Is the client flexible in the negotiations?    
Does the buyer require that you have 
certification? 
   
Did you experience a case of non-payment?    
 INFORMAL TRUST-BASED    
Percentage of the production you trade:    
Since when do trade with     
Is the payment done immediately?     
Is the payment done in advance?    
Is the payment done is partially?    
Is the price determined by the buyer?    
Is the price determined by the final industry?    
Is the price determined by you?    
Does the buyer buy any type of fruits?    
Is the client flexible in the negotiations?    
Does the buyer require that you have 
certification? 
   
Did you experience a case of non-payment?    
 
VI– Future expectation 
 
6.1 How many do you have expectation to remain in the same market? 
________ Years 
(  ) undetermined 
 
6.2. Are you planning to export to other markets? 
(  ) no 
(  ) yes. Which ones?___________________ 
 
6.3 How many years to you expect to continue to produce fruits? 
_______ years 
(  ) undetermined 
 
6.4 Which varieties are you cultivating at the currently? (Select with an“x”): 
Variety Tommy 
Atkins 
Palmer Haden Keitt Rosa Espada Other 
Mango        
        
grapes Benitaka Itália Red Globe Brasil Patrícia Rebier Vitoria 




6.5  Do you intend to change any variety? 
(  ) no 
Variety Tommy 
Atkins 
Palmer Haden Keitt Rosa Espada Outra 
Mango        
        
Variety Benitaka Itália Red Globe Brasil Patrícia Rebier Vitoria 
grapes        
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire applied for cashew nuts producers with certification 
 
Questionnaire number:_____________ 
Name of the producer:—————————————————————————— 
Number of the plot:_____________________ 
Data: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
I – Characteristics of the farm and of the producer 
 
1.1. Who is the head of the family? 
(   ) male 
(   ) female 
 
1.2. Is the head of the family also the manager of the farm? 
(   ) yes 
(   ) no 
 
1.3. Gender of the manager 
(    ) female 
(    ) male 
(    ) not applicable 
 
1.4. Age of the head of the family 
(    ) years 
 
1.5. Age of the manager 
(    ) years 
(    ) not applicable 
 
1.6. People living on the farm (To fill with the numbers of people): 
 
The owner’s family                          (  ) yes     (  ) no 
 
Where does the ower’s family live? (   ) city   (   ) rural area 
                                 
Family of workers           (    ) yes     (   ) no 
                                        (    ) how many families? 
                                        (    ) men 
                                        (    ) women 
                                        (    ) kids (age above 18) 
                                        (    ) kids (age bellow 18) 
 
Family of caratakers       (    ) yes   (    ) no 
                                        (    ) how many families? 
                                        (    ) men 
                                        (    ) women 
                                        (    ) kids (age above 18) 




1.7. How many family members are working on the fruit culture? 
(   ) none 
(   ) the owner male 
(   ) the owner female 
(   ) sons 
(   ) daughters 
 
1.8. What is the size of the land?___ ha 
How many hectares area effectively irrigated?____ 
How many hectares are potencial for irrigation?_____ 
What is the type of irrigation system used?____________ 
 
1.9. Does the land belongs to the: 
(   ) family 
(   ) rented 
(   ) ownership from the government 
(   ) other situation. Which?___________ 
 
1.10. Does the family depend only on the income generated by the fruits? 
(   ) yes 
(   ) no 
if not, which are the main sources of income? ____________________ 
 
1.11. Did you use own resources to invest on the farm? 
(   ) no 
 2005 2004 2003 2002 
 If yes, R$ R$ R$ R$ 
     
 
1.12. Do you have access to credit at commercial banks? 
(   ) no 
(   ) yes, which bank?__________  
 
1.13. Did you invest loans obtained from commercial bank to invest on the farm? 
(  ) no 
 2005 2004 2003 2002 
If yes, R$ R$ R$ R$ 





1.14. What is the level of education of the head of the family and/or the manager? 
Options head manager 
Does not know how to read and to write   
Only knows to write the name   
Fundamental school incomplete   
Fundamental school complete   
Secondary school incomplete   
Secondary school complete   
Undergraduate degree incomplete    
Undergraduate degree incomplete   
Posgraduate studies   
 
1.15. How many workers are employed with? 
________ Permanent workers with social benefits 
________ Permanent workers without social benefits  
________ Temporary workers with social benefits  
________ Temporary workers without social benefits  
 
1.16. What are you producing, since when and how many hectares? (quantity in kg in 2005): 
Product since hectares volume 
Cachew nuts    
Kernel    
 
II – Information cost 
 
2.1 Do you have organic certification? 
(  ) yes, since when?________ 
(  ) no 
 
2.2. Did you hire any workers due to certification? 
(  ) no 
(  ) yes, how many?___________ 
 
2.3 Why did you delay so many years to decide for adopting certification? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc 
according to the level of importance):  
Option ranking 
There was no requirements from the buyer  
Lack of information  
There was no guarantee of higher prices  
There was no accredited certifying company   
The cost to certify are too high  
There was no technical support  







2.4 How would you classifed the level of bureaucracy of this certificate? 
Options ranking 
Does know  
Very bureaucratic  
Acceptable  
Little bureaucratic  
Not bureaucratic  
 
2.5 In your opinion, was certification a voluntary or enforced process? 
(   ) does not know 
(   ) yes, enforced, by whom?_________________ 
(   ) no, it was voluntary 
 
2.6 Do you know why certification is needed? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to level of 
importance): 
(  ) no, I have no idea 
(  ) no, I need to fill many documents, but I do know why 
(  ) it is an excuse to make the farmers spend more money 
(  ) the domestic consumers are not aware about certification and therefore, are not willing to pay 
more 
(  ) more or less, is to register all stages of the production 
(  ) yes, it is requirement of the market seeking food safety 
(  ) yes, it is a guarantee that fruits are produced safely, according to the international standards 
(  ) other reason_____________________________________________ 
 
2.7 Who is requiring to you certification? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to level of importance): 
Options ranking 
No one, I adopted because I wanted  
The final client  
The cooperative or association to whom I sell the harvesting  
The trader  
The wholesaler in Brazil  
The middlemen in Brazil  




2.8 Why did they required certification? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc according to main answer): 
Options ranking 
It is requirement of the final consumer   
In my opinion, it is non-trade barrier  
Due to concerns with food safety  
Due to concerns on environmetal issues  






2.9 How were informed about organic certification before the adoption? (choose 1, 2, 3, etc 





Associations of producers  
EMATER  
EMPARN  





Technique support  
Other  
 
2.10 What is the level of importance of the following organizations in supporting certification? 
(select with “x”): 
Options Extremely  
important 




Does not know     
EMBRAPA     
SEBRAE     
Cooperative     
Association of producers     
EMATER     
EMPARN     
Group of producers     
City Hall     
ONG     
other     
 
III – Certification cost 
 
3.1  Where do you do the tests? 
 
Tests 
This city  Next city Onother city Does not 
do any test 
Test of...     










3.2 What did you need to build new or reconstruct at your farm due to certification? (fill the blanks 
witht the amount): 
New infrastrucure Reconstruction Options 
yes R$ yes R$ 
Shed     
Artesian wells     
Tools     
 
3.3 What is the cost of  certification? 
Opcoes R$ 




3.5 What is the production cost per kg? 
 Cost per Kg (R$) Does not know 
Cashew nuts   
Kernel   
 
3.6 Indicate what has been the support from EMBRAPA: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses  Technical 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources   Financial 
(   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.7 Indicate what has been the support from Non-Governmental Organization (ONG): 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) technical visits 
  
Technical 
(   ) pre-auditoring 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources   Financial 
(   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.8 Indicate what has been the support from SEBRAE: 
(  ) none  
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) technical visits 
 Technical 
(   ) pre-auditoring 
(   ) Program “revitalization of mini factories on cashew nuts” 
(   ) tests of agrochemical residues 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources  
  
Financial 




3.9 Indicate what has been the support from EMATER: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) technical visits 
Technical 
(   ) pre-auditoring 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources  Financial 
(   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.10 Indicate what has been the support from EMPARN: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
(   ) technical visits 
  
Technical 
(   ) pre-auditoring 
(   ) provides indirect financial resources   Financial 
(   ) provides direct financial resources 
 
3.11 Indicate what has been the support from the COOPERATIVE: 
(  ) none 
Material (   ) informative material 
(   ) training courses 
(   ) development of research 
  
Technical 
(   ) technical visits 
(   ) pre-auditoring  
 Financial (   ) provides indirect financial resources  
 
IV -  Benefíts to certify 
 
4.1Did you increase the volume exported due to certification? 
(  ) no, the volume exported was the same 
(  ) yes, the volume increased due to certification 
(  ) yes, the volume exported increased but due to olther reasons. Which?_________________ 
 
4.2 How many hectares have you designated to cahsew nuts, before and after adopting 
certification? 
 Organic certification 
before after Fruit 
 Ha  ha 
Cashew nuts   
 
4.3 Did you receive a price premium due to having certified fruit? 
(   ) yes 
(   ) no 




4.4 Did you have any expectation to receive a price premium? 
(   ) yes 
(   ) no 
(   ) do not know 
  
4.5 What was the price received in R$ in 2005? (Average price, per kg): 
 Organic certification 
Cashew nuts  
Kernel  
 
4.6 Were you aware about decreasing environmental damages at your farm? (Choose 1 for the fist 
option, 2 for the second, etc): 
(   ) I am not concern about this issue 
(   ) to follow the rules described by the manual of organic certification 
(   ) It is so complicated to conciliate fruit production and environment 
(   ) to do the basic: ______________________ 
(   ) to avoid burns 
(   )__________________________ 
 
4.7 Which of the following options did you consider while you decided to certify? (Choose 1 for 
the first option, 2 the second, etc): 
(   ) nothing, I do not care about environment 
(   ) the production is organic, i.e., does not require pesticides 
(   ) conservations and adequate soil management 
(   ) to have an environmental plan 
(   ) to decrease the use of pesticides  
(   ) do not contaminate water wells 
(   ) to give an adequate destination of empty packages of agrotoxics  
(   )_________________________ 
 
4.8 Which of the following options did you use to sell your production before certifying? (Fill in 
% in 2005): 
Options Cashew nuts kernel 
Cooperative   
US   
Europe, which countries? 
 
  
Other, which one?   
Domestic market   
 
4.9 Which of the following options did you use to sell your production after certifying? (Fill in % 
in 2005): 
Options Cashew nuts kernel 
Cooperative   
US   
Europe   
Domestic market   




4.10 Which are the advantages of having certification? (Choose 1 for the first more important, 2 
for the second, etc): 
Options Organic certification 
Do not know which could be the benefits  
There are no benefits  
To have a better farm organization  
To receive a price premium  
To follow the welfare requirements (do not have child labor, etc)  
To seek the welfare of workers  
The concern of food security  
To decrease environmental damages  
To decrease the use of pesticides and agro toxics  
The possibility to export to new markets  
To remain in the market  
To settle better negotiations   
To decrease the production cost  
To improve the quality of the fruit  
To have a differentiated product  
Other reason: which one?   
 
4.11 What are the main disadvantages of having certification? (Choose 1 for the most important, 2 
the second, etc): 
Options Organic certification 
Only disadvantages  
I do not see any disadvantage  
To compete with producers without certification in the market  
Do not receive a price premium due to certified fruit  
´The cost of compliance are too high  
To have restricted use of certain products  
There is no return for such an afford  
Other reason: which one?   
  
 
4.12 Which are the main reasons that lead you to adopt certification? (Choose 1 for the most 
important, 2 the second, etc): 
Options Organic certification 
To remain in the market  
The expectation to receive a price premium  
To protect and conserve the environment  
To produce a product with higher quality  
To have a certified fruit is a requirement from the buyer  
The facility to have support from SEBRAE, EMBRAPA, etc  
Due to the farm size: opportunity to increase the volume exported  






V – Trading 
 
5.1 How many workers are employed to help in the post harvesting process? 
________ permanent workers with social benefits 
________ permanent workers without social benefits 
________ temporary workers with social benefits 
________ temporary workers without social benefits 
 
5.2 How do you transport the product in natura to its final destination? 
(   ) I take with my truck the production to the cooperative 
(   ) I take with my truck the production to the association 
(   ) Someone from the cooperative comes to my farm to take the production 
(   ) Someone from the association comes to my farm to take the production 
(   ) the buyer comes directly to my farm to take the production 
(   ) other, _______________ 
 
5.3 How do you transport the processed cashew nuts to its final destination? 
(   ) I take with my truck the production to the cooperative 
(   ) I take with my truck the production to the association 
(   ) Someone from the cooperative comes to my farm to take the production 
(   ) Someone from the association comes to my farm to take the production 
(   ) the buyer comes directly to my farm to take the production 
(   ) other, _______________ 
 
5.4 To whom to you deliver your production? (Write the starting year and the percentage in 2005): 
Options Cashew nuts kernel 
 Since: % Since: % 
Exporter company     
Association of producers     
Cooperative     
Group     
To the middlemen     
To a neighbour     
To a wholesaler     
 
5.5 Why did you decide to trade individually? (Fill 1 for the first answer, 2 for the second, etc) 
(   ) I do not have another option to sell 
(   ) I have infrastructure 
(   ) I have better market access 
(   ) I have higher flexibility in the contracts 
(   ) it is more profitable 
(   ) Other reason. Which?______________ 
 
5.6 Why did you decide to trade with the cooperative? 
(   ) I do not have other option to trade with 
(   ) Access to market 
(   ) due to the guarantee of selling  
(   ) due to contractual conditions 
(   ) information access 
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(   ) because my neighbour does 
(   ) recommendation of EMBRAPA, SEBRAE or other organization 
(   ) other. Which?______________________ 
 
5.7 Why did you decide to trade your products in the domestic market? (Choose 1 for the first 
answer, 2 for the second, etc): 
(  ) do due easier access 
(  ) I had contractual problems with former buyers 
(  ) excess of supply 
(  ) a crop disease 
(  ) climate conditions 
(  ) the exchange rate was low 
(  ) the quality required was not reached 
(  ) Other reason,  which?___________________ 
 
5.8 How is relationship between you and your buyer? (Fill Y=yes or N=no)  
Type of arrangement Espec. 
client 
Neigh. Midd. Wholes. Coop. 
CONTRACT      
Percentage of the production you trade:      
Since when do you trade with      
Is the price fixed in the contract?      
Has the price minimum guarantee?      
Is the price consignated?      
Is the volume estipulated in the contract?      
Is the contract one harvest season?      
Is the quality estipulated?      
Does the buyer require certification?      
Have the clauses been met by the buyer?      
Is the client flexible when something 
unexpected happened? 
     
Did you have a cancelled contract?      
INFORMAL: ONLY  VERBAL       
Percentage of the production you trade:      
Since when do trade with this buyer      
Is the payment done immediately?       
Is the payment done in advance?      
Is the payment done is partially?      
Is the price determined by the buyer?      
Is the price determined by the final 
industry? 
     
Are you determining the price?      
Does the buyer buy any type of cashew 
nuts? 
     
Does the buyer buy any type of kernel?      
Is the buyer flexible in the negotiations?      
Does the buyer require that you have 
certification? 
     




 INFORMAL: TRUST-BASED      
Percentage of the production you trade:      
Since when do trade with       
Is the payment done immediately?       
Is the payment done in advance?      
Is the payment done is partially?      
Is the price determined by the buyer?      
Is the price determined by the final 
industry? 
     
Is the price determined by you?      
Does the buyer buy any type of cashew 
nuts? 
     
Does the buyer buy any type of kernel?      
Is the buyer flexible in the negotiations?      
Does the buyer require that you have 
certification? 
     
Did you experience a case of non-
payment? 
     
 
VI– Future expectation 
 
6.1 How many do you have expectation to remain in the same market? 
________ Years 
(  ) undetermined 
(  ) do not know 
 
6.2 Are you planning to export to other markets? 
(  ) no 
(  ) yes. Which ones?___________________ 
 
6.3 How many years to you expect to continue to produce cashew nuts? 
________ years 
(  ) undetermined 
(  ) do not know 
 
6.4 Which varieties of cashew nuts trees do you have currently? 
Variety dwarf giant Other 




Appendix 4: Case studies guide for melon farmers 
I – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FARM AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: 
1)  Provide some data regarding your farm. Production, area in hectares, type of melon, number of 
workers, type of irrigation system used, who runs the farms, gender and years of schooling: 
 2) Do you take loans from commercial banks to invest on the farm? Explain. 
II – INFORMATION COST: 
3) Since when and which type of certificates do you have? Why did you choose them? Do you 
intend to adopt others (which one and when)? 
4) How did you know about this specific scheme?  
5) How do you get updates? 
III – COSTS TO CERTIFY 
6) What was necessary to build and to reconstruct due to certification? Do you have any estimation 
of the amount invested? Do you investe in training courses for workers? Do you increase the area 
harvested? 
7) What is the annual cost of maintenance of the schemes? How many times a year is done the 
monitoring? Is this a national or international certifying company? 
IV – BENEFITS TO CERTIFY 
8) Did you receive a price premium due to certification? 
9) Does the volume exported increased due to certification?  
10) Did you have to hire more workers due to certification? 
11) Mention what you consider as advantages and disadvantages of having certification: 
12) Do you have any concern regarding environmental issues? What have been done with respect 
to preservation? 
V- MARKETING CHAIN 
13) Could you explain the trading process. What is the final destination of the fruit? 
14) How is the relationship between you and the other producers who deliver their production to 
you? (Explain if it is with contract, clauses, verbal, etc): 
15) Why did you choose to buy fruit from other farmers? 
16) How is the relationship between you and the final buyer? (Explain, it if is with contract, 
clauses, verbal, etc): 
17) Why did you choose for this specific buyer? Since when are you trading? 
VI – FUTURE EXPECTATIONS 
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18) What have been the main concerns of the buyers regarding certification? Do you expect any 
changes in rules, norms, and laws? 




Appendix 5: Comparison of GlobalGAP, PIF and Faitrade according to the similar requirements 
 GlobalGAP  PIF  Fairtrade 






















- - - - - - - - - -  Social development 8 9 17 
- - - - - - - - - - - Economic development 10 2 12 
- - - - - Producers organizations 1 1 0 0 2 - - -  
traceability/record keeping 
and internal self-inspection 4 1 0 5 
traceability and book-
keeping records 3 1 0 0 4 
Records on land, 
agrochemical, 
crop rotation 
1 0 1 
varieties and rootstocks/site 
history and site management 4 7 5 16 
propagative material/ 
implementation of the 
orchards 
6 5 1 1 13 - - - - 
soil and substract 
management 1 3 6 10 soil management 3 2 1 1 7 
Soil management 
and preservation 6 0 6 
Fertilizer  use 2 15 4 21 plant nutrition 1 1 1 1 4 - - - - 
irrigation 1 0 15 16 irrigation 1 1 1 0 3 - - - - 
crop protection 15 43 6 64 integrated crop protection and management 8 8 7 3 26 
Crop protection: 
agrochemicals 7 10 17 
harvesting/produce handling 18 15 7 40 harvest/post-harvest/packing process 15 15 6 5 41 - - - - 
environmental issues, waste, 
pollution management, 
recycling and re-use 
0 1 14 15 natural resources 1 2 1 0 4 Environmental issues 11 12 23 
worker health, safety and 
welfare 4 14 9 27 
 technical assistance, 
workers and training for 
producers 
4 6 1 0 11 Labor conditions 12 17 29 
Total 49 99 66 214  Total 43 42 19 11 115 Total 55 50 105 
Source: Own compilation based on EurepGAP checklist (2004), Normative N. 11 and 12 and FLO (2007) 
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Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics for the binary variable in the all fruits model, by sample 
and sub-sample categories 
Sample (n=388) Adopters (n=174) Non-adopters (n=214) 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Y (dep. Variable) 0.450 0.498     
Gender 0.891 0.311 0.885 0.319 0.897 0.304 
Education 7.579 4.559 8.517 4.809 6.817 4.204 
Type_irrigation 0.494 0.500 0.507 0.491 0.411 0.493 
Level_special 3.579 3.827 2.798 2.399 4.215 4.586 
Irrigated_area 0.791 0.320 0.794 0.336 0.772 0.308 
Non_agric_inc 0.278 0.448 0.172 0.378 0.364 0.482 
Living_village 0.400 0.491 0.390 0.488 0.420 0.495 
Year_experience 6.201 4.275 6.787 4.514 5.724 4.019 
Trust_relat 0.750 0.433 0.718 0.451 0.775 0.418 
Source: Own compilation 
Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics for the binary variable in mango and grapes models, by 
sample and sub-sample categories 
Sample (n=303) Adopters (n=148) Non-adopters (n=156) 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Y (dep. Variable) 0.490 0.501     
Mango 0.739 0.439 0.662 0.474 0.814 0.390 
Grapes 0.313 0.464 0.391 0.489 0.237 0.426 
Gender 0.891 0.312 0.891 0.311 0.891 0.312 
Education 8.554 4.434 9.297 4.561 7.865 4.196 
Manager 0.210 0.409 0.220 0.418 0.200 0.400 
Size 0.690 0.463 0.600 0.491 0.780 0.419 
Non_agri_income 0.184 0.038 0.121 0.327 0.243 0.430 
Years_exper 7.217 3.912 7.756 3.904 6.679 3.862 
Type_irrigation 0.633 0.482 0.702 0.458 0.570 0.496 
Irrigated_area 0.757 0.247 0.745 0.246 0.769 0.247 
Trust_relat 0.772 0.420 0.709 0.455 0.826 0.379 
Source: Own calculations 
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Appendix 8: Descriptive statistics for the binary variable in cashew nuts model by sample 
and sub-sample categories 
Sample (n=85) Adopters (n=25) Non-adopters (n=60) 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Y (dep. Variable) 0.290 0.458     
Gender 0.890 0.310 0.840 0.374 0.920 0.279 
Education 0.210 0.411 0.400 0.500 0.130 0.343 
Family_HH 3.552 1.769 4.200 1.658 3.288 1.757 
Variety 0.541 0.501 0.520 0.509 0.550 0.501 
Non_agri_income 0.611 0.490 0.440 0.506 0.683 0.469 
Level_special 6.788 5.473 2.800 2.692 8.450 5.490 
Share_current_area 0.868 0.495 1.080 0.587 0.779 0.426 
Years_trad_ind 3.047 4.317 2.480 6.028 3.283 3.400 








Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        388 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      48.11 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -242.82268                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0901 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 type_produc | Coef.   Std. Err.   z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_hat         1.022345  .18728     5.46   0.000     .6552829    1.389407 
_hatsq      .0356036   .1547698   0.23   0.818    -.2677397    .3389468 





Logistic model for type_produc, goodness-of-fit test 
 
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities) 
 
       number of observations =       388 
             number of groups =         9 
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(7) =         6.64 




Logistic model for type_produc 
 
number of observations =      388 




               | type_p~c   gender educat~n trust_~t type_i~n level_~i irriga~a 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 type_produc   |   1.0000  
      gender   |  -0.0194   1.0000  
   education   |   0.1856* -0.0376   1.0000  
 trust_relat   |  -0.0658  -0.0479   0.0670   1.0000  
type_irrig~n   |   0.1855* -0.0202   0.3517*  0.1905*  1.0000  
level_spec~i   |  -0.1843*  0.0268  -0.1689* -0.1086  -0.1502   1.0000  
irrigated_~a   |   0.0341   0.0052  -0.0814  -0.1656* -0.0832   0.0335   1.0000  
non_agric_~e   |  -0.2131*  0.0313  -0.0753  -0.0266  -0.2351*  0.3075*  0.0428  
  rural_area   |  -0.0360  -0.0001   0.1672*  0.0030  -0.1123  -0.2666* -0.0750  
years_expe~e   |   0.1238   0.0339   0.2423* -0.0230   0.2347* -0.2500* -0.0391  
 
               | non_ag~e rural_~a years_~e 
---------------------------------------- 
non_agric_~e   |   1.0000  
  rural_area   |  -0.1254   1.0000  
years_expe~e   |  -0.1976*  0.1973*  1.0000  
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Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        303 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      50.18 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -184.85432                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1195 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
type_produ~r | Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_hat            1.004751   .1636595    6.14   0.000     .6839843    1.325518 
_hatsq        -.1029156   .1145981    -0.90   0.369    -.3275238    .1216926 





Logistic model for type_producer, goodness-of-fit test 
 
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities) 
 
       number of observations =       303 
             number of groups =        10 
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =         6.59 




               | type_p~r   grapes   gender educat~n  manager     size non_ag~e 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
type_produ~r   |   1.0000  
grapes         |   0.1650   1.0000  
gender         |   0.0025  -0.0834   1.0000  
education      |   0.1640  -0.0172  -0.0232   1.0000  
manager        |   0.0281   0.2080* -0.2084*  0.0703   1.0000  
size           |  -0.1868  -0.2080* -0.0512  -0.0417   0.0499   1.0000  
non_agric_~e   |  -0.1591   0.0448   0.0300   0.1267   0.0661   0.1355   1.0000  
years_expe~e   |   0.1348  -0.1925*  0.0683   0.0711   0.0291  -0.0594  -0.0461  
type_irrig~n   |   0.1400   0.3514* -0.0239   0.1912*  0.1921* -0.4063* -0.0439  
irrigated_~a   |  -0.0477  -0.0744  -0.0206  -0.0986   0.0853   0.0349  -0.0425  
 trust_relat   |  -0.1464  -0.0401  -0.0383   0.0236   0.1460  -0.0920   0.0761  
 
                       | years_~e type_i~n irriga~a trust_~t 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
years_expe~e   |   1.0000  
type_irrig~n   |  -0.0014   1.0000  
irrigated_~a   |   0.0730  -0.0146   1.0000  






Appendix 11: Logistic regression results for the mango model 
Linktest 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -209.94273 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -185.45862 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -184.76226 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -184.75858 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -184.75858 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        303 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      50.37 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -184.75858                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
type_produ~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_hat             .9990823   .1611267     6.20   0.000     .6832798    1.314885 
_hatsq          -.0321152    .126077    -0.25   0.799    -.2792217    .2149912 





Logistic model for type_producer, goodness-of-fit test 
 
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities) 
 
       number of observations =       303 
             number of groups =        10 
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =         5.72 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.6785 
ROC curve 
 
Logistic model for type_producer 
number of observations =      303 





             | type_p~r    mango   gender educat~n  manager     size non_ag~e 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
type_produ~r |   1.0000  
mango        |  -0.1716   1.0000  
gender       |   0.0025   0.0819   1.0000  
education    |   0.1640   0.0591  -0.0232   1.0000  
manager      |   0.0281  -0.2268* -0.2084*  0.0703   1.0000  
size         |  -0.1868   0.2030* -0.0512  -0.0417   0.0499   1.0000  
non_agric_~e |  -0.1591   0.0310   0.0300   0.1267   0.0661   0.1355   1.0000  
years_expe~e |   0.1348   0.2217*  0.0683   0.0711   0.0291  -0.0594  -0.0461  
type_irrig~n |   0.1400  -0.3267* -0.0239   0.1912*  0.1921* -0.4063* -0.0439  
irrigated_~a |  -0.0477   0.0606  -0.0206  -0.0986   0.0853   0.0349  -0.0425  
 trust_relat |  -0.1464   0.0181  -0.0383   0.0236   0.1460  -0.0920   0.0761  
 
             | years_~e type_i~n irriga~a trust_~t 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
years_expe~e |   1.0000  
type_irrig~n |  -0.0014   1.0000  
irrigated_~a |   0.0730  -0.0146   1.0000  




Appendix 12: Logistic regression results for the cashew nuts model 
Linktest 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =         85 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      24.62 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -38.833364                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2407 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   type_prod       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        _hat       1.062045   .3652957     2.91   0.004      .346078    1.778011 
      _hatsq       .0399968   .1696437     0.24   0.814    -.2924987    .3724923 





Logistic model for type_prod, goodness-of-fit test 
 
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities) 
 
       number of observations =        84 
             number of groups =         8 
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(6) =         2.39 




Logistic model for type_prod 
 
number of observations =       85 




             | type_p~d   gender educat~n family~H non_ag~e number~x share_~a 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
type_prod    |   1.0000  
gender       |  -0.1135   1.0000  
education    |   0.2974* -0.1024   1.0000  
family_HH    |   0.2374   0.0430   0.0008   1.0000  
non_agric_~e |   0.2570   0.1942  -0.0007   0.0119   1.0000  
number_cro~x |   0.1416  -0.0374   0.0890  -0.0897   0.1465   1.0000  
share_curr~a |  -0.0487   0.0536  -0.1244   0.1354   0.0241  -0.0314   1.0000  
years_trad~d |  -0.0853  -0.0319  -0.0795   0.0464   0.0732   0.1632   0.1287  
variety_anao |  -0.1883   0.1952  -0.0637  -0.2913*  0.0731   0.0438  -0.0543  
 
              | years_~d variet~o 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
years_trad~d  |   1.0000  
variety_anao  |  -0.1701   1.0000  
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Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        148 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      67.83 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -31.685119                       Pseudo R2       =     0.5170 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
one_certific |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   1.142728   .2672105     4.28   0.000     .6190056    1.666451 
      _hatsq |  -.0490151   .0409989    -1.20   0.232    -.1293715    .0313413 





Logistic model for two_certific 
 
number of observations =      148 




Logistic model for one_certific, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       148 
 number of covariate patterns =       148 
            Pearson chi2(136) =       102.63 






             | one_ce~c      age educat~n  manager living~y ha_mango  
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
one_certific |   1.0000  
         age |  -0.0575   1.0000  
   education |   0.0772   0.0581   1.0000  
     manager |   0.1036  -0.4765   0.0828   1.0000  
 living_city |   0.1461   0.0973  -0.0083   0.0053   1.0000  
    ha_mango |  -0.0721  -0.1506   0.2644   0.0497   0.1973   1.0000  
total_labor  |  -0.1330  -0.1762   0.2370   0.0635   0.1369   0.5329   
type_irrig~n |  -0.0054   0.0282   0.2474   0.1709   0.4385   0.1398   
 sub_packing |  -0.4354   0.1613  -0.3235  -0.1640  -0.0098   0.1797   
     trans_M |   0.0974   0.0750   0.0007  -0.2018  -0.2680  -0.0241   
  year_buyer |   0.2191  -0.2591   0.2031   0.1359  -0.1863   0.3323   
 
             | total_~r type_i~n sub_pa~g  trans_M year_b~r 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
 total_labor |   1.0000  
type_irrig~n |   0.1206   1.0000  
 sub_packing |   0.1701  -0.0229   1.0000  
     trans_M |  -0.1157  -0.3707  -0.0644   1.0000  









Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        148 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      47.91 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -41.643448                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3652 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
one_certific |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .9534115   .3066844     3.11   0.002     .3523211    1.554502 
      _hatsq |   .0198993   .1049785     0.19   0.850    -.1858547    .2256533 





Logistic model for two_certific 
 
number of observations =      148 




Logistic model for one_certific, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       148 
 number of covariate patterns =       148 
            Pearson chi2(136) =       142.15 





             | one_ce~c      age educat~n  manager living~y ha_gra~s  
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
one_certific |   1.0000  
         age |  -0.0575   1.0000  
   education |   0.0772   0.0581   1.0000  
     manager |   0.1036  -0.4765   0.0828   1.0000  
 living_city |   0.1461   0.0973  -0.0083   0.0053   1.0000  
   ha_grapes |  -0.0192  -0.0462   0.0927   0.0936   0.3699   1.0000  
total_labor  |  -0.1330  -0.1762   0.2370   0.0635   0.1369   0.6291    
type_irrig~n |  -0.0054   0.0282   0.2474   0.1709   0.4385   0.3479   
 sub_packing |  -0.4354   0.1613  -0.3235  -0.1640  -0.0098   0.0890   
     trans_G |   0.1318  -0.0514   0.0204   0.1838   0.2525   0.6467    
  year_buyer |   0.2191  -0.2591   0.2031   0.1359  -0.1863   0.0311   
 
             | total_~r type_i~n sub_pa~g  trans_G year_b~r 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
 total_labor |   1.0000  
type_irrig~n |   0.1206   1.0000  
 sub_packing |   0.1701  -0.0229   1.0000  
     trans_G |   0.0375   0.3239  -0.1269   1.0000  










Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        252 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      54.85 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -140.51116                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1633 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
adopting_PIF |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .9220435   .1843424     5.00   0.000     .5607391    1.283348 
      _hatsq |  -.0995823   .1365982    -0.73   0.466    -.3673099    .1681453 





Logistic model for adopting_PIF 
 
number of observations =      252 




Logistic model for adopting_PIF, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       252 
 number of covariate patterns =       252 
            Pearson chi2(240) =       244.98 




             | adopti~F      age educat~n living~y experi~M bank_a~s member~a 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
adopting_PIF |   1.0000  
         age |  -0.1252   1.0000  
   education |   0.2473   0.1302   1.0000  
 living_city |   0.1354   0.0094   0.0331   1.0000  
experience_M |   0.0089   0.1389  -0.0182  -0.0584   1.0000  
 bank_access |   0.0608  -0.1087  -0.1668  -0.2454   0.1808   1.0000  
member_ass~a |   0.0359   0.0361  -0.0455  -0.0813  -0.0945   0.0568   1.0000  
 total_labor |   0.0168  -0.1304   0.1071   0.1627  -0.0215   0.0435  -0.0705  
type_irrig~n |   0.0605  -0.1156   0.2183   0.4468  -0.2303  -0.2749  -0.1329  
non_agric_~e |  -0.1482   0.0285   0.0686  -0.1216  -0.0816   0.0774   0.0768  
harvest_pa~M |  -0.1662   0.2394   0.0726   0.0073   0.4822  -0.1122  -0.3194  
 trading_ind |  -0.0608   0.0054   0.0918   0.0467  -0.0103  -0.1604   0.0195  
 
             | total_~r type_i~n non_ag~e harv~t_M tradin~d 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
 total_labor |   1.0000  
type_irrig~n |   0.2018   1.0000  
non_agric_~e |  -0.0639  -0.0519   1.0000  
harvest_pa~M |  -0.0543  -0.0570  -0.1112   1.0000  







Appendix 16: Logistic regression results on the decision of grapes farmers to adopt PIF  
Linktest 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        252 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      55.74 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -140.0658                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1660 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
adopting_PIF |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .8619462   .1678454     5.14   0.000     .5329753    1.190917 
      _hatsq |  -.2370001   .1298717    -1.82   0.768    -.4915438    .0175437 





Logistic model for adopting_PIF, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       252 
 number of covariate patterns =       250 
            Pearson chi2(238) =       253.16 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.2386 
 
ROC curve  
 
Logistic model for adopting_PIF 
 
number of observations =      252 




             | adopti~F      age educat~n living~y experi~G bank_a~s member~a 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
adopting_PIF |   1.0000  
         age |  -0.1252   1.0000  
   education |   0.2473   0.1302   1.0000  
 living_city |   0.1354   0.0094   0.0331   1.0000  
experience_G |   0.0969  -0.2064   0.0538   0.0983   1.0000  
 bank_access |   0.0608  -0.1087  -0.1668  -0.2454   0.0096   1.0000  
member_ass~a |   0.0359   0.0361  -0.0455  -0.0813   0.0837   0.0568   1.0000  
 total_labor |   0.0168  -0.1304   0.1071   0.1627   0.5000   0.0435  -0.0705  
type_irrig~n |   0.0605  -0.1156   0.2183   0.4468   0.2429  -0.2749  -0.1329  
non_agric_~e |  -0.1482   0.0285   0.0686  -0.1216   0.0234   0.0774   0.0768  
harvesting~G |   0.1831  -0.1770   0.0649   0.1427   0.7139  -0.1550   0.1039  
 trading_ind |  -0.0608   0.0054   0.0918   0.0467  -0.1896  -0.1604   0.0195  
 
             | total_~r type_i~n non_ag~e harves~G tradin~d 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
 total_labor |   1.0000  
type_irrig~n |   0.2018   1.0000  
non_agric_~e |  -0.0639  -0.0519   1.0000  
harvesting~G |   0.2515   0.2768  -0.0173   1.0000  
 trading_ind |  -0.2279  -0.0393   0.0540  -0.1031   1.0000  
 
 
